Narrative:

I was towing gliders out of ZZZ from approximately XA00 until about XF30. 17 glider tows were performed with 17 glider recoveries. In addition; parachute activity was taking place over the northwest corner of the field. All of this mixed with GA training; departures; and arrs. All of this activity is normal wkend flying at this airport. Around XD00 while returning from releasing a glider near 3000 ft to the northwest of ZZZ; radio position and intention reports were heard from a jet approaching ZZZ. Intention was to land on runway 12. Most of the glider activity was using runway 30 and the winds were mostly calm to light; maybe favoring runway 12. Most GA traffic used runway 30 and constant radio traffic was announcing this. The westwind jet made several position/intention announcements while I returned to ZZZ. I and other aircraft around ZZZ made position/intention announcements along with coordination communications. The westwind crew never indicated that they heard any of the other reports. I landed on runway 30 and stayed on the runway to hook up to another glider. We heard the westwind report 4 mi left base for runway 12. The glider crew called that we were still on the runway. We finished hooking up and started to take off. Am not sure if I called the departure before I saw the westwind on short final to runway 12 with gear and flaps down. They finally saw us about when I called out to them that a tow plane and glider were still on the runway. They called a go around and went around and landed on runway 30. The tow plane and glider aborted their takeoff and rolled to the end of runway 30. The westwind landed on runway 30; rolled to the end; passed by the tow plane and glider; taxied to the terminal; dropped off a passenger without shutting down; taxied to runway 30 and departed. The westwind then flew through the parachute jump zone on its departure to the northwest. No damage or injuries to tow plane or glider. I do not think the westwind crew heard any xmissions although we could hear them. They could have had radios misconfigured to be able to hear the frequency. I should have held off the hook-up and takeoff; not knowing for certain where the westwind was and that it knew what was going on at ZZZ. Supplemental information from acn 731071: this report describes a near miss involving an opposite direction (landing versus departing) aircraft conflict at a busy uncontrolled county airport on a saturday afternoon in 2007. I am a rated commercial glider pilot. WX conditions were excellent. I estimate no clouds below 10000 ft; visibility greater than 10 mi; and winds from the southeast at no more than 3 KTS. Landing and departing traffic was using the calm wind runway (runway 30) so operations were being conducted with a very slight tailwind. I was receiving dual instruction and chkout from one of the instructors. At approximately XA00 we pushed our sailplane onto runway 30 for hook-up with the tow plane. The hook-up process took approximately 2 mins during which time the tow plane and glider were in position for an intersection takeoff as the tow cable was being attached to the glider. During this time I heard a position report on CTAF from a westwind executive jet that was on a 4 mi left base approach for runway 12 at ZZZ airport. The tow plane pilot responded to the arriving aircraft that there was a tow plane with glider about to depart on runway 30 and shortly thereafter he began his takeoff roll towing our glider behind. As the takeoff roll commenced; one of the ground crew pointed at the arriving westwind and transmitted via handheld radio on CTAF that a tow plane and glider were departing on runway 30 at ZZZ. As glider pilot; I was occupied flying the glider and I was expecting the tow plane to make an evasive maneuver shortly after takeoff. The tow plane pilot decided to abort the takeoff before the main wheels of the tow plane left the ground. When I saw the tail of the tow plane begin to settle back to the ground; I released the tow cable and; with the help of the instructor pilot; landed the glider and maneuvered it to the right side of the runway to avoid a rear-end collision with the tow plane which was maneuvering to the left side of the runway. Both the tow plane and glider exited the