Narrative:

Uneventful landing at mht runway 17. Exited at east taxiway and taxied north on a taxiway. Tower had directed us to 'exit east and taxi to the gate.' PNF went off frequency to get gate assignment when we were between D and east txwys. Unlike what is depicted on the 10-9 page; this area is solid concrete. This area was illuminated by two or more large; very bright flood lights. This made it difficult to see. The entire area (taxiway a and the ramp) appeared to be one large concrete area. This was unexpected since I had studied the 10-9 and 10-7 pages prior to landing. The 10-9 depicts this area as unpaved/undeveloped; not as a large concrete parking area. I took the straight route from between D and east txwys while on a and went across the concrete parking pad. While on this route; I noticed a dip in the concrete and proceeded with great caution. Before we arrived at the gate; tower asked us to call them on 122.75. He informed us that the parking ramp was not for taxi but was another carrier parking area. He also informed us that many aircraft had done the same thing. We apologized. After parking; a ramper came to the cockpit and said the same thing and that 'everyone has been doing it.' several factors contributed to this event. First; the 10-9 page does not depict what is actually on the ground at mht. There were no warnings from tower or in commercial chart; the area is poorly marked; there are flood lights that interfere with visibility from the cockpit and making it hard to see taxiway lights. My first officer (PNF) was off frequency and thus was not helping monitor the taxi so that crew coordination broke down. Tower gave us unclear; or at least insufficiently directive; taxi instructions; even though he was not busy. Finally; fatigue played a major factor. I had six days of flying; one day off; and four more days of flying. On this day; we had already done an approach at bwi to 1000 RVR and an approach at another city in heavy rain and two mile visibility. We then flew to mht. When in doubt; stop the aircraft and coordinate with ATC and the other pilot. Keep crew coordination optimized at all times and in all phases of operations. Also; the 10-9 and 10-7 pages need to reflect the current status of mht airfield; with associated cautions. Supplemental information from acn 720921: after landing on runway 17 at mht; we were cleared to taxi to the gate by tower. We exited the runway at echo and proceeded north on alpha. I assumed that the captain would be turning left on delta in order to taxi to our gate so I began accomplishing my after landing flow. As I felt the aircraft turn towards the left I redirected my attention outside since it seemed to me that we had reached delta very quickly. It was then that I noticed that we were now taxiing on to a paved parking ramp and were heading for a large gap in between two parked aircraft. I asked the captain where we were going and he replied that he felt we could fit in between the two aircraft up ahead. I looked around; assessed the situation; and although this was somewhat irregular; it didn't seem unsafe for us to continue. As we approached golf; I noticed a shallow gulley running the length of the parking area so I advised the captain of it. He slowed his taxi speed and we passed through it with no problems; turned north on to golf and proceeded to the gate. Tower noticed all of this and asked us to call them. Afterwards; tower explained to the captain that the parking ramp we used is not considered to be an authorized taxiway and to please not use it in the future. During my walk-around; one of the ground personnel advised me of the same thing; saying that one of our crews once 'bottomed out' crossing that gulley just east of golf. Whether this is true or not; I'm not really sure. First; we should have stuck to the txwys. Never deviate from authorized routes and on to open ramps; especially at night. Second; if the captain plans on doing something this non-standard; captain should tell the first officer before attempting it. The other pilot may see a hazard that the captain does not. Third (and I'm guilty of this); first officer's should try their best to not become too focused on completing their after landing flows. Fourth; I'd recommend putting a note on the 10-7 page for mht to prevent other crews from making this same mistake.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 FLT CREW TAXIING IN TO RAMP AT MHT CLAIMS THE COMMERCIAL ARPT CHART DEPICTION OF PAVED RAMP AREAS IS INACCURATE.

