Narrative:

My scheduled feb/fri/07 flight from jfk to ZZZ2 was changed on relatively short notice by the FAA to a later departure and an ETOPS evaluation. I was giving operating experience training to a captain and another captain was performing as relief officer. We arrived at the jfk airport at approximately XA45 and pushed the aircraft at XJ08. The late push was due to an aircraft change and numerous testing scenarios given to our crew and maintenance personnel by an FAA inspector. The scenarios and their impact on our flight became confusing because the inspector wanted logbook entries and compliance that would have grounded the aircraft due to the actual WX we would be flying into. I repeatedly urged the inspector to complete his scenarios due to the long day and depart jfk before the arrival of potentially 'show stopping' WX. At pushback the ATIS called for light ice pellets and -4 degrees C. After the push; we configured the aircraft for deicing/anti-icing; and the process began. When the anti-icing was completed; we expected ground personnel to contact us via headset. Instead; after a few mins of what seemed like no activity and no precipitation; we called and got the communication report over the deicing frequency. We were reported to be free on contaminants. The final application of type 4 fluid at 100% began at XJ23. Shortly after that; we began our taxi to runway 4L. While on taxiway B abeam runway 31L; the captain being trained in the left seat (the operating experience captain); wanted to extend the flaps and configure the aircraft since the precipitation had stopped. I agreed with his observation; but suggested waiting until taxiway K because of the contaminated taxiway. Shortly after that; I asked the relief officer to do a cabin check even though it now was not required. He reported the wings clear as we were accomplishing our taxi checklist. Shortly after this and a couple mins prior to takeoff; I commented that it still looked clear outside and relief officer reported that our 25 min time allowance ended at XJ48. This time was not required as long as there was no precipitation. After completing the before takeoff check and taxiing on the runway; I observed again that it looked fine outside; and we were going to depart. As the throttles were about to be advanced at XJ49; the FAA inspector stopped the takeoff. He accused us of violating our holdover time which was a non issue. After blocking in at the gate at XK25; the inspector disappeared and held no discussion regarding the event. The right/O and myself flew to stn the next night; and while on layover discovered that the inspector was seeking action against us as a crew. As captain; I made a judgement call to which I was entitled; and all procedures were accomplished in accordance with the boeing's fcom and air carrier's fom. Supplemental information from acn 727377: I was scheduled as relief officer on a flight. I went back to check the status of the wings and ensure we were clear of contamination. I returned to the flight deck at approximately XJ43 and informed the captain that the wings looked good. At this point both captain's were observing and discussing that the precipitation had ended. This prompted a comment from the inspector; 'what does the ATIS say?' to which I responded 'light ice pellets.' we were now approaching the runway and I sensed that maybe the inspector believed the ATIS was controling or wasn't familiar that our fom allowed the PIC to use observed actual conditions; so I made a call of '2 mins to go' to our original XJ48 limit; at which point the captain responded 'I think we are fine.' from my vantage point; I started to sense the disconnect between the inspector and PIC and there had been no challenge or direct communication to the captain from the inspector; and the undirected comment about the ATIS was lost in the time compression of events; completing of aircraft confign and checklists. Again I was sensing unexpressed dissent from the inspector so I made a 1 min call at XJ47 and a 1 min late call at XJ49 but not out of concern of safety; or contamination as I had checked the wings just as the precipitation abated; or safe operating practice or violation of anything. When the inspector said 'stop' it was the first time he had communicated any disagreement of captain's assessment of the WX or decision to take off. We then proceeded to taxi back to the gate and arrived at XK25 at which point the inspector asked me for my laptop and read the section of chapter of the fom on ice pellets but no other parts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 WAS DE-ICE AND APPLYING PWR FOR TKOF WHEN A FAA INSPECTOR STOPPED THE FLT BECAUSE THE ICE PELLET DE-ICE HOLD OVER TIME WAS EXCEEDED.

