Narrative:

During climb out from mmpr; noticed ECAM sts 'left outer tk unusable and right outer tk unusable in green.' there were no other ECAM indications or warnings. Discussed the problem with first officer; checked QRH; ph; fcom 1 and could not find guidance. Had already begun calls to dispatch/maintenance using ACARS. Could not reach them until about 100 mi north of mzt. I had slowed the plane slightly to save fuel and allow time to further evaluate the fuel tank situation. Noticed the ECAM sts indication during climb (10000 ft) to cruise in cockpit flows. Observation of fuel quantities and ECAM page and FMGC. I initially I was concerned sufficient fuel supply; sufficient reserves and fuel tank balance. After contact with maintenance; we were instructed to pull certain fuel xfer circuit breakers. As a recommendation; use MEL as reference. I exercised captain's emergency authority/authorized; followed their recommendation. We proceeded with this procedure and right outer tank fuel xferred. We left the circuit breaker open per maintenance. Further observation found the left outer tank did not xfer and upon recontacting maintenance we were instructed to close the circuit breaker by the MEL steps. Left outer fuel xferred and we proceeded to phx for normal landing. Both times I had exercised my captain's authority/authorized. I realize the MEL is not an in-flight document; but maintenance found it a quick way to convey the information. Pilot handbook and QRH did not cover this specific system area. However; system knowledge helped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 ENROUTE FROM MMPR IS UNABLE TO TRANSFER FUEL FROM AUX TANKS. CITE DIFFICULTIES IN CONTACTING MAINT SUPPORT THROUGH ENROUTE COM LINKS.

Narrative: DURING CLBOUT FROM MMPR; NOTICED ECAM STS 'L OUTER TK UNUSABLE AND R OUTER TK UNUSABLE IN GREEN.' THERE WERE NO OTHER ECAM INDICATIONS OR WARNINGS. DISCUSSED THE PROB WITH FO; CHKED QRH; PH; FCOM 1 AND COULD NOT FIND GUIDANCE. HAD ALREADY BEGUN CALLS TO DISPATCH/MAINT USING ACARS. COULD NOT REACH THEM UNTIL ABOUT 100 MI N OF MZT. I HAD SLOWED THE PLANE SLIGHTLY TO SAVE FUEL AND ALLOW TIME TO FURTHER EVALUATE THE FUEL TANK SITUATION. NOTICED THE ECAM STS INDICATION DURING CLB (10000 FT) TO CRUISE IN COCKPIT FLOWS. OBSERVATION OF FUEL QUANTITIES AND ECAM PAGE AND FMGC. I INITIALLY I WAS CONCERNED SUFFICIENT FUEL SUPPLY; SUFFICIENT RESERVES AND FUEL TANK BAL. AFTER CONTACT WITH MAINT; WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO PULL CERTAIN FUEL XFER CIRCUIT BREAKERS. AS A RECOMMENDATION; USE MEL AS REF. I EXERCISED CAPT'S EMER AUTH; FOLLOWED THEIR RECOMMENDATION. WE PROCEEDED WITH THIS PROC AND R OUTER TANK FUEL XFERRED. WE LEFT THE CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN PER MAINT. FURTHER OBSERVATION FOUND THE L OUTER TANK DID NOT XFER AND UPON RECONTACTING MAINT WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CLOSE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER BY THE MEL STEPS. L OUTER FUEL XFERRED AND WE PROCEEDED TO PHX FOR NORMAL LNDG. BOTH TIMES I HAD EXERCISED MY CAPT'S AUTH. I REALIZE THE MEL IS NOT AN INFLT DOCUMENT; BUT MAINT FOUND IT A QUICK WAY TO CONVEY THE INFO. PLT HANDBOOK AND QRH DID NOT COVER THIS SPECIFIC SYS AREA. HOWEVER; SYS KNOWLEDGE HELPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.