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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 729962 |
Time | |
Date | 200702 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : iad.airport |
State Reference | DC |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty |
ASRS Report | 729962 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : 1 |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Cabin Crew Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
Our preflight stated the following write-ups: cabin interphone inoperative and aft flight attendant handset inoperative. I was the purser on this flight. During preflight safety checks; the aft flight attendants realized that the aft PA was also inoperative. We were concerned because we had no means of communication between each other. The aft flight attendants had no way to communicate with the cockpit. I asked the captain to check with maintenance. The captain asked me to check the fom. We found the fom to be unclr on which communication system needed to be operable. Passenger were boarded and the aircraft door was closed. Captain apologized to me that he was unable to get maintenance items fixed. I was surprised that the aircraft was ok to go; but assumed that maintenance had cleared the aircraft to go. During taxi out; one of the aft flight attendants came up front and advised me that they were unable to operate the light switches at the panel at door X. They were now concerned that the evacuate/evacuation system might not be operable and urged me to call the cockpit. The captain was immediately concerned and said that he would pull over and call maintenance. We eventually tested the evacuate/evacuation system at door X; the lights worked but the evacuate/evacuation horn or sound did not. The captain then had me test the evacuate/evacuation command at door Y and it was operable. We then returned to the gate. When the mechanics boarded the aircraft; they were very angry; they told us that they had not cleared the aircraft to depart; that the captain had cleared the aircraft. They also asked why we did not test the evacuate/evacuation system before we left the gate. We told them that this was not part of our preflight safety check. We now feel that it should be. Had we needed to evacuate/evacuation the airplane; we believe that there could have been serious consequences; in that the cockpit would not have known to stop the aircraft. We also wonder whether it was safe to dispatch the airplane without covert communication possibilities between the crew members in this day and age of level 3 and 4 safety threats. Also; I would like to once again state that the fom was very unclr to all of us. We really feel after this incident that the evacuate/evacuation system should be tested during preflight checks.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A FLT ATTENDANT RPTS DEPARTING THE GATE WITH CABIN INTERPHONE AND AFT CABIN HANDSETS INOP. WHEN THE EVAC SYS WAS FOUND INOP; ACFT RETURNED TO THE GATE.
Narrative: OUR PREFLT STATED THE FOLLOWING WRITE-UPS: CABIN INTERPHONE INOP AND AFT FLT ATTENDANT HANDSET INOP. I WAS THE PURSER ON THIS FLT. DURING PREFLT SAFETY CHKS; THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS REALIZED THAT THE AFT PA WAS ALSO INOP. WE WERE CONCERNED BECAUSE WE HAD NO MEANS OF COM BTWN EACH OTHER. THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS HAD NO WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE COCKPIT. I ASKED THE CAPT TO CHK WITH MAINT. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CHK THE FOM. WE FOUND THE FOM TO BE UNCLR ON WHICH COM SYS NEEDED TO BE OPERABLE. PAX WERE BOARDED AND THE ACFT DOOR WAS CLOSED. CAPT APOLOGIZED TO ME THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GET MAINT ITEMS FIXED. I WAS SURPRISED THAT THE ACFT WAS OK TO GO; BUT ASSUMED THAT MAINT HAD CLRED THE ACFT TO GO. DURING TAXI OUT; ONE OF THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS CAME UP FRONT AND ADVISED ME THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO OPERATE THE LIGHT SWITCHES AT THE PANEL AT DOOR X. THEY WERE NOW CONCERNED THAT THE EVAC SYS MIGHT NOT BE OPERABLE AND URGED ME TO CALL THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT WAS IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PULL OVER AND CALL MAINT. WE EVENTUALLY TESTED THE EVAC SYS AT DOOR X; THE LIGHTS WORKED BUT THE EVAC HORN OR SOUND DID NOT. THE CAPT THEN HAD ME TEST THE EVAC COMMAND AT DOOR Y AND IT WAS OPERABLE. WE THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE. WHEN THE MECHS BOARDED THE ACFT; THEY WERE VERY ANGRY; THEY TOLD US THAT THEY HAD NOT CLRED THE ACFT TO DEPART; THAT THE CAPT HAD CLRED THE ACFT. THEY ALSO ASKED WHY WE DID NOT TEST THE EVAC SYS BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE. WE TOLD THEM THAT THIS WAS NOT PART OF OUR PREFLT SAFETY CHK. WE NOW FEEL THAT IT SHOULD BE. HAD WE NEEDED TO EVAC THE AIRPLANE; WE BELIEVE THAT THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES; IN THAT THE COCKPIT WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN TO STOP THE ACFT. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER IT WAS SAFE TO DISPATCH THE AIRPLANE WITHOUT COVERT COM POSSIBILITIES BTWN THE CREW MEMBERS IN THIS DAY AND AGE OF LEVEL 3 AND 4 SAFETY THREATS. ALSO; I WOULD LIKE TO ONCE AGAIN STATE THAT THE FOM WAS VERY UNCLR TO ALL OF US. WE REALLY FEEL AFTER THIS INCIDENT THAT THE EVAC SYS SHOULD BE TESTED DURING PREFLT CHKS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.