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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 721087 |
Time | |
Date | 200612 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : d10.tracon |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | msl single value : 3500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : d10.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure sid : hurb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : instructor oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 140 flight time total : 891 flight time type : 697 |
ASRS Report | 721087 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | instruction : trainee |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : excursion from assigned altitude non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert flight crew : returned to assigned altitude |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
The flight was an IFR training flight; on an active IFR flight plan; with a pretty new IFR student; the purpose was to get him used to using radio navigation and immerse him in a real IFR environment. We were on vectors; and to intercept the hubbard 5 departure paris transition (HUBB5.prx) out of ads. I was handling the radios; GPS; VOR receivers and obs dials as well as the role of safety pilot/instructor. I had my student flying the plane under the hood; and taking radio calls when able. We were told to climb to 3000 ft MSL from 1500 ft MSL. I read back the climb instructions and then confirmed them with my student. I have spent quite a bit of time with the student in both the classroom and the simulator. Climbing to an altitude and holding it had never been a training issue with the student. As we neared 3000 ft; I looked at my terminal procedures chart to double-check I had everything set in the navigation instruments to resume our own navigation on the departure. I was expecting my student to simply capture the altitude with pitch; allow the airspeed to build up to cruise and reduce power to cruise settings. Approximately 45 seconds later; ATC asked me to confirm the altitude that I had been assigned and the altitude I was at. I looked up from the terminal procedures chart and over at the altimeter and noticed that we were at 3400 ft MSL and climbing at approximately 600 FPM. I immediately reduced the power to idle and pitched the aircraft down toward the ground to begin an immediate descent. I told ATC that I was assigned 3000 ft; was at 3400 ft; and was immediately correcting it. I then reported that we were level at 3000 ft and apologized for the deviation in altitude. I asked my student what happened. He told me he heard me and ATC tell him 3000 ft; after thinking about a few mins he thought it should be 3500 ft because he was used to adding the 500 ft to his altitudes from his VFR flying. He told me he did know that IFR altitudes were straight thousands without the extra 500 ft; and that he was sorry for getting me into trouble. I told him it was not his fault; it was mine for not paying close enough attention to him. A major contributing factor to this incident was my fatigue. On the previous day; I began my work day at XA00 am and continued throughout the day. I then logged 5.1 hours of night IMC cross country flying on a flight in which I landed back at ads at XR00 am. I left ads at XS00 am; got home at XS30 am; fell asleep around XT30 am; and then got up at XW00 am; and was back at ads at XX30 am. My lack of supervision of my student during a critical phase of flight and my fatigue caused this incident. I teach the imsafe checklist but did not follow it myself. During the 15 yrs prior to becoming a flight instructor; I got used to being tired all of the time and still being able to do my job extremely well. It caused me to develop a bit of an invincible attitude and caused me to underestimate the effects of fatigue on my awareness and judgement. Another factor in this incident was my student's failure to adhere to both ATC and CFI instructions. The student is a private sel pilot with over 150 hours of flight time under his belt. I was lured into a bit of complacency by his flight time; good performance in the simulator; and his excellent understanding in the classroom as I have been teaching him his ground instruction. Never again!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C172 INSTRUCTOR PLT RPTS ALTDEV BY HIS STUDENT.
