Narrative:

On departure out of ZZZ level at 10000 ft MSL; the #1 (left) engine experienced a series of suspected compressor stalls. A series of thuds accompanied by the aircraft slightly yawing confirmed the fluctuations indicated on the engine instruments. The #1 thrust lever was retarded to idle and the surging and stalling stopped. The 'B' flight attendant called to say she had observed flames shooting out from the back of the left engine (during compressor stalls). At this point we xferred control of the aircraft to me. ATC cleared us to a higher altitude and we refused the clearance and told them we would need to return to ZZZ. I instructed first officer to run the 'engine; fire; severe damage; separation' checklist. Following this and the subsequent engine shutdown checklist; we secured the engine and prepared for a single engine landing back into ZZZ. I also instructed first officer to declare an emergency and have equipment standing by as a precaution. The flight attendants were told of the impending return to ZZZ and to 'secure' the cabin for arrival. At no time during this event was the landing or successful rollout ever in question. Even though an emergency with ATC was declared; in my judgement; this event did not indicate the probability of an evacuate/evacuation; hence; the decision on my part to instruct the flight attendants to 'secure' versus 'prepare' the cabin. We were feeling a bit rushed by ATC as they immediately started to vector us back to the visual to runway 35R so I asked for an extended downwind. This gave us time to finish the appropriate checklists. An uneventful flaps 15 degree landing was accomplished. Due to the light load and long runway; landing weight or distance was not a concern. Crash fire rescue equipment followed us back to the gate and the aircraft was secured. An exterior postflt inspection did not reveal any external damage as far as we could see. Also; maintenance control instructed me to query the FMC via the maintenance index to check for engine exceedances. None were logged. I had good WX; a great first officer; and all the support I could ask for. Upon arriving at the gate my first officer brought to my attention that we had skipped pulling the fire handle during the emergency procedure. As I recall; he did in fact call for the item and I told him to 'stand by' as ATC was vectoring us at the same time and also asking all the pertinent questions like fuel and souls on board. Bottom line is it was not accomplished. The rest of the checklist was successfully completed. Missing this item did not have any material effect on the outcome of the event but still stings when brought your attention. As far as missing the checklist item; it was not intentional. It just happened to coincide with what clearly was task saturation. I should have told ATC to stand by and not my first officer. We should have finished the checklist uninterrupted and then communicated with ATC. Lesson learned. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter could not supply any additional information as to why the compressor stalls occurred. He did not receive any additional information from maintenance after the fact.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 CREW EXPERIENCES COMPRESSOR STALLS WHILE LEVEL AT 10000 FEET ON DEPARTURE AND RETURNS FOR SINGLE ENGINE LANDING.

Narrative: ON DEP OUT OF ZZZ LEVEL AT 10000 FT MSL; THE #1 (L) ENG EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF SUSPECTED COMPRESSOR STALLS. A SERIES OF THUDS ACCOMPANIED BY THE ACFT SLIGHTLY YAWING CONFIRMED THE FLUCTUATIONS INDICATED ON THE ENG INSTS. THE #1 THRUST LEVER WAS RETARDED TO IDLE AND THE SURGING AND STALLING STOPPED. THE 'B' FLT ATTENDANT CALLED TO SAY SHE HAD OBSERVED FLAMES SHOOTING OUT FROM THE BACK OF THE L ENG (DURING COMPRESSOR STALLS). AT THIS POINT WE XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT TO ME. ATC CLRED US TO A HIGHER ALT AND WE REFUSED THE CLRNC AND TOLD THEM WE WOULD NEED TO RETURN TO ZZZ. I INSTRUCTED FO TO RUN THE 'ENG; FIRE; SEVERE DAMAGE; SEPARATION' CHKLIST. FOLLOWING THIS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST; WE SECURED THE ENG AND PREPARED FOR A SINGLE ENG LNDG BACK INTO ZZZ. I ALSO INSTRUCTED FO TO DECLARE AN EMER AND HAVE EQUIP STANDING BY AS A PRECAUTION. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE TOLD OF THE IMPENDING RETURN TO ZZZ AND TO 'SECURE' THE CABIN FOR ARR. AT NO TIME DURING THIS EVENT WAS THE LNDG OR SUCCESSFUL ROLLOUT EVER IN QUESTION. EVEN THOUGH AN EMER WITH ATC WAS DECLARED; IN MY JUDGEMENT; THIS EVENT DID NOT INDICATE THE PROBABILITY OF AN EVAC; HENCE; THE DECISION ON MY PART TO INSTRUCT THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO 'SECURE' VERSUS 'PREPARE' THE CABIN. WE WERE FEELING A BIT RUSHED BY ATC AS THEY IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO VECTOR US BACK TO THE VISUAL TO RWY 35R SO I ASKED FOR AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND. THIS GAVE US TIME TO FINISH THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS. AN UNEVENTFUL FLAPS 15 DEG LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED. DUE TO THE LIGHT LOAD AND LONG RWY; LNDG WT OR DISTANCE WAS NOT A CONCERN. CFR FOLLOWED US BACK TO THE GATE AND THE ACFT WAS SECURED. AN EXTERIOR POSTFLT INSPECTION DID NOT REVEAL ANY EXTERNAL DAMAGE AS FAR AS WE COULD SEE. ALSO; MAINT CTL INSTRUCTED ME TO QUERY THE FMC VIA THE MAINT INDEX TO CHK FOR ENG EXCEEDANCES. NONE WERE LOGGED. I HAD GOOD WX; A GREAT FO; AND ALL THE SUPPORT I COULD ASK FOR. UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE MY FO BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT WE HAD SKIPPED PULLING THE FIRE HANDLE DURING THE EMER PROC. AS I RECALL; HE DID IN FACT CALL FOR THE ITEM AND I TOLD HIM TO 'STAND BY' AS ATC WAS VECTORING US AT THE SAME TIME AND ALSO ASKING ALL THE PERTINENT QUESTIONS LIKE FUEL AND SOULS ON BOARD. BOTTOM LINE IS IT WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED. THE REST OF THE CHKLIST WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. MISSING THIS ITEM DID NOT HAVE ANY MATERIAL EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE EVENT BUT STILL STINGS WHEN BROUGHT YOUR ATTN. AS FAR AS MISSING THE CHKLIST ITEM; IT WAS NOT INTENTIONAL. IT JUST HAPPENED TO COINCIDE WITH WHAT CLRLY WAS TASK SATURATION. I SHOULD HAVE TOLD ATC TO STAND BY AND NOT MY FO. WE SHOULD HAVE FINISHED THE CHKLIST UNINTERRUPTED AND THEN COMMUNICATED WITH ATC. LESSON LEARNED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER COULD NOT SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS TO WHY THE COMPRESSOR STALLS OCCURRED. HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM MAINTENANCE AFTER THE FACT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.