Narrative:

Aircraft had left fuel tank indicator MEL inoperative. We had no MEL deferral form onboard aircraft. Company maintenance had no MEL deferral forms in ZZZ. Fueler xferred fuel out of right tank to center tank without coordination with flight deck crew and with passenger onboard aircraft. When maintenance brought us a MEL deferral form from another aircraft on ground we read the back of the form. It indicated that we should not xfer fuel out of a tank below 2000 pounds with passenger onboard aircraft. We removed the passenger and pumped the fuel back into the #2 main tank and then xferred fuel out of the #1 main tank (the correct tank) into the center tank. Then we xferred a known quantity into the #1 tank as required by MEL. All company stations should have MEL deferral form available. The MEL deferral is not required to be on aircraft. All company maintenance personnel should be trained in inoperative fuel indicator procedures. Our maintenance person clearly was not trained. All fuelers and maintenance personnel should be schooled to coordinate any abnormal fueling events with the flight deck crew. I should have been more proactive in monitoring the fueling event when I saw that the wrong tank was being emptied. Frankly I did not know about the next generation xfer limitation until I read the MEL deferral and I thought it was not a big deal to xfer the fuel back into the #2 main and get the right tank emptied. I turned off the fuel boost pumps in the #2 main as soon as the associated low pressure lights illuminated so I didn't think any safety issues were involved until I read the MEL deferral.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IMPROPER ABNORMAL FUELING PROCS EMPLOYED BY MAINT PERSONNEL ON B737-700 WITH INOP L MAIN FUEL TANK QUANTITY INDICATOR.

Narrative: ACFT HAD L FUEL TANK INDICATOR MEL INOP. WE HAD NO MEL DEFERRAL FORM ONBOARD ACFT. COMPANY MAINT HAD NO MEL DEFERRAL FORMS IN ZZZ. FUELER XFERRED FUEL OUT OF R TANK TO CTR TANK WITHOUT COORD WITH FLT DECK CREW AND WITH PAX ONBOARD ACFT. WHEN MAINT BROUGHT US A MEL DEFERRAL FORM FROM ANOTHER ACFT ON GND WE READ THE BACK OF THE FORM. IT INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD NOT XFER FUEL OUT OF A TANK BELOW 2000 LBS WITH PAX ONBOARD ACFT. WE REMOVED THE PAX AND PUMPED THE FUEL BACK INTO THE #2 MAIN TANK AND THEN XFERRED FUEL OUT OF THE #1 MAIN TANK (THE CORRECT TANK) INTO THE CTR TANK. THEN WE XFERRED A KNOWN QUANTITY INTO THE #1 TANK AS REQUIRED BY MEL. ALL COMPANY STATIONS SHOULD HAVE MEL DEFERRAL FORM AVAILABLE. THE MEL DEFERRAL IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE ON ACFT. ALL COMPANY MAINT PERSONNEL SHOULD BE TRAINED IN INOP FUEL INDICATOR PROCS. OUR MAINT PERSON CLRLY WAS NOT TRAINED. ALL FUELERS AND MAINT PERSONNEL SHOULD BE SCHOOLED TO COORDINATE ANY ABNORMAL FUELING EVENTS WITH THE FLT DECK CREW. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE IN MONITORING THE FUELING EVENT WHEN I SAW THAT THE WRONG TANK WAS BEING EMPTIED. FRANKLY I DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION XFER LIMITATION UNTIL I READ THE MEL DEFERRAL AND I THOUGHT IT WAS NOT A BIG DEAL TO XFER THE FUEL BACK INTO THE #2 MAIN AND GET THE R TANK EMPTIED. I TURNED OFF THE FUEL BOOST PUMPS IN THE #2 MAIN AS SOON AS THE ASSOCIATED LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED SO I DIDN'T THINK ANY SAFETY ISSUES WERE INVOLVED UNTIL I READ THE MEL DEFERRAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.