Narrative:

Training sortie to nqx; military station key west with a full stop planned to refuel and return home base afterwards. ATIS for nqx said WX was better than 5000 ft and 5 mi; landing runway 7. I set up for the VOR runway 7 approach which uses the eyw TACAN (located northwest of key west international airport). This approach is flown to NAS key west but clearly transits key west international airspace. When asked by approach if I would like the overhead; I replied affirmative; thinking that due to the volume of calls I was hearing; it would best deconflict my arrival if I entered the overhead arrival. Approach asked if I was familiar with the break procedures. I replied negative. Approach then told me to go to the 240 degree radial and track in at 2000 ft; then descend to 1500 ft at 2.6 DME and report the field in sight. I set up my display and after being given a vector of 180 degrees; was cleared to begin the arrival and to switch to tower frequency. At this time I was right on top of the radial I was to track in on so I made a tight turn to intercept the 240 degree radial; and track inbound on a heading of 060 degrees. Tower asked if I had field in sight; which I thought I did; but then could not maintain sight and reported that to tower. They replied that it was clear at the field and eventually sent me back to approach control. I climbed from 1500 ft to 2000 ft to be clear of clouds and stay VMC. Approach then vectored me around for another kings 1; this time advising me to remain south of the island. At 2.6 DME I turned east to stay south of the island; descended to 1500 ft; saw runway 7 and entered the break and landed. At base operations; I discussed the kings 1 arrival with the duty clerk who was also an approach controller. He said that controllers are supposed to advise aircrew to remain south of the island; which did not get called on my first approach. However; he could not produce a copy of the kings 1 procedure for my review. After departing en route home; I received a call from ZMA asking me to call the key west international tower supervisor when I next landed. I did so on arrival. He advised me that during my first approach an embraer commuter jet had received a TCAS warning and that I had passed approximately 500 ft from that aircraft. I did not see that aircraft at any time. While discussing the event with the tower supervisor; I realized that there was not just a TACAN at eyw but also a TACAN at navy key west; that evidently the kings 1 arrival is supposed to be flown to. Since I had previously been looking at an approach to nqx that used eyw; I thought the kings 1 arrival was also using that TACAN. Fields with more than one NAVAID in use for arrs need to be extremely careful to advise unfamiliar arrs of the appropriate procedure and NAVAID to be used to prevent aircraft believing themselves to be properly executing the arrival while actually in the wrong airspace. The scattered clouds contributed to this event since I could not see and avoid other aircraft and also could not see the navy field in relation to key west international. Supplemental information from acn 729170: heading to eyw. Upon turning to final to intercept the final course for runway 9 at eyw in visual conditions; our TCAS issued an RA for 'traffic; descend;' the TCAS display showed a red target at +500 ft in front and to our left. Immediately upon looking up from the TCAS display; traffic of a T38 was observed opposite direction above and to the left. The traffic was moving right and toward our track such that it appeared it would intercept shortly aft of our tail. We continued the approach by intercepting final and descending. A second RA was issued approximately 10-20 seconds after the first one. The TCAS display showed a red target to our left at 100 ft. Looking in that direction; I could not see the traffic visually. We landed without further incident. Contributing factors included a high workload environment and a lack of TA from navy approach. After speaking with the tower on the phone I was brought to understand that the T38 traffic had no imposed speed limit; had violated authority/authorized agreement to use delta airspace south of the airport; and had violated authority/authorized altitude. Apparently; this traffic was holding speed in excess of 300 KTS. Human factors is a difficult category to firmly identify. For my own performance; the first encroachment presented a highly charged moment: a TCAS alert calling for 'descend' from a maintained 1600 ft is 'no joke.' there is no margin for error. After seeing the traffic pass uncomfortably close; there was definitely a charge of adrenaline for me. In my experience; adrenaline causes a scattering effect on concentration. I was in the process of regaining my focus on the approach when the second TCAS RA sounded. Frankly; I was very tense not being able to see the traffic after the second alert sounded; and had to rely heavily on the first officer to conduct his business of 'PF' duties without double-checking confign changes or approach path maintenance. I believe this experience has tempered me; and in the future I will be able to handle RA's without becoming as excited. As far as eyw operations are concerned; I think it is inappropriate to mix military traffic with civilian commercial in such close proximity.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT REPORTED USING WRONG TACAN FOR OVERHEAD PATTERN ENTRY AT NQX THAT RESULTED IN TCAS RA CONFLICT AT 1500' WITH ACR LNDG AT EYW.

