Narrative:

During our arrival into lax; ZLA gave us a restriction to cross gramm intersection at FL180 and 280 KIAS. Just prior to gramm; we were told to contact socal approach. Socal told us to descend via the civet 5 arrival for runway 25R. This was not the runway that was programmed into the plane so I; as the PNF; began to change this as the PF entered and we both confirmed 7000 ft in the FCU. The controller then within 20 seconds came back and said to maintain 16000 ft and expect runway 24R prompting another change in the airplane. The PF set 16000 ft in the altitude window of the FCU and we both confirmed. The controller then said for us to descend via the civet 5 for runway 24R. At this point; we were going to be too high to make out next restriction; we thought so the PF selected open descent with full spoilers. The controller next gave us winds from the new ATIS as 060 at 10 gust 19. At this point I had to check our manuals to see if this was to exceed our limitations for the airplane. I looked up from the manual to see us below 14000 ft and not yet at civet. The PF quickly disconnected the autoplt to arrest our sink rate and climb back up. At the lowest point we may have been less than 12000 ft but that would have been after passing civet. I think we crossed civet at 13000 ft. Once back on the descent profile we reengaged the autoplt. The controller then said the winds were 360 at 10 gusting to 19. Contributing factors included: 1) fatigue. Both the first officer and myself had come in on a red eye flight and each gotten about 4 hours sleep in a 24 hour period. This also probably caused the accidental pulling of the altitude knob for an open descent rather than pushing for managed descent. 2) communication. ATC's issuance of multiple changes of runway; altitude and erroneous WX for the airport within a very short distance of approximately 8 miles. This causing one person to be inside the aircraft at all times and not backing up the other pilot. And last of all; complacency in the aircraft's automation. The airplane does not make mistakes; we as pilots do; and we have to watch this closer.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW MISSES CROSSING RESTRICTION AT CIVET AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES DURING THE CIVET 5 ARR TO LAX.

Narrative: DURING OUR ARR INTO LAX; ZLA GAVE US A RESTRICTION TO CROSS GRAMM INTXN AT FL180 AND 280 KIAS. JUST PRIOR TO GRAMM; WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT SOCAL APCH. SOCAL TOLD US TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5 ARR FOR RWY 25R. THIS WAS NOT THE RWY THAT WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE PLANE SO I; AS THE PNF; BEGAN TO CHANGE THIS AS THE PF ENTERED AND WE BOTH CONFIRMED 7000 FT IN THE FCU. THE CTLR THEN WITHIN 20 SECONDS CAME BACK AND SAID TO MAINTAIN 16000 FT AND EXPECT RWY 24R PROMPTING ANOTHER CHANGE IN THE AIRPLANE. THE PF SET 16000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCU AND WE BOTH CONFIRMED. THE CTLR THEN SAID FOR US TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5 FOR RWY 24R. AT THIS POINT; WE WERE GOING TO BE TOO HIGH TO MAKE OUT NEXT RESTRICTION; WE THOUGHT SO THE PF SELECTED OPEN DSCNT WITH FULL SPOILERS. THE CTLR NEXT GAVE US WINDS FROM THE NEW ATIS AS 060 AT 10 GUST 19. AT THIS POINT I HAD TO CHK OUR MANUALS TO SEE IF THIS WAS TO EXCEED OUR LIMITATIONS FOR THE AIRPLANE. I LOOKED UP FROM THE MANUAL TO SEE US BELOW 14000 FT AND NOT YET AT CIVET. THE PF QUICKLY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO ARREST OUR SINK RATE AND CLB BACK UP. AT THE LOWEST POINT WE MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN 12000 FT BUT THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AFTER PASSING CIVET. I THINK WE CROSSED CIVET AT 13000 FT. ONCE BACK ON THE DSCNT PROFILE WE REENGAGED THE AUTOPLT. THE CTLR THEN SAID THE WINDS WERE 360 AT 10 GUSTING TO 19. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDED: 1) FATIGUE. BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF HAD COME IN ON A RED EYE FLT AND EACH GOTTEN ABOUT 4 HOURS SLEEP IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. THIS ALSO PROBABLY CAUSED THE ACCIDENTAL PULLING OF THE ALT KNOB FOR AN OPEN DSCNT RATHER THAN PUSHING FOR MANAGED DSCNT. 2) COMMUNICATION. ATC'S ISSUANCE OF MULTIPLE CHANGES OF RWY; ALT AND ERRONEOUS WX FOR THE ARPT WITHIN A VERY SHORT DISTANCE OF APPROX 8 MILES. THIS CAUSING ONE PERSON TO BE INSIDE THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES AND NOT BACKING UP THE OTHER PLT. AND LAST OF ALL; COMPLACENCY IN THE ACFT'S AUTOMATION. THE AIRPLANE DOES NOT MAKE MISTAKES; WE AS PLTS DO; AND WE HAVE TO WATCH THIS CLOSER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.