runway at the departure end of runway 30. The westwind executed agar offsetting the runway to the east and maneuvered for a landing on runway 30. Contributory factors: all 3 aircraft (tow plane; glider; and westwind) made multiple calls on CTAF announcing their intentions; however; there was no real communication between the pilots to affect a resolution of the conflict before a hazardous situation developed. The tow plane pilot informed me that these communications began when the westwind first announced its intentions 20 mi from location and the tow plane pilot reported to the westwind that the active runway was runway 30. The westwind's choice to make a nonstandard base leg entry to an uncontrolled airport contributed to the hazardous condition. I can think of 2 reasons the westwind crew would have chosen runway 12: 1) winds were favoring runway 12 (3 KT winds from southeast). 2) parachute jump planes routinely depart on runway 12 (against the normal traffic flow) to expedite their operations. It is possible that the westwind crew heard the jump plane depart on runway 12 and assumed it to be the active runway. I believe opposite direction departures by the jump planes are extremely hazardous and I'm befuddled as to why the FAA hasn't put a stop to it. Supplemental information from acn 730107: contributing factors: multiple calls were made to the jet announcing the tow/glider situation; while the jet made position reports of intentions on CTAF; there was not once a transmission by the jet directly relating to the received transmission of the glider/tow plane; other aircraft in the air or ground crew relating to the glider takeoff and the runway in use. The jet never used the word 'glider' or 'looking for traffic;' etc. I subsequently sought out and had a long (over 1 hour) telephone interview with the pilot flying the jet (not the pilot talking on the radio). He stated that they had 3 good radios -- one for center or approach during their IFR flight from location for CTAF and one for ATIS or AWOS -- he stated that AWOS reported 5 KT winds from 140 degrees; which made them decide to use runway 12. He stated that he heard the glider/tow plane and related xmissions but had no explanation as to whether or why there was no mention of the glider traffic or a direct reply to glider xmissions. He saw no problem in landing on a runway opposite to the direction of traffic and stated that he had done 1 or 2 360's while descending from 4000 ft and saw the traffic on the runway. He expected that the tow would have departed the runway prior to his arrival. He may not have realized that a tow plane towing a glider is not very maneuverable and he should have been prepared to give them the right-of-way. In summary; I believe that the jet was involved in a hazardous operation; did not properly sequence his arrival with 2-WAY communication with other traffic and was possibly engaged in a game of 'chicken;' hoping we would get out of his way so he could land. Lessons learned and prevention of a future such dangerous event: the tow plane later stated that the jet had announced a position on the previous tow; about 20 mi away. In retrospect; the tow pilot should have pulled off the runway and waited for the jet to land before the next takeoff. Educate pilots on IFR routing to see and avoid and communicate; not just announce position after radar service is terminated and xfer to contact CTAF. In addition; the cpr jet pilot needs to sequence his arrival with other slower; lower; VFR aircraft; gliders and gliders on tow. This is particularly important when deciding to land opposite to runway in use. A tow plane towing a glider is not maneuverable and has right-of-way over all engine driven aircraft. This needs to be re-emphasized in operations with mixed glider and power traffic. Specific questions: 'do you have the glider and tow plane in sight?' need to be repeated. If it appears that there is a radio reception problem; special evasive procedures need to be taken. Decision to use a nonstandard base entry instead of a normal pattern added to the hazardous situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TOW PLANE ON TAKE OFF ROLL WITH GLIDER ATTACHED; FINDS ITSELF NOSE TO NOSE WITH A LANDING COOPERATE JET AND ABORTS THE TAKE OFF.

