Narrative:

In mar/07; an operational error occurred at anchorage ATCT. A supervisor departed a small helicopter behind a dehavilland dash 8 aircraft; a large weight class aircraft. In an effort to exonerate the supervisor and 'get out of an error;' the FAA decided to reclassify the dash 8 aircraft owned and operated by a local company as small weight class. This is an unprecedented move. There is no allowance for this in any FAA orders. The weight classes of aircraft are decided by type and manufacturer's specifications and jointly agreed by ICAO; FAA; navigation canada; and euro control. Other air traffic facilities in the system do not know about this reclassification. This sleazy move has serious safety implications. ATC controllers at anchorage now can sequence light aircraft 3 mi in trail of a dash 8 owned by a local company; possibly creating a dangerous wake turbulence situation. Prior to this reclassification of the dash 8 aircraft; anchorage TRACON sequenced dash 8's 5 mi behind heavy jets. If in fact these aircraft are small; as the FAA now claims; the agency has knowingly placed these aircraft and all passenger on board in serious danger from wake turbulence by allowing them to be sequenced 5 mi in trail of heavy aircraft when 6 mi is required. The agency has admitted to knowing that dash 8 aircraft owned and operated by the local company in alaska are certificated at 38000 pounds maximum takeoff weight for 6 months or more. Staff personnel learned this at a briefing at the aircraft's company. The ICAO standard for large weight class is 41000 pounds. No action was taken at that time to reclassify the aircraft. A move that would have increased the wake turbulence separation requirement and the margin of safety. Supplemental information from acn 733303: the last time I checked; the agency does not have the authority/authorized to change the size of an aircraft due to an operational error committed by an agency operations supervisor. This is yet another example of how the agency disregards safety in order to preserve the apparent integrity of members of its management teams.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A11 CTLRS EXPRESS CONCERN REGARDING FACILITY MGMNT'S RECENT WEIGHT CATEGORY CHANGE FOR DASH 8 ACFT; ALLEGEDLY TO AVOID SUPVR OPERROR.

Narrative: IN MAR/07; AN OPERROR OCCURRED AT ANCHORAGE ATCT. A SUPVR DEPARTED A SMALL HELI BEHIND A DEHAVILLAND DASH 8 ACFT; A LARGE WT CLASS ACFT. IN AN EFFORT TO EXONERATE THE SUPVR AND 'GET OUT OF AN ERROR;' THE FAA DECIDED TO RECLASSIFY THE DASH 8 ACFT OWNED AND OPERATED BY A LCL COMPANY AS SMALL WT CLASS. THIS IS AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE. THERE IS NO ALLOWANCE FOR THIS IN ANY FAA ORDERS. THE WT CLASSES OF ACFT ARE DECIDED BY TYPE AND MANUFACTURER'S SPECS AND JOINTLY AGREED BY ICAO; FAA; NAV CANADA; AND EURO CTL. OTHER AIR TFC FACILITIES IN THE SYS DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THIS RECLASSIFICATION. THIS SLEAZY MOVE HAS SERIOUS SAFETY IMPLICATIONS. ATC CTLRS AT ANCHORAGE NOW CAN SEQUENCE LIGHT ACFT 3 MI IN TRAIL OF A DASH 8 OWNED BY A LCL COMPANY; POSSIBLY CREATING A DANGEROUS WAKE TURB SITUATION. PRIOR TO THIS RECLASSIFICATION OF THE DASH 8 ACFT; ANCHORAGE TRACON SEQUENCED DASH 8'S 5 MI BEHIND HVY JETS. IF IN FACT THESE ACFT ARE SMALL; AS THE FAA NOW CLAIMS; THE AGENCY HAS KNOWINGLY PLACED THESE ACFT AND ALL PAX ON BOARD IN SERIOUS DANGER FROM WAKE TURB BY ALLOWING THEM TO BE SEQUENCED 5 MI IN TRAIL OF HVY ACFT WHEN 6 MI IS REQUIRED. THE AGENCY HAS ADMITTED TO KNOWING THAT DASH 8 ACFT OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE LCL COMPANY IN ALASKA ARE CERTIFICATED AT 38000 LBS MAX TKOF WT FOR 6 MONTHS OR MORE. STAFF PERSONNEL LEARNED THIS AT A BRIEFING AT THE ACFT'S COMPANY. THE ICAO STANDARD FOR LARGE WT CLASS IS 41000 LBS. NO ACTION WAS TAKEN AT THAT TIME TO RECLASSIFY THE ACFT. A MOVE THAT WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE WAKE TURB SEPARATION REQUIREMENT AND THE MARGIN OF SAFETY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 733303: THE LAST TIME I CHKED; THE AGENCY DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTH TO CHANGE THE SIZE OF AN ACFT DUE TO AN OPERROR COMMITTED BY AN AGENCY OPS SUPVR. THIS IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW THE AGENCY DISREGARDS SAFETY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE APPARENT INTEGRITY OF MEMBERS OF ITS MGMNT TEAMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.