Narrative:

On the ground: I'd received at least 3 FSS briefings on this flight. First; the night before; I had a discussion with a briefer about going through the outer ring (30 NM) of the tfr by filing a DVFR flight plan or go 'way out over the water.' I said I'd rather circumnav the tfr altogether; by flying north to hpn then west via sax to avoid the whole thing. Second; early morning; I called FSS to check if the times or geography of the tfr had changed. I was told that they rarely change; exactly the opposite I'd been told the day prior. Third; I called FSS to receive a standard briefing and file a VFR flight plan. Prior to starting the engine; I tried to call new york FSS by cell phone from the ramp at republic. The 'on hold' time seemed long (I waited +/-5 mins) so I decided to take another tack. On initial contact with republic ground; I asked if they had any way of contacting jfk and finding out if we had time to take the 'shoreline route' (below the ring of the jfk class B = less than 500 ft AGL) or if we had to 'go the long way around the tfr.' at first; the ground controller said that they were not aware of a tfr covering republic. I said it was a presidential tfr and it covered newark and a 30 NM radius; and that it did not cover frg. (First breakdown of situational awareness.) I was told by this controller; 'we have the TRACON (them) on the line and they are saying that that tfr is no longer a factor. (It's either been changed or canceled).' I responded that we would proceed and obey any further instructions from ATC. Departure from republic was at XA19L and we flew at 1500 ft toward jones beach monument (southwest from frg) where we contacted jfk tower; and received permission to follow the shoreline less than 500 ft below the class B wbound. We also called new york radio and activated our VFR flight plan. Speaking on 2 radios; I may have missed 1 call from new york radio. The jfk tower controller made no mention of the tfr or our impending incursion. (Second breakdown of situational awareness.) at the west end of the shoreline route; in vicinity of floyd bennett field; jfk gave us 'at or below 1400 ft' and we started a climb and a left turn towards sandy hook. This was acknowledged by jfk tower and no mention was made that we were about to be in a hot tfr. (We didn't fly into the 30 NM ring of the tfr; we were in the 30 NM ring when it went 'hot'.) a few more mi south; and jfk asked if we required further advisories. We asked for VFR flight following to our destination. After a min or so; jfk said 'unable the handoff; squawk 1200; try mcguire approach in another mi or so.' this must have been when the tfr was going 'hot.' in a few mi; I called mcguire approach; just south of monmouth (blm) and was idented by mcguire as 'radar contact; sir; do you know you are in a tfr? I've been trying to raise you on 'guard.'' the response: I immediately said; 'is this the vip tfr?' (yes.) 'what do I need to do to comply?' (continue on course sbound.) 'we're sorry; we were told on the ground that this had been changed; but we will do anything we're instructed to do.' I was told by this controller to 'continue on course; the authority/authorized (unknown entity) is not going to report this because you were on your way out when the area went hot.' remainder of flight: we were handed off to atlantic city approach; then dover approach; continuing from dixie along V16 to south of dover; de; where we canceled flight following; closed our flight plan with washington radio and landed uneventfully. Possible corrective actions: 1) if I had stayed on hold with new york FSS; I would have learned that the tfr was going as scheduled; and I would have taken 'the long way around' and none of this would have happened. 2) if the republic ground controller had known about the tfr; even if it didn't directly affect their airspace (it was within 50 NM) maybe we could have avoided this incursion. 3) if TRACON (whoever she was talking to) had known about the tfr; and that the cherokee can only make 100 KTS; maybe a better time-distance evaluation could have been made by either us or the controller and a better decision could havebeen made. 4) if the jfk tower controller had known we were about to fly into an area that was going to 'go hot' we could have turned around and 'flown the long way around.' 5) if jfk had been able to work a direct handoff to mcguire; maybe we could have at least been a 'known quantity' when we started talking to them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNINFORMED HANDLING BY ATC AND FSS RESULTS IN TFR VIOLATION FOR LIMITED EXPERIENCE BUT CONSCIENTIOUS PILOT.

