Narrative:

We were dispatched to fly the aircraft with the FGC fail and the FD fail MEL. The captain side pfd was accurate and the first officer's was failed. There was no altitude select; heading; course select; or altimeter setting; or accurate altitude indication. It was about 200-300 ft off the entire flight. In addition to that the autoplt was failed. The captain had to do all of the flying from ZZZ for an overnight and back to ZZZ the next morning. Because of delays we were on a reduced rest schedule; we started the next morning with very little rest. We had storm cells to vector around and turbulence. ATC kept giving us 1000 ft increments for the climb instead of a steady climb. The leveloffs were very abrupt and a few went beyond the assigned altitude. At cruise we had another failure occur; dau 1B and a list of failed equipment on the EICAS as well as chimes. With this distraction; and me looking at the QRH; we climbed up above our assigned altitude by more than 500 ft. We are barely VMC grazing the clouds and I'm having to monitor everything by looking at the captain's side. I did suggest to him the first day that I would like to use the reversionary panel to bring his screen to my side so it would be easier for me to follow; but he was uncomfortable with that because my mfd page was unavailable to me. I do not feel that my company watched out for our safety and that of the passenger by dispatching that airplane to fly with passenger into WX. In my opinion that equipment should not be MEL'able. I was uncomfortable with the erroneous visual cues in front of me and had a very high workload. I saw the altitude and airspeed deviations and called them out immediately as well and calling out the SOP of 1000 ft to go. I called the deviations and the captain responded by correcting. Upon returning to ZZZ; I became more upset at my company for expecting to fly broken equipment that requires so much workload. We are all working so hard for them already as it is because they are understaffed. Somehow; the company's poor planning has become the pilot's problem not only with quality of life; but flying 7 leg schedules and long hours with little or no breaks and reduced rest. They are pushing the regulations to the limit. We are getting burned out and fatigued. It's only a short time and there is going to be a fatality! How many lives have to be lost before my air carrier and or the FAA regulations change to lighten the load on the pilots. I wanted to talk to someone in management when I landed about what had just occurred with my flight and being a weekend; there wasn't one available. Next time; I will refuse to fly the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DO328 FLT CREW IS DISPATCHED WITH FGC AND FD ON MEL RESULTING IN THE FO'S PFD BEING INOPERATIVE FOR TWO LEGS.

Narrative: WE WERE DISPATCHED TO FLY THE ACFT WITH THE FGC FAIL AND THE FD FAIL MEL. THE CAPT SIDE PFD WAS ACCURATE AND THE FO'S WAS FAILED. THERE WAS NO ALT SELECT; HDG; COURSE SELECT; OR ALTIMETER SETTING; OR ACCURATE ALT INDICATION. IT WAS ABOUT 200-300 FT OFF THE ENTIRE FLT. IN ADDITION TO THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS FAILED. THE CAPT HAD TO DO ALL OF THE FLYING FROM ZZZ FOR AN OVERNIGHT AND BACK TO ZZZ THE NEXT MORNING. BECAUSE OF DELAYS WE WERE ON A REDUCED REST SCHEDULE; WE STARTED THE NEXT MORNING WITH VERY LITTLE REST. WE HAD STORM CELLS TO VECTOR AROUND AND TURB. ATC KEPT GIVING US 1000 FT INCREMENTS FOR THE CLB INSTEAD OF A STEADY CLB. THE LEVELOFFS WERE VERY ABRUPT AND A FEW WENT BEYOND THE ASSIGNED ALT. AT CRUISE WE HAD ANOTHER FAILURE OCCUR; DAU 1B AND A LIST OF FAILED EQUIP ON THE EICAS AS WELL AS CHIMES. WITH THIS DISTR; AND ME LOOKING AT THE QRH; WE CLBED UP ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT BY MORE THAN 500 FT. WE ARE BARELY VMC GRAZING THE CLOUDS AND I'M HAVING TO MONITOR EVERYTHING BY LOOKING AT THE CAPT'S SIDE. I DID SUGGEST TO HIM THE FIRST DAY THAT I WOULD LIKE TO USE THE REVERSIONARY PANEL TO BRING HIS SCREEN TO MY SIDE SO IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR ME TO FOLLOW; BUT HE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THAT BECAUSE MY MFD PAGE WAS UNAVAILABLE TO ME. I DO NOT FEEL THAT MY COMPANY WATCHED OUT FOR OUR SAFETY AND THAT OF THE PAX BY DISPATCHING THAT AIRPLANE TO FLY WITH PAX INTO WX. IN MY OPINION THAT EQUIP SHOULD NOT BE MEL'ABLE. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE ERRONEOUS VISUAL CUES IN FRONT OF ME AND HAD A VERY HIGH WORKLOAD. I SAW THE ALT AND AIRSPD DEVS AND CALLED THEM OUT IMMEDIATELY AS WELL AND CALLING OUT THE SOP OF 1000 FT TO GO. I CALLED THE DEVS AND THE CAPT RESPONDED BY CORRECTING. UPON RETURNING TO ZZZ; I BECAME MORE UPSET AT MY COMPANY FOR EXPECTING TO FLY BROKEN EQUIP THAT REQUIRES SO MUCH WORKLOAD. WE ARE ALL WORKING SO HARD FOR THEM ALREADY AS IT IS BECAUSE THEY ARE UNDERSTAFFED. SOMEHOW; THE COMPANY'S POOR PLANNING HAS BECOME THE PLT'S PROB NOT ONLY WITH QUALITY OF LIFE; BUT FLYING 7 LEG SCHEDULES AND LONG HRS WITH LITTLE OR NO BREAKS AND REDUCED REST. THEY ARE PUSHING THE REGS TO THE LIMIT. WE ARE GETTING BURNED OUT AND FATIGUED. IT'S ONLY A SHORT TIME AND THERE IS GOING TO BE A FATALITY! HOW MANY LIVES HAVE TO BE LOST BEFORE MY ACR AND OR THE FAA REGS CHANGE TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD ON THE PLTS. I WANTED TO TALK TO SOMEONE IN MGMNT WHEN I LANDED ABOUT WHAT HAD JUST OCCURRED WITH MY FLT AND BEING A WEEKEND; THERE WASN'T ONE AVAILABLE. NEXT TIME; I WILL REFUSE TO FLY THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.