Narrative:

Captain and first officer conflict. Captain and first officer began this trip by stating that both had 'thick skin.' if something needs to be said; 'speak up.' I 'spoke up' 10 mins prior to departure on flight XXX. The captain asked for the before starting engines checklist twice; at 10 mins prior; just as the 'good book' says. It seemed that sticking to the timeline was more important than making sure everything was done; and both pilots in the loop. With route paperwork still in hand; I was clearly not ready for the checklist. I was still verifying the route and legs pages of the FMS. The route was a SID to a STAR; a short hop with many points to verify. I said as much after the second time the checklist was requested. For 3 days it seemed there was little regard for both pilots to complete the route and weight and balance portion of the predep set-up. For 3 days it seemed there was little regard for safety concerns that were brought to the captain's attention. There was the issue of an RA at ZZZ because the captain overshot final to runway; we ended up in the path of an aircraft for parallel runway. The captain seemed over reliant on the automation; too much 'heads down' at low altitude on a visual approach. There were taxi issues where the captain had his head down for extended periods of time during taxi out from the ramp. During the rollout portion of a landing within the last 1000 ft still indicating between 60-80 KTS the captain had a pen in hand; head down; writing the taxi instructions from the tower...I stepped on the brakes because it needed to be done; the boss didn't agree with that decision. There were continuous parking issues with excess speed approaching the chocks. After the second request to read the checklist; I made the statement that 'I wasn't ready; but if the captain would like to run a single pilot operation; he's welcome to do so; I'll get off.' at this point in the trip I had seen enough red flags that I felt it was time to be even more direct than I had been during the first 2 days of flying. The captain stated that 'if I was going to give him an attitude; I needed to get off the airplane.' I interpreted his tone to mean that I was to get off the airplane. I called crew tracking; I packed up; I got off. While on the phone with tracking requesting a new first officer; I was placed on hold. Eventually I was speaking to a chief pilot. I thought he was a manager in the crew tracking department. I didn't realize he was a chief pilot until after he was finished talking to me. Once we hung up; the gate agent brought it to my attention. The sole purpose of the report is this: I removed myself from a volatile situation which affected safety. I did so while the brakes were parked and the forward door was still open. I thought; and still think; I did the right thing. In the interest of safety I was 'breaking the chain' that I thought could potentially lead to a much bigger incident. What's bothering me is that I was coerced into getting back on to an airplane against my better judgement. The coercion occurred when a chief pilot threatened; point blank; that I was going to be terminated if I did not get back on the aircraft. In his words 'it was going to get very ugly.' I love this job; this career. I wasn't willing to lose it without taking the time to further reflect on the whole event. I felt I had no choice but to get back on; so I informed him that I was willing; but it was obviously up to the captain since it appeared at the time that he no longer wished to fly with me. After talking to the chief pilot; the captain decided I could return to my seat. I have no idea what the chief said to captain to make that happen. Clearly I did what the chief pilot wanted me to do. Whether it was the best decision or not in the interest of safety; I don't think so. Maybe in another month or so I'll see it in a different light. Right now it's a bitter pill to swallow; I feel as if I 'sold out' the safety of passenger and crew to save my own butt. Part of my job is to stand up for everybody behind the door. I was trying to do my job. That's all.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FO TALKS ABOUT BEING COERCED BY HIS CHIEF PILOT TO FLY WITH A CAPT FOLLOWING A SERIES OF EVENTS ON THE TRIP THAT THE FO FELT WERE UNSAFE.