Narrative: TRAINING SORTIE TO NQX; MIL STATION KEY WEST WITH A FULL STOP PLANNED TO REFUEL AND RETURN HOME BASE AFTERWARDS. ATIS FOR NQX SAID WX WAS BETTER THAN 5000 FT AND 5 MI; LNDG RWY 7. I SET UP FOR THE VOR RWY 7 APCH WHICH USES THE EYW TACAN (LOCATED NW OF KEY WEST INTL ARPT). THIS APCH IS FLOWN TO NAS KEY WEST BUT CLRLY TRANSITS KEY WEST INTL AIRSPACE. WHEN ASKED BY APCH IF I WOULD LIKE THE OVERHEAD; I REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE; THINKING THAT DUE TO THE VOLUME OF CALLS I WAS HEARING; IT WOULD BEST DECONFLICT MY ARR IF I ENTERED THE OVERHEAD ARR. APCH ASKED IF I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE BREAK PROCS. I REPLIED NEGATIVE. APCH THEN TOLD ME TO GO TO THE 240 DEG RADIAL AND TRACK IN AT 2000 FT; THEN DSND TO 1500 FT AT 2.6 DME AND RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. I SET UP MY DISPLAY AND AFTER BEING GIVEN A VECTOR OF 180 DEGS; WAS CLRED TO BEGIN THE ARR AND TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. AT THIS TIME I WAS RIGHT ON TOP OF THE RADIAL I WAS TO TRACK IN ON SO I MADE A TIGHT TURN TO INTERCEPT THE 240 DEG RADIAL; AND TRACK INBOUND ON A HDG OF 060 DEGS. TWR ASKED IF I HAD FIELD IN SIGHT; WHICH I THOUGHT I DID; BUT THEN COULD NOT MAINTAIN SIGHT AND RPTED THAT TO TWR. THEY REPLIED THAT IT WAS CLR AT THE FIELD AND EVENTUALLY SENT ME BACK TO APCH CTL. I CLBED FROM 1500 FT TO 2000 FT TO BE CLR OF CLOUDS AND STAY VMC. APCH THEN VECTORED ME AROUND FOR ANOTHER KINGS 1; THIS TIME ADVISING ME TO REMAIN S OF THE ISLAND. AT 2.6 DME I TURNED E TO STAY S OF THE ISLAND; DSNDED TO 1500 FT; SAW RWY 7 AND ENTERED THE BREAK AND LANDED. AT BASE OPS; I DISCUSSED THE KINGS 1 ARR WITH THE DUTY CLERK WHO WAS ALSO AN APCH CTLR. HE SAID THAT CTLRS ARE SUPPOSED TO ADVISE AIRCREW TO REMAIN S OF THE ISLAND; WHICH DID NOT GET CALLED ON MY FIRST APCH. HOWEVER; HE COULD NOT PRODUCE A COPY OF THE KINGS 1 PROC FOR MY REVIEW. AFTER DEPARTING ENRTE HOME; I RECEIVED A CALL FROM ZMA ASKING ME TO CALL THE KEY WEST INTL TWR SUPVR WHEN I NEXT LANDED. I DID SO ON ARR. HE ADVISED ME THAT DURING MY FIRST APCH AN EMBRAER COMMUTER JET HAD RECEIVED A TCAS WARNING AND THAT I HAD PASSED APPROX 500 FT FROM THAT ACFT. I DID NOT SEE THAT ACFT AT ANY TIME. WHILE DISCUSSING THE EVENT WITH THE TWR SUPVR; I REALIZED THAT THERE WAS NOT JUST A TACAN AT EYW BUT ALSO A TACAN AT NAVY KEY WEST; THAT EVIDENTLY THE KINGS 1 ARR IS SUPPOSED TO BE FLOWN TO. SINCE I HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LOOKING AT AN APCH TO NQX THAT USED EYW; I THOUGHT THE KINGS 1 ARR WAS ALSO USING THAT TACAN. FIELDS WITH MORE THAN ONE NAVAID IN USE FOR ARRS NEED TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL TO ADVISE UNFAMILIAR ARRS OF