Narrative: MY SCHEDULED FEB/FRI/07 FLT FROM JFK TO ZZZ2 WAS CHANGED ON RELATIVELY SHORT NOTICE BY THE FAA TO A LATER DEP AND AN ETOPS EVALUATION. I WAS GIVING OPERATING EXPERIENCE TRAINING TO A CAPT AND ANOTHER CAPT WAS PERFORMING AS RELIEF OFFICER. WE ARRIVED AT THE JFK ARPT AT APPROX XA45 AND PUSHED THE ACFT AT XJ08. THE LATE PUSH WAS DUE TO AN ACFT CHANGE AND NUMEROUS TESTING SCENARIOS GIVEN TO OUR CREW AND MAINT PERSONNEL BY AN FAA INSPECTOR. THE SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPACT ON OUR FLT BECAME CONFUSING BECAUSE THE INSPECTOR WANTED LOGBOOK ENTRIES AND COMPLIANCE THAT WOULD HAVE GNDED THE ACFT DUE TO THE ACTUAL WX WE WOULD BE FLYING INTO. I REPEATEDLY URGED THE INSPECTOR TO COMPLETE HIS SCENARIOS DUE TO THE LONG DAY AND DEPART JFK BEFORE THE ARR OF POTENTIALLY 'SHOW STOPPING' WX. AT PUSHBACK THE ATIS CALLED FOR LIGHT ICE PELLETS AND -4 DEGS C. AFTER THE PUSH; WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR DEICING/ANTI-ICING; AND THE PROCESS BEGAN. WHEN THE ANTI-ICING WAS COMPLETED; WE EXPECTED GND PERSONNEL TO CONTACT US VIA HEADSET. INSTEAD; AFTER A FEW MINS OF WHAT SEEMED LIKE NO ACTIVITY AND NO PRECIP; WE CALLED AND GOT THE COM RPT OVER THE DEICING FREQ. WE WERE RPTED TO BE FREE ON CONTAMINANTS. THE FINAL APPLICATION OF TYPE 4 FLUID AT 100% BEGAN AT XJ23. SHORTLY AFTER THAT; WE BEGAN OUR TAXI TO RWY 4L. WHILE ON TXWY B ABEAM RWY 31L; THE CAPT BEING TRAINED IN THE L SEAT (THE OPERATING EXPERIENCE CAPT); WANTED TO EXTEND THE FLAPS AND CONFIGURE THE ACFT SINCE THE PRECIP HAD STOPPED. I AGREED WITH HIS OBSERVATION; BUT SUGGESTED WAITING UNTIL TXWY K BECAUSE OF THE CONTAMINATED TXWY. SHORTLY AFTER THAT; I ASKED THE RELIEF OFFICER TO DO A CABIN CHK EVEN THOUGH IT NOW WAS NOT REQUIRED. HE RPTED THE WINGS CLR AS WE WERE ACCOMPLISHING OUR TAXI CHKLIST. SHORTLY AFTER THIS AND A COUPLE MINS PRIOR TO TKOF; I COMMENTED THAT IT STILL LOOKED CLR OUTSIDE AND RELIEF OFFICER RPTED THAT OUR 25 MIN TIME ALLOWANCE ENDED AT XJ48. THIS TIME WAS NOT REQUIRED AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO PRECIP. AFTER COMPLETING THE BEFORE TKOF CHK AND TAXIING ON THE RWY; I OBSERVED AGAIN THAT IT LOOKED FINE OUTSIDE; AND WE WERE GOING TO DEPART. AS THE THROTTLES WERE ABOUT TO BE ADVANCED AT XJ49; THE FAA INSPECTOR STOPPED THE TKOF. HE ACCUSED US OF VIOLATING OUR HOLDOVER TIME WHICH WAS A NON ISSUE. AFTER BLOCKING IN AT THE GATE AT XK25; THE INSPECTOR DISAPPEARED AND HELD NO DISCUSSION REGARDING THE EVENT. THE R/O AND MYSELF FLEW TO STN THE NEXT NIGHT; AND WHILE ON LAYOVER DISCOVERED THAT THE INSPECTOR WAS SEEKING ACTION AGAINST US AS A CREW. AS CAPT; I MADE A JUDGEMENT CALL TO WHICH I WAS ENTITLED; AND ALL PROCS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOEING'S FCOM AND ACR'S FOM. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 727377: I WAS SCHEDULED AS RELIEF OFFICER ON A FLT. I WENT BACK TO CHK THE STATUS OF THE WINGS AND ENSURE WE WERE CLR OF CONTAMINATION. I RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK AT APPROX XJ43 AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE WINGS LOOKED GOOD. AT THIS POINT BOTH CAPT'S WERE OBSERVING AND DISCUSSING THAT THE PRECIP HAD ENDED. THIS PROMPTED A COMMENT FROM THE INSPECTOR; 'WHAT DOES THE ATIS SAY?' TO WHICH I RESPONDED 'LIGHT ICE PELLETS.' WE WERE NOW APCHING THE RWY AND I SENSED THAT MAYBE THE INSPECTOR BELIEVED THE ATIS WAS CTLING OR WASN'T FAMILIAR THAT OUR FOM ALLOWED THE PIC TO USE OBSERVED ACTUAL CONDITIONS; SO I MADE A CALL OF '2 MINS TO GO' TO OUR ORIGINAL XJ48 LIMIT; AT WHICH POINT THE CAPT RESPONDED 'I THINK WE ARE FINE.' FROM MY VANTAGE POINT; I STARTED TO SENSE THE DISCONNECT BTWN THE INSPECTOR AND PIC AND THERE HAD BEEN NO CHALLENGE OR DIRECT COM TO THE CAPT FROM THE INSPECTOR; AND THE UNDIRECTED COMMENT ABOUT THE ATIS WAS LOST IN THE TIME COMPRESSION OF EVENTS; COMPLETING OF ACFT CONFIGN AND CHKLISTS. AGAIN I WAS SENSING UNEXPRESSED DISSENT FROM THE INSPECTOR SO I MADE A 1 MIN CALL AT XJ47 AND A 1 MIN LATE CALL AT XJ49 BUT NOT OUT OF CONCERN OF SAFETY; OR CONTAMINATION AS I HAD CHKED THE WINGS JUST AS THE PRECIP ABATED; OR SAFE OPERATING PRACTICE OR VIOLATION OF ANYTHING. WHEN THE INSPECTOR SAID 'STOP' IT WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD COMMUNICATED ANY DISAGREEMENT OF CAPT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE WX OR DECISION TO TAKE OFF. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO TAXI BACK TO THE GATE AND ARRIVED AT XK25 AT WHICH POINT THE INSPECTOR ASKED ME FOR MY LAPTOP AND READ THE SECTION OF CHAPTER OF THE FOM ON ICE PELLETS BUT NO OTHER PARTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.