Narrative:

The pilot was en route to houston hobby airport on apr/wed/07 at approximately XA30; at 3000 ft MSL via radar vectors to intercept the localizer for the ILS approach to runway 4. A vector was received from the approach controller to 'maintain 3000 ft till established on the localizer; cleared for the ILS approach to runway 4.' the PIC did not manage the descent of the aircraft sufficiently to be able to intercept GS and commence the final approach; and was prompted by the controller to state intentions; ie; 'you are above GS; do you want to execute a missed approach?' the pilot executed a missed approach because the aircraft was too high to continue a safe and stabilized approach. The approach controller issued a 'right turn' and 'maintain 3000;' but the heading was not heard or acknowledged. The pilot's attention was focused on executing the missed approach and on the transition from a descent in the landing confign; to a climb to 3000 ft. The pilot executed the right turn and established a southwest heading (approximately 210 degrees) and was awaiting an opportunity to confirm the heading with the approach controller; but as the pilot can best recall; due to radio congestion on the frequency now due to the necessity to re-sequence the king air and following traffic; no confirmation call was made to the pilot. The first confirmation the pilot had of an incorrect heading was when the controller directed a left turn to 170 degrees; and stated 'you turned 50 degrees too far.' the pilot of the king air was still attempting to establish a climb to assigned altitude and due to the imperative tone in the controller's voice; turn the aircraft to the correct heading. The pilot of the king air also heard imperative heading changes issued for an air carrier Y flight. The pilot of the king air was requested to contact the houston approach control supervisor; and was informed of the near midair and that a pilot deviation report would have to be issued. The pilot later learned that his rear cabin passenger had visually seen 'a red light' on the air carrier Y jet in close vicinity to their aircraft. The human performance factors that caused this incident were: 1) the pilot did not descend the aircraft in a manner that enabled him to safely intercept GS and continue the ILS approach; and had to execute a missed approach. 2) the pilot did not accurately hear the assigned heading on the missed approach. 3) the pilot did not seek confirmation of the assigned heading because: a) task saturation in the cockpit while reconfiguring the aircraft from a gear/flaps down descent to a gear/flaps up climb. B) subsequent congestion on the approach control frequency due to the fact that he botched the approach controller's aircraft sequencing plan. 4) the pilot turned the aircraft to an incorrect heading and in IMC conditions did not see the impending traffic conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: KING AIR PILOT REPORTS MISSED APPROACH AT HOU AFTER FAILURE TO DESCEND IN A TIMELY MANNER ON THE GS. MISSED APPROACH HEADING ASSIGNMENT IS NOT HEARD CAUSING CONFLICT WITH B737.

Narrative: THE PLT WAS ENRTE TO HOUSTON HOBBY ARPT ON APR/WED/07 AT APPROX XA30; AT 3000 FT MSL VIA RADAR VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR THE ILS APCH TO RWY 4. A VECTOR WAS RECEIVED FROM THE APCH CTLR TO 'MAINTAIN 3000 FT TILL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC; CLRED FOR THE ILS APCH TO RWY 4.' THE PIC DID NOT MANAGE THE DSCNT OF THE ACFT SUFFICIENTLY TO BE ABLE TO INTERCEPT GS AND COMMENCE THE FINAL APCH; AND WAS PROMPTED BY THE CTLR TO STATE INTENTIONS; IE; 'YOU ARE ABOVE GS; DO YOU WANT TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH?' THE PLT EXECUTED A MISSED APCH BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS TOO HIGH TO CONTINUE A SAFE AND STABILIZED APCH. THE APCH CTLR ISSUED A 'R TURN' AND 'MAINTAIN 3000;' BUT THE HDG WAS NOT HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED. THE PLT'S ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH AND ON THE TRANSITION FROM A DSCNT IN THE LNDG CONFIGN; TO A CLB TO 3000 FT. THE PLT EXECUTED THE R TURN AND ESTABLISHED A SW HDG (APPROX 210 DEGS) AND WAS AWAITING AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFIRM THE HDG WITH THE APCH CTLR; BUT AS THE PLT CAN BEST RECALL; DUE TO RADIO CONGESTION ON THE FREQ NOW DUE TO THE NECESSITY TO RE-SEQUENCE THE KING AIR AND FOLLOWING TFC; NO CONFIRMATION CALL WAS MADE TO THE PLT. THE FIRST CONFIRMATION THE PLT HAD OF AN INCORRECT HDG WAS WHEN THE CTLR DIRECTED A L TURN TO 170 DEGS; AND STATED 'YOU TURNED 50 DEGS TOO FAR.' THE PLT OF THE KING AIR WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A CLB TO ASSIGNED ALT AND DUE TO THE IMPERATIVE TONE IN THE CTLR'S VOICE; TURN THE ACFT TO THE CORRECT HDG. THE PLT OF THE KING AIR ALSO HEARD IMPERATIVE HDG CHANGES ISSUED FOR AN ACR Y FLT. THE PLT OF THE KING AIR WAS REQUESTED TO CONTACT THE HOUSTON APCH CTL SUPVR; AND WAS INFORMED OF THE NEAR MIDAIR AND THAT A PLTDEV RPT WOULD HAVE TO BE ISSUED. THE PLT LATER LEARNED THAT HIS REAR CABIN PAX HAD VISUALLY SEEN 'A RED LIGHT' ON THE ACR Y JET IN CLOSE VICINITY TO THEIR ACFT. THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS THAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT WERE: 1) THE PLT DID NOT DSND THE ACFT IN A MANNER THAT ENABLED HIM TO SAFELY INTERCEPT GS AND CONTINUE THE ILS APCH; AND HAD TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. 2) THE PLT DID NOT ACCURATELY HEAR THE ASSIGNED HDG ON THE MISSED APCH. 3) THE PLT DID NOT SEEK CONFIRMATION OF THE ASSIGNED HDG BECAUSE: A) TASK SATURATION IN THE COCKPIT WHILE RECONFIGURING THE ACFT FROM A GEAR/FLAPS DOWN DSCNT TO A GEAR/FLAPS UP CLB. B) SUBSEQUENT CONGESTION ON THE APCH CTL FREQ DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE BOTCHED THE APCH CTLR'S ACFT SEQUENCING PLAN. 4) THE PLT TURNED THE ACFT TO AN INCORRECT HDG AND IN IMC CONDITIONS DID NOT SEE THE IMPENDING TFC CONFLICT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.