Narrative:

The event occurred for a couple of reasons. First and foremost was that the ATIS information was incorrectly understood and written down. Instead of noting from the ATIS that runway 23L was closed; the ILS runway 23L was transcribed as the approach in use. All planning then became focused for the ILS to runway 23L. Secondly; since no other approach other than ILS runway 23R was in use; indianapolis approach did not tell us on initial contact what approach to expect. We believed that we were being vectored to ILS runway 23L. Finally; I believe that fatigue played a role; given our approximately ten hour layover and early showtime. While being vectored by indianapolis approach in the indianapolis terminal area in IMC conditions; the first officer and I were told to intercept the ILS runway 23R localizer. Because we had briefed; set up our navigation equipment; and programmed the FMS for the ILS runway 23L; confusion occurred. We immediately attempted to get clarification by ATC; but due to frequency congestion; we ended up flying through the runway 23R localizer. After finally getting through to ATC; we were vectored back and executed the ILS runway 23R. After questioning ATC about our final approach clearance and being told that runway 23L was closed; we realized an oversight had occurred. We listened to the same ATIS as we taxied to the gate and found that the error had been on our part. We immediately set up for ILS runway 23R and followed ATC instructions. I believe that if workload conditions permit; both pilots should listen to the ATIS transmission and discuss any possible questions regarding its content. Also; I believe that irregardless of whether only one approach is being used at an airport; approach control should always tell you what approach you are being vectored for when vectoring is started.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATIS MISINTERPRETATION BY A TIRED CREW LEADS TO A LOC OVERSHOOT WHEN AN APCH IS PLANNED TO A CLOSED PARALLEL RWY.

Narrative: THE EVENT OCCURRED FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST WAS THAT THE ATIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD AND WRITTEN DOWN. INSTEAD OF NOTING FROM THE ATIS THAT RWY 23L WAS CLOSED; THE ILS RWY 23L WAS TRANSCRIBED AS THE APCH IN USE. ALL PLANNING THEN BECAME FOCUSED FOR THE ILS TO RWY 23L. SECONDLY; SINCE NO OTHER APCH OTHER THAN ILS RWY 23R WAS IN USE; INDIANAPOLIS APCH DID NOT TELL US ON INITIAL CONTACT WHAT APCH TO EXPECT. WE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO ILS RWY 23L. FINALLY; I BELIEVE THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE; GIVEN OUR APPROX TEN HOUR LAYOVER AND EARLY SHOWTIME. WHILE BEING VECTORED BY INDIANAPOLIS APCH IN THE INDIANAPOLIS TERMINAL AREA IN IMC CONDITIONS; THE FO AND I WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 23R LOC. BECAUSE WE HAD BRIEFED; SET UP OUR NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT; AND PROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR THE ILS RWY 23L; CONFUSION OCCURRED. WE IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO GET CLARIFICATION BY ATC; BUT DUE TO FREQUENCY CONGESTION; WE ENDED UP FLYING THROUGH THE RWY 23R LOC. AFTER FINALLY GETTING THROUGH TO ATC; WE WERE VECTORED BACK AND EXECUTED THE ILS RWY 23R. AFTER QUESTIONING ATC ABOUT OUR FINAL APCH CLRNC AND BEING TOLD THAT RWY 23L WAS CLOSED; WE REALIZED AN OVERSIGHT HAD OCCURRED. WE LISTENED TO THE SAME ATIS AS WE TAXIED TO THE GATE AND FOUND THAT THE ERROR HAD BEEN ON OUR PART. WE IMMEDIATELY SET UP FOR ILS RWY 23R AND FOLLOWED ATC INSTRUCTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT IF WORKLOAD CONDITIONS PERMIT; BOTH PILOTS SHOULD LISTEN TO THE ATIS TRANSMISSION AND DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE QUESTIONS REGARDING ITS CONTENT. ALSO; I BELIEVE THAT IRREGARDLESS OF WHETHER ONLY ONE APCH IS BEING USED AT AN ARPT; APCH CTL SHOULD ALWAYS TELL YOU WHAT APCH YOU ARE BEING VECTORED FOR WHEN VECTORING IS STARTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.