Narrative: UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT MHT RWY 17. EXITED AT E TXWY AND TAXIED NORTH ON A TXWY. TWR HAD DIRECTED US TO 'EXIT E AND TAXI TO THE GATE.' PNF WENT OFF FREQ TO GET GATE ASSIGNMENT WHEN WE WERE BETWEEN D AND E TXWYS. UNLIKE WHAT IS DEPICTED ON THE 10-9 PAGE; THIS AREA IS SOLID CONCRETE. THIS AREA WAS ILLUMINATED BY TWO OR MORE LARGE; VERY BRIGHT FLOOD LIGHTS. THIS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE. THE ENTIRE AREA (TXWY A AND THE RAMP) APPEARED TO BE ONE LARGE CONCRETE AREA. THIS WAS UNEXPECTED SINCE I HAD STUDIED THE 10-9 AND 10-7 PAGES PRIOR TO LNDG. THE 10-9 DEPICTS THIS AREA AS UNPAVED/UNDEVELOPED; NOT AS A LARGE CONCRETE PARKING AREA. I TOOK THE STRAIGHT ROUTE FROM BETWEEN D AND E TXWYS WHILE ON A AND WENT ACROSS THE CONCRETE PARKING PAD. WHILE ON THIS ROUTE; I NOTICED A DIP IN THE CONCRETE AND PROCEEDED WITH GREAT CAUTION. BEFORE WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE; TWR ASKED US TO CALL THEM ON 122.75. HE INFORMED US THAT THE PARKING RAMP WAS NOT FOR TAXI BUT WAS ANOTHER CARRIER PARKING AREA. HE ALSO INFORMED US THAT MANY ACFT HAD DONE THE SAME THING. WE APOLOGIZED. AFTER PARKING; A RAMPER CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND SAID THE SAME THING AND THAT 'EVERYONE HAS BEEN DOING IT.' SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. FIRST; THE 10-9 PAGE DOES NOT DEPICT WHAT IS ACTUALLY ON THE GROUND AT MHT. THERE WERE NO WARNINGS FROM TWR OR IN COMMERCIAL CHART; THE AREA IS POORLY MARKED; THERE ARE FLOOD LIGHTS THAT INTERFERE WITH VISIBILITY FROM THE COCKPIT AND MAKING IT HARD TO SEE TXWY LIGHTS. MY FO (PNF) WAS OFF FREQ AND THUS WAS NOT HELPING MONITOR THE TAXI SO THAT CREW COORDINATION BROKE DOWN. TWR GAVE US UNCLEAR; OR AT LEAST INSUFFICIENTLY DIRECTIVE; TAXI INSTRUCTIONS; EVEN THOUGH HE WAS NOT BUSY. FINALLY; FATIGUE PLAYED A MAJOR FACTOR. I HAD SIX DAYS OF FLYING; ONE DAY OFF; AND FOUR MORE DAYS OF FLYING. ON THIS DAY; WE HAD ALREADY DONE AN APCH AT BWI TO 1000 RVR AND AN APCH AT ANOTHER CITY IN HEAVY RAIN AND TWO MILE VISIBILITY. WE THEN FLEW TO MHT. WHEN IN DOUBT; STOP THE ACFT AND COORDINATE WITH ATC AND THE OTHER PLT. KEEP CREW COORDINATION OPTIMIZED AT ALL TIMES AND IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATIONS. ALSO; THE 10-9 AND 10-7 PAGES NEED TO REFLECT THE CURRENT STATUS OF MHT AIRFIELD; WITH ASSOCIATED CAUTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 720921: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 17 AT MHT; WE WERE CLEARED TO TAXI TO THE GATE BY TWR. WE EXITED THE RWY AT ECHO AND PROCEEDED NORTH ON ALPHA. I ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT WOULD BE TURNING LEFT ON DELTA IN ORDER TO TAXI TO OUR GATE SO I BEGAN ACCOMPLISHING MY AFTER LNDG FLOW. AS I FELT THE ACFT TURN TOWARDS THE LEFT I REDIRECTED MY ATTENTION OUTSIDE SINCE IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WE HAD REACHED DELTA VERY QUICKLY. IT WAS THEN THAT I NOTICED THAT WE WERE NOW TAXIING ON TO A PAVED PARKING RAMP AND WERE HEADING FOR A LARGE GAP IN BETWEEN TWO PARKED ACFT. I ASKED THE CAPT WHERE WE WERE GOING AND HE REPLIED THAT HE FELT WE COULD FIT IN BETWEEN THE TWO ACFT UP AHEAD. I LOOKED AROUND; ASSESSED THE SITUATION; AND ALTHOUGH THIS WAS SOMEWHAT IRREGULAR; IT DIDN'T SEEM UNSAFE FOR US TO CONTINUE. AS WE APPROACHED GOLF; I NOTICED A SHALLOW GULLEY RUNNING THE LENGTH OF THE PARKING AREA SO I ADVISED THE CAPT OF IT. HE SLOWED HIS TAXI SPEED AND WE PASSED THROUGH IT WITH NO PROBLEMS; TURNED NORTH ON TO GOLF AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. TWR NOTICED ALL OF THIS AND ASKED US TO CALL THEM. AFTERWARDS; TWR EXPLAINED TO THE CAPT THAT THE PARKING RAMP WE USED IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE AN AUTHORIZED TXWY AND TO PLEASE NOT USE IT IN THE FUTURE. DURING MY WALK-AROUND; ONE OF THE GROUND PERSONNEL ADVISED ME OF THE SAME THING; SAYING THAT ONE OF OUR CREWS ONCE 'BOTTOMED OUT' CROSSING THAT GULLEY JUST EAST OF GOLF. WHETHER THIS IS TRUE OR NOT; I'M NOT REALLY SURE. FIRST; WE SHOULD HAVE STUCK TO THE TXWYS. NEVER DEVIATE FROM AUTHORIZED ROUTES AND ON TO OPEN RAMPS; ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. SECOND; IF THE CAPT PLANS ON DOING SOMETHING THIS NON-STANDARD; CAPT SHOULD TELL THE FO BEFORE ATTEMPTING IT. THE OTHER PLT MAY SEE A HAZARD THAT THE CAPT DOES NOT. THIRD (AND I'M GUILTY OF THIS); FO'S SHOULD TRY THEIR BEST TO NOT BECOME TOO FOCUSED ON COMPLETING THEIR AFTER LNDG FLOWS. FOURTH; I'D RECOMMEND PUTTING A NOTE ON THE 10-7 PAGE FOR MHT TO PREVENT OTHER CREWS FROM MAKING THIS SAME MISTAKE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.