Narrative:

The first officer made a routine takeoff from runway 28R. Shortly after gear retraction an EICAS message 'antiskid' annunciated. Due to a high ATC and pending class ii workload environment we elected to defer analyzing the message until level at cruise altitude and established in class ii operation. We were unable to recall the message and there were no associated status messages. We did not look at cmc status. We decided to familiarize ourselves with the associated irregular procedure in the flight manual. The balance of the flight was routine. For the approach briefing we elected to set autobrake ii and land flaps 25 degrees as recommended in B747 flight manual SOP. The ATC environment workload was high and the approach controller became distraction and forgot to give us a visual approach clearance to runway 8R. I was able to finally effect an approach clearance. This was only a distraction and did not preclude the first officer from executing a stabilized approach. The WX conditions were typical with steady winds at approximately 060 degrees at 15 KTS. There was no windshear reported. Descending through 200 ft AGL; the 'antiskid' EICAS message reappeared. The autobrake selector released to the disarm position. There was no associated or additional autobrake EICAS message which I had expected to see. I then physically moved the autobrake selector to 'off' and advise the first officer to continue and land. I briefed that there would be no autobrakes and to use minimal manual braking which he acknowledged and did. Immediately; on touchdown; the tower advised that they observed a blown tire on our right main gear. We did not hear or feel any indications of a tire failure. The aircraft tracked and decelerated normally. We exited the runway and observed the brake temperatures on the right main and body gear were acceptable; approximately 100/200 on an approximately 80 degree F day and a landing weight of approximately 530.0 pounds. The tower had already dispatched equipment before we could request it. The emergency crew confirmed to us that there was 1 tire (deflated) on the right main gear and no subsequent fire or smoke. We informed the station to have personnel stay clear the right main landing gear and to inform maintenance of the problem. Our assigned gate was approximately 100 yards straight ahead we elected to taxi the aircraft in to the gate. Flight attendants and passenger were unaware of any problem. The entire sequence of events was 2 mins from touchdown to gate arrival. I debriefed the purser after the flight. I briefed a maintenance technician and he informed that he had seen this before on the B747. The next day I talked to maintenance person and he confirmed that it was indeed an antiskid malfunction. All airport and station personnel involved in the incident did an excellent job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 CREW REPORTS AN ANTI-SKID MALFUNCTION ON LANDING THAT CAUSES A SINGLE WHEEL TO LOCK UP AND CAUSE TIRE FAILURE.

Narrative: THE FO MADE A ROUTINE TKOF FROM RWY 28R. SHORTLY AFTER GEAR RETRACTION AN EICAS MESSAGE 'ANTISKID' ANNUNCIATED. DUE TO A HIGH ATC AND PENDING CLASS II WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT WE ELECTED TO DEFER ANALYZING THE MESSAGE UNTIL LEVEL AT CRUISE ALT AND ESTABLISHED IN CLASS II OP. WE WERE UNABLE TO RECALL THE MESSAGE AND THERE WERE NO ASSOCIATED STATUS MESSAGES. WE DID NOT LOOK AT CMC STATUS. WE DECIDED TO FAMILIARIZE OURSELVES WITH THE ASSOCIATED IRREGULAR PROC IN THE FLT MANUAL. THE BAL OF THE FLT WAS ROUTINE. FOR THE APCH BRIEFING WE ELECTED TO SET AUTOBRAKE II AND LAND FLAPS 25 DEGS AS RECOMMENDED IN B747 FLT MANUAL SOP. THE ATC ENVIRONMENT WORKLOAD WAS HIGH AND THE APCH CTLR BECAME DISTR AND FORGOT TO GIVE US A VISUAL APCH CLRNC TO RWY 8R. I WAS ABLE TO FINALLY EFFECT AN APCH CLRNC. THIS WAS ONLY A DISTR AND DID NOT PRECLUDE THE FO FROM EXECUTING A STABILIZED APCH. THE WX CONDITIONS WERE TYPICAL WITH STEADY WINDS AT APPROX 060 DEGS AT 15 KTS. THERE WAS NO WINDSHEAR RPTED. DSNDING THROUGH 200 FT AGL; THE 'ANTISKID' EICAS MESSAGE REAPPEARED. THE AUTOBRAKE SELECTOR RELEASED TO THE DISARM POS. THERE WAS NO ASSOCIATED OR ADDITIONAL AUTOBRAKE EICAS MESSAGE WHICH I HAD EXPECTED TO SEE. I THEN PHYSICALLY MOVED THE AUTOBRAKE SELECTOR TO 'OFF' AND ADVISE THE FO TO CONTINUE AND LAND. I BRIEFED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO AUTOBRAKES AND TO USE MINIMAL MANUAL BRAKING WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED AND DID. IMMEDIATELY; ON TOUCHDOWN; THE TWR ADVISED THAT THEY OBSERVED A BLOWN TIRE ON OUR R MAIN GEAR. WE DID NOT HEAR OR FEEL ANY INDICATIONS OF A TIRE FAILURE. THE ACFT TRACKED AND DECELERATED NORMALLY. WE EXITED THE RWY AND OBSERVED THE BRAKE TEMPS ON THE R MAIN AND BODY GEAR WERE ACCEPTABLE; APPROX 100/200 ON AN APPROX 80 DEG F DAY AND A LNDG WT OF APPROX 530.0 LBS. THE TWR HAD ALREADY DISPATCHED EQUIP BEFORE WE COULD REQUEST IT. THE EMER CREW CONFIRMED TO US THAT THERE WAS 1 TIRE (DEFLATED) ON THE R MAIN GEAR AND NO SUBSEQUENT FIRE OR SMOKE. WE INFORMED THE STATION TO HAVE PERSONNEL STAY CLR THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR AND TO INFORM MAINT OF THE PROB. OUR ASSIGNED GATE WAS APPROX 100 YARDS STRAIGHT AHEAD WE ELECTED TO TAXI THE ACFT IN TO THE GATE. FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX WERE UNAWARE OF ANY PROB. THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS 2 MINS FROM TOUCHDOWN TO GATE ARR. I DEBRIEFED THE PURSER AFTER THE FLT. I BRIEFED A MAINT TECHNICIAN AND HE INFORMED THAT HE HAD SEEN THIS BEFORE ON THE B747. THE NEXT DAY I TALKED TO MAINT PERSON AND HE CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS INDEED AN ANTISKID MALFUNCTION. ALL ARPT AND STATION PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT DID AN EXCELLENT JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.