MD80 flight crew concerned with allowable crosswind at ZZZ.

Attributes
ACN	721088
Time
Date	200612
Local Time Of Day	0001 To 0600
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 100
Environment
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 225 flight time type : 1600
ASRS Report	721088
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	inflight encounter : turbulence inflight encounter : weather other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : gps other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	none taken : anomaly accepted
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance Weather Airport Environmental Factor
Primary Problem	Weather

Narrative:

Any all-nighter; particularly an all-nighter turn is prone to fatigue and safety issues. It is not natural to stay up all night and this particular pairing had us landing at a circadian low. This combined with the major windstorm that hit the puget sound made this event even more difficult. Some other facts that caused some trouble for us was the airport wind meter had broken earlier in the night. The airport was estimating winds that were at or over our maximum crosswind limit (60 KTS crosswind according to the GPS wind readout on the first approach). We were not sure about the legality of these reported winds. We attempted to contact dispatch; but the inbound radio frequency was inoperative. Operations was offline too due to a power outage. We ultimately did contact dispatch (after the first approach) and they were no help. The only guidance was to do another approach and then divert to geg. We were tired; bumping around and in need some information on the legality of the estimated wind report. We were on our own at XA30. On our second approach (winds were down to a steady state and provided 'only' a crosswind component of 25 KTS); we were successful and were extremely reliant upon the GPS wind page for our wind data. We were in a non-EFIS aircraft. I would like to see some guidance from the company; FAA and ATC on 'estimated winds' and the legality of using this data. Dispatch could have and should have advised of the significance of the wind event; the power outage and frequency failures. We would have had a better plan going into this event.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLT CREW CONCERNED WITH ALLOWABLE XWIND AT ZZZ.

Narrative: ANY ALL-NIGHTER; PARTICULARLY AN ALL-NIGHTER TURN IS PRONE TO FATIGUE AND SAFETY ISSUES. IT IS NOT NATURAL TO STAY UP ALL NIGHT AND THIS PARTICULAR PAIRING HAD US LNDG AT A CIRCADIAN LOW. THIS COMBINED WITH THE MAJOR WINDSTORM THAT HIT THE PUGET SOUND MADE THIS EVENT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. SOME OTHER FACTS THAT CAUSED SOME TROUBLE FOR US WAS THE ARPT WIND METER HAD BROKEN EARLIER IN THE NIGHT. THE ARPT WAS ESTIMATING WINDS THAT WERE AT OR OVER OUR MAX XWIND LIMIT (60 KTS XWIND ACCORDING TO THE GPS WIND READOUT ON THE FIRST APCH). WE WERE NOT SURE ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF THESE RPTED WINDS. WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT DISPATCH; BUT THE INBOUND RADIO FREQ WAS INOP. OPS WAS OFFLINE TOO DUE TO A PWR OUTAGE. WE ULTIMATELY DID CONTACT DISPATCH (AFTER THE FIRST APCH) AND THEY WERE NO HELP. THE ONLY GUIDANCE WAS TO DO ANOTHER APCH AND THEN DIVERT TO GEG. WE WERE TIRED; BUMPING AROUND AND IN NEED SOME INFO ON THE LEGALITY OF THE ESTIMATED WIND RPT. WE WERE ON OUR OWN AT XA30. ON OUR SECOND APCH (WINDS WERE DOWN TO A STEADY STATE AND PROVIDED 'ONLY' A XWIND COMPONENT OF 25 KTS); WE WERE SUCCESSFUL AND WERE EXTREMELY RELIANT UPON THE GPS WIND PAGE FOR OUR WIND DATA. WE WERE IN A NON-EFIS ACFT. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME GUIDANCE FROM THE COMPANY; FAA AND ATC ON 'ESTIMATED WINDS' AND THE LEGALITY OF USING THIS DATA. DISPATCH COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE ADVISED OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WIND EVENT; THE PWR OUTAGE AND FREQ FAILURES. WE WOULD HAVE HAD A BETTER PLAN GOING INTO THIS EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.