Narrative: ON THE GND: I'D RECEIVED AT LEAST 3 FSS BRIEFINGS ON THIS FLT. FIRST; THE NIGHT BEFORE; I HAD A DISCUSSION WITH A BRIEFER ABOUT GOING THROUGH THE OUTER RING (30 NM) OF THE TFR BY FILING A DVFR FLT PLAN OR GO 'WAY OUT OVER THE WATER.' I SAID I'D RATHER CIRCUMNAV THE TFR ALTOGETHER; BY FLYING N TO HPN THEN W VIA SAX TO AVOID THE WHOLE THING. SECOND; EARLY MORNING; I CALLED FSS TO CHK IF THE TIMES OR GEOGRAPHY OF THE TFR HAD CHANGED. I WAS TOLD THAT THEY RARELY CHANGE; EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE I'D BEEN TOLD THE DAY PRIOR. THIRD; I CALLED FSS TO RECEIVE A STANDARD BRIEFING AND FILE A VFR FLT PLAN. PRIOR TO STARTING THE ENG; I TRIED TO CALL NEW YORK FSS BY CELL PHONE FROM THE RAMP AT REPUBLIC. THE 'ON HOLD' TIME SEEMED LONG (I WAITED +/-5 MINS) SO I DECIDED TO TAKE ANOTHER TACK. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH REPUBLIC GND; I ASKED IF THEY HAD ANY WAY OF CONTACTING JFK AND FINDING OUT IF WE HAD TIME TO TAKE THE 'SHORELINE RTE' (BELOW THE RING OF THE JFK CLASS B = LESS THAN 500 FT AGL) OR IF WE HAD TO 'GO THE LONG WAY AROUND THE TFR.' AT FIRST; THE GND CTLR SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF A TFR COVERING REPUBLIC. I SAID IT WAS A PRESIDENTIAL TFR AND IT COVERED NEWARK AND A 30 NM RADIUS; AND THAT IT DID NOT COVER FRG. (FIRST BREAKDOWN OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.) I WAS TOLD BY THIS CTLR; 'WE HAVE THE TRACON (THEM) ON THE LINE AND THEY ARE SAYING THAT THAT TFR IS NO LONGER A FACTOR. (IT'S EITHER BEEN CHANGED OR CANCELED).' I RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD PROCEED AND OBEY ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATC. DEP FROM REPUBLIC WAS AT XA19L AND WE FLEW AT 1500 FT TOWARD JONES BEACH MONUMENT (SW FROM FRG) WHERE WE CONTACTED JFK TWR; AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO FOLLOW THE SHORELINE LESS THAN 500 FT BELOW THE CLASS B WBOUND. WE ALSO CALLED NEW YORK RADIO AND ACTIVATED OUR VFR FLT PLAN. SPEAKING ON 2 RADIOS; I MAY HAVE MISSED 1 CALL FROM NEW YORK RADIO. THE JFK TWR CTLR MADE NO MENTION OF THE TFR OR OUR IMPENDING INCURSION. (SECOND BREAKDOWN OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.) AT THE W END OF THE SHORELINE RTE; IN VICINITY OF FLOYD BENNETT FIELD; JFK GAVE US 'AT OR BELOW 1400 FT' AND WE STARTED A CLB AND A L TURN TOWARDS SANDY HOOK. THIS WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY JFK TWR AND NO MENTION WAS MADE THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO BE IN A HOT TFR. (WE DIDN'T FLY INTO THE 30 NM RING OF THE TFR; WE WERE IN THE 30 NM RING WHEN IT WENT 'HOT'.) A FEW MORE MI S; AND JFK ASKED IF WE REQUIRED FURTHER ADVISORIES. WE ASKED FOR VFR FLT FOLLOWING TO OUR DEST. AFTER A MIN OR SO; JFK SAID 'UNABLE THE HDOF; SQUAWK 1200; TRY MCGUIRE APCH IN ANOTHER MI OR SO.' THIS MUST HAVE BEEN WHEN THE TFR WAS GOING 'HOT.' IN A FEW MI; I CALLED MCGUIRE APCH; JUST S OF MONMOUTH (BLM) AND WAS IDENTED BY MCGUIRE AS 'RADAR CONTACT; SIR; DO YOU KNOW YOU ARE IN A TFR? I'VE BEEN TRYING TO RAISE YOU ON 'GUARD.'' THE RESPONSE: I IMMEDIATELY SAID; 'IS THIS THE VIP TFR?' (YES.) 'WHAT DO I NEED TO DO TO COMPLY?' (CONTINUE ON COURSE SBOUND.) 'WE'RE SORRY; WE WERE TOLD ON THE GND THAT THIS HAD BEEN CHANGED; BUT WE WILL DO ANYTHING WE'RE INSTRUCTED TO DO.' I WAS TOLD BY THIS CTLR TO 'CONTINUE ON COURSE; THE AUTH (UNKNOWN ENTITY) IS NOT GOING TO RPT THIS BECAUSE YOU WERE ON YOUR WAY OUT WHEN THE AREA WENT HOT.' REMAINDER OF FLT: WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ATLANTIC CITY APCH; THEN DOVER APCH; CONTINUING FROM DIXIE ALONG V16 TO S OF DOVER; DE; WHERE WE CANCELED FLT FOLLOWING; CLOSED OUR FLT PLAN WITH WASHINGTON RADIO AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) IF I HAD STAYED ON HOLD WITH NEW YORK FSS; I WOULD HAVE LEARNED THAT THE TFR WAS GOING AS SCHEDULED; AND I WOULD HAVE TAKEN 'THE LONG WAY AROUND' AND NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. 2) IF THE REPUBLIC GND CTLR HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE TFR; EVEN IF IT DIDN'T DIRECTLY AFFECT THEIR AIRSPACE (IT WAS WITHIN 50 NM) MAYBE WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS INCURSION. 3) IF TRACON (WHOEVER SHE WAS TALKING TO) HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE TFR; AND THAT THE CHEROKEE CAN ONLY MAKE 100 KTS; MAYBE A BETTER TIME-DISTANCE EVALUATION COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER US OR THE CTLR AND A BETTER DECISION COULD HAVEBEEN MADE. 4) IF THE JFK TWR CTLR HAD KNOWN WE WERE ABOUT TO FLY INTO AN AREA THAT WAS GOING TO 'GO HOT' WE COULD HAVE TURNED AROUND AND 'FLOWN THE LONG WAY AROUND.' 5) IF JFK HAD BEEN ABLE TO WORK A DIRECT HDOF TO MCGUIRE; MAYBE WE COULD HAVE AT LEAST BEEN A 'KNOWN QUANTITY' WHEN WE STARTED TALKING TO THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.