Narrative: CAPT AND FO CONFLICT. CAPT AND FO BEGAN THIS TRIP BY STATING THAT BOTH HAD 'THICK SKIN.' IF SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE SAID; 'SPEAK UP.' I 'SPOKE UP' 10 MINS PRIOR TO DEP ON FLT XXX. THE CAPT ASKED FOR THE BEFORE STARTING ENGS CHKLIST TWICE; AT 10 MINS PRIOR; JUST AS THE 'GOOD BOOK' SAYS. IT SEEMED THAT STICKING TO THE TIMELINE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MAKING SURE EVERYTHING WAS DONE; AND BOTH PLTS IN THE LOOP. WITH RTE PAPERWORK STILL IN HAND; I WAS CLRLY NOT READY FOR THE CHKLIST. I WAS STILL VERIFYING THE RTE AND LEGS PAGES OF THE FMS. THE RTE WAS A SID TO A STAR; A SHORT HOP WITH MANY POINTS TO VERIFY. I SAID AS MUCH AFTER THE SECOND TIME THE CHKLIST WAS REQUESTED. FOR 3 DAYS IT SEEMED THERE WAS LITTLE REGARD FOR BOTH PLTS TO COMPLETE THE RTE AND WT AND BAL PORTION OF THE PREDEP SET-UP. FOR 3 DAYS IT SEEMED THERE WAS LITTLE REGARD FOR SAFETY CONCERNS THAT WERE BROUGHT TO THE CAPT'S ATTN. THERE WAS THE ISSUE OF AN RA AT ZZZ BECAUSE THE CAPT OVERSHOT FINAL TO RWY; WE ENDED UP IN THE PATH OF AN ACFT FOR PARALLEL RWY. THE CAPT SEEMED OVER RELIANT ON THE AUTOMATION; TOO MUCH 'HEADS DOWN' AT LOW ALT ON A VISUAL APCH. THERE WERE TAXI ISSUES WHERE THE CAPT HAD HIS HEAD DOWN FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME DURING TAXI OUT FROM THE RAMP. DURING THE ROLLOUT PORTION OF A LNDG WITHIN THE LAST 1000 FT STILL INDICATING BTWN 60-80 KTS THE CAPT HAD A PEN IN HAND; HEAD DOWN; WRITING THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR...I STEPPED ON THE BRAKES BECAUSE IT NEEDED TO BE DONE; THE BOSS DIDN'T AGREE WITH THAT DECISION. THERE WERE CONTINUOUS PARKING ISSUES WITH EXCESS SPD APCHING THE CHOCKS. AFTER THE SECOND REQUEST TO READ THE CHKLIST; I MADE THE STATEMENT THAT 'I WASN'T READY; BUT IF THE CAPT WOULD LIKE TO RUN A SINGLE PLT OP; HE'S WELCOME TO DO SO; I'LL GET OFF.' AT THIS POINT IN THE TRIP I HAD SEEN ENOUGH RED FLAGS THAT I FELT IT WAS TIME TO BE EVEN MORE DIRECT THAN I HAD BEEN DURING THE FIRST 2 DAYS OF FLYING. THE CAPT STATED THAT 'IF I WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM AN ATTITUDE; I NEEDED TO GET OFF THE AIRPLANE.' I INTERPED HIS TONE TO MEAN THAT I WAS TO GET OFF THE AIRPLANE. I CALLED CREW TRACKING; I PACKED UP; I GOT OFF. WHILE ON THE PHONE WITH TRACKING REQUESTING A NEW FO; I WAS PLACED ON HOLD. EVENTUALLY I WAS SPEAKING TO A CHIEF PLT. I THOUGHT HE WAS A MGR IN THE CREW TRACKING DEPT. I DIDN'T REALIZE HE WAS A CHIEF PLT UNTIL AFTER HE WAS FINISHED TALKING TO ME. ONCE WE HUNG UP; THE GATE AGENT BROUGHT IT TO MY ATTN. THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE REPORT IS THIS: I REMOVED MYSELF FROM A VOLATILE SITUATION WHICH AFFECTED SAFETY. I DID SO WHILE THE BRAKES WERE PARKED AND THE FORWARD DOOR WAS STILL OPEN. I THOUGHT; AND STILL THINK; I DID THE RIGHT THING. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY I WAS 'BREAKING THE CHAIN' THAT I THOUGHT COULD POTENTIALLY LEAD TO A MUCH BIGGER INCIDENT. WHAT'S BOTHERING ME IS THAT I WAS COERCED INTO GETTING BACK ON TO AN AIRPLANE AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT. THE COERCION OCCURRED WHEN A CHIEF PLT THREATENED; POINT BLANK; THAT I WAS GOING TO BE TERMINATED IF I DID NOT GET BACK ON THE ACFT. IN HIS WORDS 'IT WAS GOING TO GET VERY UGLY.' I LOVE THIS JOB; THIS CAREER. I WASN'T WILLING TO LOSE IT WITHOUT TAKING THE TIME TO FURTHER REFLECT ON THE WHOLE EVENT. I FELT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GET BACK ON; SO I INFORMED HIM THAT I WAS WILLING; BUT IT WAS OBVIOUSLY UP TO THE CAPT SINCE IT APPEARED AT THE TIME THAT HE NO LONGER WISHED TO FLY WITH ME. AFTER TALKING TO THE CHIEF PLT; THE CAPT DECIDED I COULD RETURN TO MY SEAT. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE CHIEF SAID TO CAPT TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN. CLRLY I DID WHAT THE CHIEF PLT WANTED ME TO DO. WHETHER IT WAS THE BEST DECISION OR NOT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY; I DON'T THINK SO. MAYBE IN ANOTHER MONTH OR SO I'LL SEE IT IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. RIGHT NOW IT'S A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW; I FEEL AS IF I 'SOLD OUT' THE SAFETY OF PAX AND CREW TO SAVE MY OWN BUTT. PART OF MY JOB IS TO STAND UP FOR EVERYBODY BEHIND THE DOOR. I WAS TRYING TO DO MY JOB. THAT'S ALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.