Narrative: I WAS TOWING GLIDERS OUT OF ZZZ FROM APPROX XA00 UNTIL ABOUT XF30. 17 GLIDER TOWS WERE PERFORMED WITH 17 GLIDER RECOVERIES. IN ADDITION; PARACHUTE ACTIVITY WAS TAKING PLACE OVER THE NW CORNER OF THE FIELD. ALL OF THIS MIXED WITH GA TRAINING; DEPS; AND ARRS. ALL OF THIS ACTIVITY IS NORMAL WKEND FLYING AT THIS ARPT. AROUND XD00 WHILE RETURNING FROM RELEASING A GLIDER NEAR 3000 FT TO THE NW OF ZZZ; RADIO POS AND INTENTION RPTS WERE HEARD FROM A JET APCHING ZZZ. INTENTION WAS TO LAND ON RWY 12. MOST OF THE GLIDER ACTIVITY WAS USING RWY 30 AND THE WINDS WERE MOSTLY CALM TO LIGHT; MAYBE FAVORING RWY 12. MOST GA TFC USED RWY 30 AND CONSTANT RADIO TFC WAS ANNOUNCING THIS. THE WESTWIND JET MADE SEVERAL POS/INTENTION ANNOUNCEMENTS WHILE I RETURNED TO ZZZ. I AND OTHER ACFT AROUND ZZZ MADE POS/INTENTION ANNOUNCEMENTS ALONG WITH COORD COMS. THE WESTWIND CREW NEVER INDICATED THAT THEY HEARD ANY OF THE OTHER RPTS. I LANDED ON RWY 30 AND STAYED ON THE RWY TO HOOK UP TO ANOTHER GLIDER. WE HEARD THE WESTWIND RPT 4 MI L BASE FOR RWY 12. THE GLIDER CREW CALLED THAT WE WERE STILL ON THE RWY. WE FINISHED HOOKING UP AND STARTED TO TAKE OFF. AM NOT SURE IF I CALLED THE DEP BEFORE I SAW THE WESTWIND ON SHORT FINAL TO RWY 12 WITH GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN. THEY FINALLY SAW US ABOUT WHEN I CALLED OUT TO THEM THAT A TOW PLANE AND GLIDER WERE STILL ON THE RWY. THEY CALLED A GAR AND WENT AROUND AND LANDED ON RWY 30. THE TOW PLANE AND GLIDER ABORTED THEIR TKOF AND ROLLED TO THE END OF RWY 30. THE WESTWIND LANDED ON RWY 30; ROLLED TO THE END; PASSED BY THE TOW PLANE AND GLIDER; TAXIED TO THE TERMINAL; DROPPED OFF A PAX WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN; TAXIED TO RWY 30 AND DEPARTED. THE WESTWIND THEN FLEW THROUGH THE PARACHUTE JUMP ZONE ON ITS DEP TO THE NW. NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES TO TOW PLANE OR GLIDER. I DO NOT THINK THE WESTWIND CREW HEARD ANY XMISSIONS ALTHOUGH WE COULD HEAR THEM. THEY COULD HAVE HAD RADIOS MISCONFIGURED TO BE ABLE TO HEAR THE FREQ. I SHOULD HAVE HELD OFF THE HOOK-UP AND TKOF; NOT KNOWING FOR CERTAIN WHERE THE WESTWIND WAS AND THAT IT KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON AT ZZZ. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 731071: THIS RPT DESCRIBES A NEAR MISS INVOLVING AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION (LNDG VERSUS DEPARTING) ACFT CONFLICT AT A BUSY UNCTLED COUNTY ARPT ON A SATURDAY AFTERNOON IN 2007. I AM A RATED COMMERCIAL GLIDER PLT. WX CONDITIONS WERE EXCELLENT. I ESTIMATE NO CLOUDS BELOW 10000 FT; VISIBILITY GREATER THAN 10 MI; AND WINDS FROM THE SE AT NO MORE THAN 3 KTS. LNDG AND DEPARTING TFC WAS USING THE CALM WIND RWY (RWY 30) SO OPS WERE BEING CONDUCTED WITH A VERY SLIGHT TAILWIND. I WAS RECEIVING DUAL INSTRUCTION AND CHKOUT