THE APPROPRIATE PROC AND NAVAID TO BE USED TO PREVENT ACFT BELIEVING THEMSELVES TO BE PROPERLY EXECUTING THE ARR WHILE ACTUALLY IN THE WRONG AIRSPACE. THE SCATTERED CLOUDS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT SINCE I COULD NOT SEE AND AVOID OTHER ACFT AND ALSO COULD NOT SEE THE NAVY FIELD IN RELATION TO KEY WEST INTL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 729170: HEADING TO EYW. UPON TURNING TO FINAL TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL COURSE FOR RWY 9 AT EYW IN VISUAL CONDITIONS; OUR TCAS ISSUED AN RA FOR 'TFC; DSND;' THE TCAS DISPLAY SHOWED A RED TARGET AT +500 FT IN FRONT AND TO OUR L. IMMEDIATELY UPON LOOKING UP FROM THE TCAS DISPLAY; TFC OF A T38 WAS OBSERVED OPPOSITE DIRECTION ABOVE AND TO THE L. THE TFC WAS MOVING R AND TOWARD OUR TRACK SUCH THAT IT APPEARED IT WOULD INTERCEPT SHORTLY AFT OF OUR TAIL. WE CONTINUED THE APCH BY INTERCEPTING FINAL AND DSNDING. A SECOND RA WAS ISSUED APPROX 10-20 SECONDS AFTER THE FIRST ONE. THE TCAS DISPLAY SHOWED A RED TARGET TO OUR L AT 100 FT. LOOKING IN THAT DIRECTION; I COULD NOT SEE THE TFC VISUALLY. WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED A HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT AND A LACK OF TA FROM NAVY APCH. AFTER SPEAKING WITH THE TWR ON THE PHONE I WAS BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE T38 TFC HAD NO IMPOSED SPD LIMIT; HAD VIOLATED AUTH AGREEMENT TO USE DELTA AIRSPACE S OF THE ARPT; AND HAD VIOLATED AUTH ALT. APPARENTLY; THIS TFC WAS HOLDING SPD IN EXCESS OF 300 KTS. HUMAN FACTORS IS A DIFFICULT CATEGORY TO FIRMLY IDENT. FOR MY OWN PERFORMANCE; THE FIRST ENCROACHMENT PRESENTED A HIGHLY CHARGED MOMENT: A TCAS ALERT CALLING FOR 'DSND' FROM A MAINTAINED 1600 FT IS 'NO JOKE.' THERE IS NO MARGIN FOR ERROR. AFTER SEEING THE TFC PASS UNCOMFORTABLY CLOSE; THERE WAS DEFINITELY A CHARGE OF ADRENALINE FOR ME. IN MY EXPERIENCE; ADRENALINE CAUSES A SCATTERING EFFECT ON CONCENTRATION. I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF REGAINING MY FOCUS ON THE APCH WHEN THE SECOND TCAS RA SOUNDED. FRANKLY; I WAS VERY TENSE NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE THE TFC AFTER THE SECOND ALERT SOUNDED; AND HAD TO RELY HEAVILY ON THE FO TO CONDUCT HIS BUSINESS OF 'PF' DUTIES WITHOUT DOUBLE-CHKING CONFIGN CHANGES OR APCH PATH MAINT. I BELIEVE THIS EXPERIENCE HAS TEMPERED ME; AND IN THE FUTURE I WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE RA'S WITHOUT BECOMING AS EXCITED. AS FAR AS EYW OPS ARE CONCERNED; I THINK IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO MIX MIL TFC WITH CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL IN SUCH CLOSE PROX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.