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Attributes | |
ACN | 716797 |
Time | |
Date | 200611 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zma.artcc |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl single value : 19000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zma.artcc tower : sat.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zma.artcc |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude cruise : level |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar controller : non radar |
Experience | controller non radar : 18 controller radar : 17 controller time certified in position1 : 17 |
ASRS Report | 716797 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 18000 vertical : 500 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airspace Structure ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
I was working a sector where there was an active military MOA. The departures from orlando approach airspace were on headings that aimed them right at the active MOA. I was given 2 departures side by side out the departure transition area that I needed to climb above orlando approach's airspace so that I could turn them to keep them clear of the active MOA. I climbed the astrojet to FL190. When the astrojet was out of FL180 I turned him to a heading to keep the aircraft clear of the active MOA and I climbed the boeing to 17000 ft. When the boeing was at 17000 ft; I turned him to keep the aircraft clear of the active MOA. When the astrojet was at FL190; I thought I climbed the boeing to FL180 below the astrojet. I put FL180 into the boeing's data block. As I began to issue the traffic to the boeing; I saw him climb through FL180 and I reclred him to maintain FL180. He said that he had been assigned FL190; but was descending back down to FL180. When lateral separation had been established between the boeing and the astrojet; I climbed the boeing to FL230 and handed him off to the next sector. Upon listening to the tapes; I found that I had climbed the boeing to FL190; not the FL180 that I had intended and had put into the data block. The aircraft were 3 mi and 500 ft apart. The procedure for aiming departures at an active military MOA are standard for this sector. On several occasions over the previous weeks; I had expressed my concerns regarding this unsafe procedure. I even offered several suggestions for implementing safe procedures that would keep the departures away from the MOA. I do not know of anywhere else in the country where aircraft are aimed at an active MOA and the controller is then given a very limited amount of time and distance to turn the aircraft out of harm's way.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZMA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL190; WHEN VECTORING TO AVOID MOA; AN INCORRECT ALT WAS ISSUED CONFLICTING WITH ANOTHER ACFT.
Narrative: I WAS WORKING A SECTOR WHERE THERE WAS AN ACTIVE MIL MOA. THE DEPS FROM ORLANDO APCH AIRSPACE WERE ON HDGS THAT AIMED THEM RIGHT AT THE ACTIVE MOA. I WAS GIVEN 2 DEPS SIDE BY SIDE OUT THE DEP TRANSITION AREA THAT I NEEDED TO CLB ABOVE ORLANDO APCH'S AIRSPACE SO THAT I COULD TURN THEM TO KEEP THEM CLR OF THE ACTIVE MOA. I CLBED THE ASTROJET TO FL190. WHEN THE ASTROJET WAS OUT OF FL180 I TURNED HIM TO A HDG TO KEEP THE ACFT CLR OF THE ACTIVE MOA AND I CLBED THE BOEING TO 17000 FT. WHEN THE BOEING WAS AT 17000 FT; I TURNED HIM TO KEEP THE ACFT CLR OF THE ACTIVE MOA. WHEN THE ASTROJET WAS AT FL190; I THOUGHT I CLBED THE BOEING TO FL180 BELOW THE ASTROJET. I PUT FL180 INTO THE BOEING'S DATA BLOCK. AS I BEGAN TO ISSUE THE TFC TO THE BOEING; I SAW HIM CLB THROUGH FL180 AND I RECLRED HIM TO MAINTAIN FL180. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED FL190; BUT WAS DSNDING BACK DOWN TO FL180. WHEN LATERAL SEPARATION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BTWN THE BOEING AND THE ASTROJET; I CLBED THE BOEING TO FL230 AND HANDED HIM OFF TO THE NEXT SECTOR. UPON LISTENING TO THE TAPES; I FOUND THAT I HAD CLBED THE BOEING TO FL190; NOT THE FL180 THAT I HAD INTENDED AND HAD PUT INTO THE DATA BLOCK. THE ACFT WERE 3 MI AND 500 FT APART. THE PROC FOR AIMING DEPS AT AN ACTIVE MIL MOA ARE STANDARD FOR THIS SECTOR. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OVER THE PREVIOUS WKS; I HAD EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS REGARDING THIS UNSAFE PROC. I EVEN OFFERED SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING SAFE PROCS THAT WOULD KEEP THE DEPS AWAY FROM THE MOA. I DO NOT KNOW OF ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE COUNTRY WHERE ACFT ARE AIMED AT AN ACTIVE MOA AND THE CTLR IS THEN GIVEN A VERY LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME AND DISTANCE TO TURN THE ACFT OUT OF HARM'S WAY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.