Narrative:

After an uneventful flight from myr to cvg we began our descent into cvg. At one point I had briefed the approach for ILS 18C; after a few minutes the approach was changed to ILS 18R. For some reason; I had heard ILS 18L. I re-briefed the approach for 18L and had that page open and available as well as the airport diagram. After receiving vectors to intercept; we completed the checklist but did not identification the frequency for the approach. I was wondering why I did not have blue data. We received vectors to intercept so I flipped to green data and noticed we had the correct inbound course displayed. I should have questioned this at that point. We received our intercept heading and as we approached the course; I noticed my frequency was for runway 18L as we arrived at the localizer. The aircraft did not capture and we shot through the course. Seconds prior to shooting through the course; I told the captain what had happened. I began to turn the heading bug back to the right to re-intercept and started to dial in the correct frequency. I was concerned that we would encroach on runway 18C due to the slow turn so I disconnected the autoplt to expedite the turn. At that point I was confused as to why I had briefed runway 18L and dialed in the wrong frequency. ATC noticed this and after a brief period; we went missed approach. Instinctively; I added power and looked for a positive rate; forgetting to maintain 3000 ft. The flight director was at an odd irregular nose dive attitude in a turn to the right. It was distracting so I removed it. Trying to recall; I remember ATC saying to maintain 3000 ft and I noticed I had climbed and I did not want to make an evasive nose over dive to recapture the altitude and risk an injury in the cabin. I applied forward pressure to arrest the ascent and by that time I was approaching 4000 ft. ATC said to maintain 4000 ft and I re-engaged the autoplt. After that; the events were uneventful. We received vectors to shoot the approach again; we briefed ILS runway 18R and without any issues; we flew the approach to a safe landing. After a long night of running the scenario in my mind; I found many actions I should have performed differently. First of all; I should have spoken up when I noticed I did not have blue data available. At that point I should have transferred the controls and given the approach to the captain who had the correct data in place. Next; at the point at which we went missed approach; I should not have disengaged the autoplt; nor applied power. I let the aircraft climb and should have noticed the problem unfolding before it got to the point that it did. I lost situational awareness and failed to recognize the problem before it started.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CARJ FLT CREW PROGRAMS WRONG ILS ON APCH TO CVG. FLT DECK CONFUSION RESULTS IN GO AROUND.

Narrative: AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL FLT FROM MYR TO CVG WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT INTO CVG. AT ONE POINT I HAD BRIEFED THE APCH FOR ILS 18C; AFTER A FEW MINUTES THE APCH WAS CHANGED TO ILS 18R. FOR SOME REASON; I HAD HEARD ILS 18L. I RE-BRIEFED THE APCH FOR 18L AND HAD THAT PAGE OPEN AND AVAILABLE AS WELL AS THE ARPT DIAGRAM. AFTER RECEIVING VECTORS TO INTERCEPT; WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST BUT DID NOT ID THE FREQ FOR THE APCH. I WAS WONDERING WHY I DID NOT HAVE BLUE DATA. WE RECEIVED VECTORS TO INTERCEPT SO I FLIPPED TO GREEN DATA AND NOTICED WE HAD THE CORRECT INBOUND COURSE DISPLAYED. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THIS AT THAT POINT. WE RECEIVED OUR INTERCEPT HDG AND AS WE APCHED THE COURSE; I NOTICED MY FREQ WAS FOR RWY 18L AS WE ARRIVED AT THE LOC. THE ACFT DID NOT CAPTURE AND WE SHOT THROUGH THE COURSE. SECONDS PRIOR TO SHOOTING THROUGH THE COURSE; I TOLD THE CAPTAIN WHAT HAD HAPPENED. I BEGAN TO TURN THE HDG BUG BACK TO THE RIGHT TO RE-INTERCEPT AND STARTED TO DIAL IN THE CORRECT FREQ. I WAS CONCERNED THAT WE WOULD ENCROACH ON RWY 18C DUE TO THE SLOW TURN SO I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO EXPEDITE THE TURN. AT THAT POINT I WAS CONFUSED AS TO WHY I HAD BRIEFED RWY 18L AND DIALED IN THE WRONG FREQ. ATC NOTICED THIS AND AFTER A BRIEF PERIOD; WE WENT MISSED APCH. INSTINCTIVELY; I ADDED POWER AND LOOKED FOR A POSITIVE RATE; FORGETTING TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS AT AN ODD IRREGULAR NOSE DIVE ATTITUDE IN A TURN TO THE RIGHT. IT WAS DISTRACTING SO I REMOVED IT. TRYING TO RECALL; I REMEMBER ATC SAYING TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT AND I NOTICED I HAD CLBED AND I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE AN EVASIVE NOSE OVER DIVE TO RECAPTURE THE ALT AND RISK AN INJURY IN THE CABIN. I APPLIED FORWARD PRESSURE TO ARREST THE ASCENT AND BY THAT TIME I WAS APCHING 4000 FT. ATC SAID TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT AND I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. AFTER THAT; THE EVENTS WERE UNEVENTFUL. WE RECEIVED VECTORS TO SHOOT THE APCH AGAIN; WE BRIEFED ILS RWY 18R AND WITHOUT ANY ISSUES; WE FLEW THE APCH TO A SAFE LNDG. AFTER A LONG NIGHT OF RUNNING THE SCENARIO IN MY MIND; I FOUND MANY ACTIONS I SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED DIFFERENTLY. FIRST OF ALL; I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP WHEN I NOTICED I DID NOT HAVE BLUE DATA AVAILABLE. AT THAT POINT I SHOULD HAVE TRANSFERRED THE CTLS AND GIVEN THE APCH TO THE CAPT WHO HAD THE CORRECT DATA IN PLACE. NEXT; AT THE POINT AT WHICH WE WENT MISSED APCH; I SHOULD NOT HAVE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT; NOR APPLIED POWER. I LET THE ACFT CLB AND SHOULD HAVE NOTICED THE PROB UNFOLDING BEFORE IT GOT TO THE POINT THAT IT DID. I LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE PROB BEFORE IT STARTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.