FROM ONE OF THE INSTRUCTORS. AT APPROX XA00 WE PUSHED OUR SAILPLANE ONTO RWY 30 FOR HOOK-UP WITH THE TOW PLANE. THE HOOK-UP PROCESS TOOK APPROX 2 MINS DURING WHICH TIME THE TOW PLANE AND GLIDER WERE IN POS FOR AN INTXN TKOF AS THE TOW CABLE WAS BEING ATTACHED TO THE GLIDER. DURING THIS TIME I HEARD A POS RPT ON CTAF FROM A WESTWIND EXECUTIVE JET THAT WAS ON A 4 MI L BASE APCH FOR RWY 12 AT ZZZ ARPT. THE TOW PLANE PLT RESPONDED TO THE ARRIVING ACFT THAT THERE WAS A TOW PLANE WITH GLIDER ABOUT TO DEPART ON RWY 30 AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER HE BEGAN HIS TKOF ROLL TOWING OUR GLIDER BEHIND. AS THE TKOF ROLL COMMENCED; ONE OF THE GND CREW POINTED AT THE ARRIVING WESTWIND AND XMITTED VIA HANDHELD RADIO ON CTAF THAT A TOW PLANE AND GLIDER WERE DEPARTING ON RWY 30 AT ZZZ. AS GLIDER PLT; I WAS OCCUPIED FLYING THE GLIDER AND I WAS EXPECTING THE TOW PLANE TO MAKE AN EVASIVE MANEUVER SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. THE TOW PLANE PLT DECIDED TO ABORT THE TKOF BEFORE THE MAIN WHEELS OF THE TOW PLANE LEFT THE GND. WHEN I SAW THE TAIL OF THE TOW PLANE BEGIN TO SETTLE BACK TO THE GND; I RELEASED THE TOW CABLE AND; WITH THE HELP OF THE INSTRUCTOR PLT; LANDED THE GLIDER AND MANEUVERED IT TO THE R SIDE OF THE RWY TO AVOID A REAR-END COLLISION WITH THE TOW PLANE WHICH WAS MANEUVERING TO THE L SIDE OF THE RWY. BOTH THE TOW PLANE AND GLIDER EXITED THE RWY AT THE DEP END OF RWY 30. THE WESTWIND EXECUTED AGAR OFFSETTING THE RWY TO THE E AND MANEUVERED FOR A LNDG ON RWY 30. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS: ALL 3 ACFT (TOW PLANE; GLIDER; AND WESTWIND) MADE MULTIPLE CALLS ON CTAF ANNOUNCING THEIR INTENTIONS; HOWEVER; THERE WAS NO REAL COM BTWN THE PLTS TO AFFECT A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BEFORE A HAZARDOUS SIT DEVELOPED. THE TOW PLANE PLT INFORMED ME THAT THESE COMS BEGAN WHEN THE WESTWIND FIRST ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTIONS 20 MI FROM LOCATION AND THE TOW PLANE PLT RPTED TO THE WESTWIND THAT THE ACTIVE RWY WAS RWY 30. THE WESTWIND'S CHOICE TO MAKE A NONSTANDARD BASE LEG ENTRY TO AN UNCTLED ARPT CONTRIBUTED TO THE HAZARDOUS CONDITION. I CAN THINK OF 2 REASONS THE WESTWIND CREW WOULD HAVE CHOSEN RWY 12: 1) WINDS WERE FAVORING RWY 12 (3 KT WINDS FROM SE). 2) PARACHUTE JUMP PLANES ROUTINELY DEPART ON RWY 12 (AGAINST THE NORMAL TFC FLOW) TO EXPEDITE THEIR OPS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE WESTWIND CREW HEARD THE JUMP PLANE DEPART ON RWY 12 AND ASSUMED IT TO BE THE ACTIVE RWY. I BELIEVE OPPOSITE DIRECTION DEPS BY THE JUMP PLANES ARE EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS AND I'M BEFUDDLED AS TO WHY THE FAA HASN'T PUT A STOP TO IT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 730107: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: MULTIPLE CALLS WERE MADE TO THE JET ANNOUNCING THE TOW/GLIDER SIT; WHILE THE JET MADE POS RPTS OF INTENTIONS ON CTAF; THERE WAS NOT ONCE A XMISSION BY THE JET DIRECTLY RELATING TO THE RECEIVED XMISSION OF THE GLIDER/TOW PLANE; OTHER ACFT IN THE AIR OR GND CREW RELATING TO THE GLIDER TKOF AND THE RWY IN USE. THE JET NEVER USED THE WORD 'GLIDER' OR 'LOOKING FOR TFC;' ETC. I SUBSEQUENTLY SOUGHT OUT AND HAD A LONG (OVER 1 HR) TELEPHONE INTERVIEW WITH THE PLT FLYING THE JET (NOT THE PLT TALKING ON THE RADIO). HE STATED THAT THEY HAD 3 GOOD RADIOS -- ONE FOR CTR OR APCH DURING THEIR IFR FLT FROM LOCATION FOR CTAF AND ONE FOR ATIS OR AWOS -- HE STATED THAT AWOS RPTED 5 KT WINDS FROM 140 DEGS; WHICH MADE THEM DECIDE TO USE RWY 12. HE STATED THAT HE HEARD THE GLIDER/TOW PLANE AND RELATED XMISSIONS BUT HAD NO EXPLANATION AS TO WHETHER OR WHY THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE GLIDER TFC OR A DIRECT REPLY TO GLIDER XMISSIONS. HE SAW NO PROB IN LNDG ON A RWY OPPOSITE TO THE DIRECTION OF TFC AND STATED THAT HE HAD DONE 1 OR 2 360'S WHILE DSNDING FROM 4000 FT AND SAW THE TFC ON THE RWY. HE EXPECTED THAT THE TOW WOULD HAVE DEPARTED THE RWY PRIOR TO HIS ARR. HE MAY NOT HAVE REALIZED THAT A TOW PLANE TOWING A GLIDER IS NOT VERY MANEUVERABLE AND HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO GIVE THEM THE RIGHT-OF-WAY. IN SUMMARY; I BELIEVE THAT THE JET WAS INVOLVED IN A HAZARDOUS OP; DID NOT PROPERLY SEQUENCE HIS ARR WITH 2-WAY COM WITH OTHER TFC AND WAS POSSIBLY ENGAGED IN A GAME OF 'CHICKEN;' HOPING WE WOULD GET OUT OF HIS WAY SO HE COULD LAND. LESSONS LEARNED AND PREVENTION OF A FUTURE SUCH DANGEROUS EVENT: THE TOW PLANE LATER STATED THAT THE JET HAD ANNOUNCED A POS ON THE PREVIOUS TOW; ABOUT 20 MI AWAY. IN RETROSPECT; THE TOW PLT SHOULD HAVE PULLED OFF THE RWY AND WAITED FOR THE JET TO LAND BEFORE THE NEXT TKOF. EDUCATE PLTS ON IFR ROUTING TO SEE AND AVOID AND COMMUNICATE; NOT JUST ANNOUNCE POS AFTER RADAR SVC IS TERMINATED AND XFER TO CONTACT CTAF. IN ADDITION; THE CPR JET PLT NEEDS TO SEQUENCE HIS ARR WITH OTHER SLOWER; LOWER; VFR ACFT; GLIDERS AND GLIDERS ON TOW. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN DECIDING TO LAND OPPOSITE TO RWY IN USE. A TOW PLANE TOWING A GLIDER IS NOT MANEUVERABLE AND HAS RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER ALL ENG DRIVEN ACFT. THIS NEEDS TO BE RE-EMPHASIZED IN OPS WITH MIXED GLIDER AND PWR TFC. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS: 'DO YOU HAVE THE GLIDER AND TOW PLANE IN SIGHT?' NEED TO BE REPEATED. IF IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS A RADIO RECEPTION PROB; SPECIAL EVASIVE PROCS NEED TO BE TAKEN. DECISION TO USE A NONSTANDARD BASE ENTRY INSTEAD OF A NORMAL PATTERN ADDED TO THE HAZARDOUS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.