Narrative: THE FLT WAS AN IFR TRAINING FLT; ON AN ACTIVE IFR FLT PLAN; WITH A PRETTY NEW IFR STUDENT; THE PURPOSE WAS TO GET HIM USED TO USING RADIO NAV AND IMMERSE HIM IN A REAL IFR ENVIRONMENT. WE WERE ON VECTORS; AND TO INTERCEPT THE HUBBARD 5 DEP PARIS TRANSITION (HUBB5.PRX) OUT OF ADS. I WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS; GPS; VOR RECEIVERS AND OBS DIALS AS WELL AS THE ROLE OF SAFETY PLT/INSTRUCTOR. I HAD MY STUDENT FLYING THE PLANE UNDER THE HOOD; AND TAKING RADIO CALLS WHEN ABLE. WE WERE TOLD TO CLB TO 3000 FT MSL FROM 1500 FT MSL. I READ BACK THE CLB INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN CONFIRMED THEM WITH MY STUDENT. I HAVE SPENT QUITE A BIT OF TIME WITH THE STUDENT IN BOTH THE CLASSROOM AND THE SIMULATOR. CLBING TO AN ALT AND HOLDING IT HAD NEVER BEEN A TRAINING ISSUE WITH THE STUDENT. AS WE NEARED 3000 FT; I LOOKED AT MY TERMINAL PROCS CHART TO DOUBLE-CHK I HAD EVERYTHING SET IN THE NAV INSTS TO RESUME OUR OWN NAV ON THE DEP. I WAS EXPECTING MY STUDENT TO SIMPLY CAPTURE THE ALT WITH PITCH; ALLOW THE AIRSPD TO BUILD UP TO CRUISE AND REDUCE PWR TO CRUISE SETTINGS. APPROX 45 SECONDS LATER; ATC ASKED ME TO CONFIRM THE ALT THAT I HAD BEEN ASSIGNED AND THE ALT I WAS AT. I LOOKED UP FROM THE TERMINAL PROCS CHART AND OVER AT THE ALTIMETER AND NOTICED THAT WE WERE AT 3400 FT MSL AND CLBING AT APPROX 600 FPM. I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED THE PWR TO IDLE AND PITCHED THE ACFT DOWN TOWARD THE GND TO BEGIN AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. I TOLD ATC THAT I WAS ASSIGNED 3000 FT; WAS AT 3400 FT; AND WAS IMMEDIATELY CORRECTING IT. I THEN RPTED THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT 3000 FT AND APOLOGIZED FOR THE DEV IN ALT. I ASKED MY STUDENT WHAT HAPPENED. HE TOLD ME HE HEARD ME AND ATC TELL HIM 3000 FT; AFTER THINKING ABOUT A FEW MINS HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE 3500 FT BECAUSE HE WAS USED TO ADDING THE 500 FT TO HIS ALTS FROM HIS VFR FLYING. HE TOLD ME HE DID KNOW THAT IFR ALTS WERE STRAIGHT THOUSANDS WITHOUT THE EXTRA 500 FT; AND THAT HE WAS SORRY FOR GETTING ME INTO TROUBLE. I TOLD HIM IT WAS NOT HIS FAULT; IT WAS MINE FOR NOT PAYING CLOSE ENOUGH ATTN TO HIM. A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS INCIDENT WAS MY FATIGUE. ON THE PREVIOUS DAY; I BEGAN MY WORK DAY AT XA00 AM AND CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE DAY. I THEN LOGGED 5.1 HRS OF NIGHT IMC XCOUNTRY FLYING ON A FLT IN WHICH I LANDED BACK AT ADS AT XR00 AM. I LEFT ADS AT XS00 AM; GOT HOME AT XS30 AM; FELL ASLEEP AROUND XT30 AM; AND THEN GOT UP AT XW00 AM; AND WAS BACK AT ADS AT XX30 AM. MY LACK OF SUPERVISION OF MY STUDENT DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND MY FATIGUE CAUSED THIS INCIDENT. I TEACH THE IMSAFE CHKLIST BUT DID NOT FOLLOW IT MYSELF. DURING THE 15 YRS PRIOR TO BECOMING A FLT INSTRUCTOR; I GOT USED TO BEING TIRED ALL OF THE TIME AND STILL BEING ABLE TO DO MY JOB EXTREMELY WELL. IT CAUSED ME TO DEVELOP A BIT OF AN INVINCIBLE ATTITUDE AND CAUSED ME TO UNDERESTIMATE THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE ON MY AWARENESS AND JUDGEMENT. ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS MY STUDENT'S FAILURE TO ADHERE TO BOTH ATC AND CFI INSTRUCTIONS. THE STUDENT IS A PVT SEL PLT WITH OVER 150 HRS OF FLT TIME UNDER HIS BELT. I WAS LURED INTO A BIT OF COMPLACENCY BY HIS FLT TIME; GOOD PERFORMANCE IN THE SIMULATOR; AND HIS EXCELLENT UNDERSTANDING IN THE CLASSROOM AS I HAVE BEEN TEACHING HIM HIS GND INSTRUCTION. NEVER AGAIN!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.