37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 742361 |
Time | |
Date | 200706 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zoa.artcc |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 31000 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zoa.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 80 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 1100 |
ASRS Report | 742361 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Chart Or Publication |
Narrative:
Deferred item does not contain enough flight crew information. With this condition of #4 hydraulic temperature fluctuating high from 55 degrees to 115 degrees. Deferred item makes no mention that the 'system fault' light remains on continuously; only that the light operate normally. Deferred item makes no mention that the #4 hydraulic system now has no means to monitor temperature should a subsequent actual overheat occur. I find this disturbing to fly a 12 hour leg with a #4 hydraulic temperature pegged out; an ember 'hydraulic overheat system 4' EICAS message; and 'system fault/overhead light' staring me in the face. All that is mentioned in log history is that hydraulic temperature was checked ok on ground. How was the check performed? After consulting maintenance; we collectively determined that the #4 temperature is a single source probe that triggers all 3 lights (EICAS hydraulic overheat system 4; system fault-overhead; and amber digital temperature readout on hydraulic synoptic). Also; hydraulic quantity indication must be available for this deferred item. So; basically; we fly along for 12 hours with a single source temperature probe inoperative; but showing pegged; out with no secondary way to monitor hydraulic temperature. So the deferred item allows the #4 system to burn itself off the accessory case of the #4 engine and your backup for monitoring system temperature is when the fluid drains from the system at point of failure. The deferred item needs to be rewritten and fixed at first maintenance opportunity available. I will not accept this condition for this long of flight next time. My first officer stated he had this aircraft on a flight in june. This needs to be repaired as soon as possible. There appears to be no temperature monitoring redundancy until point of failure of the #4 system. More information must be included for the flight crew's notes for future deferred item and shorter flight time limit.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B747-400 PILOT IS CONCERNED WITH THE DEFERRAL OF A #4 HYD SYS TEMP INDICATION AND BELIEVES THE DEFERRAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH INFO FOR FLT CREW.
Narrative: DEFERRED ITEM DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH FLT CREW INFO. WITH THIS CONDITION OF #4 HYD TEMP FLUCTUATING HIGH FROM 55 DEGS TO 115 DEGS. DEFERRED ITEM MAKES NO MENTION THAT THE 'SYS FAULT' LIGHT REMAINS ON CONTINUOUSLY; ONLY THAT THE LIGHT OPERATE NORMALLY. DEFERRED ITEM MAKES NO MENTION THAT THE #4 HYD SYS NOW HAS NO MEANS TO MONITOR TEMP SHOULD A SUBSEQUENT ACTUAL OVERHEAT OCCUR. I FIND THIS DISTURBING TO FLY A 12 HR LEG WITH A #4 HYD TEMP PEGGED OUT; AN EMBER 'HYD OVERHEAT SYS 4' EICAS MESSAGE; AND 'SYS FAULT/OVERHEAD LIGHT' STARING ME IN THE FACE. ALL THAT IS MENTIONED IN LOG HISTORY IS THAT HYD TEMP WAS CHKED OK ON GND. HOW WAS THE CHK PERFORMED? AFTER CONSULTING MAINT; WE COLLECTIVELY DETERMINED THAT THE #4 TEMP IS A SINGLE SOURCE PROBE THAT TRIGGERS ALL 3 LIGHTS (EICAS HYD OVERHEAT SYS 4; SYS FAULT-OVERHEAD; AND AMBER DIGITAL TEMP READOUT ON HYD SYNOPTIC). ALSO; HYD QUANTITY INDICATION MUST BE AVAILABLE FOR THIS DEFERRED ITEM. SO; BASICALLY; WE FLY ALONG FOR 12 HRS WITH A SINGLE SOURCE TEMP PROBE INOP; BUT SHOWING PEGGED; OUT WITH NO SECONDARY WAY TO MONITOR HYD TEMP. SO THE DEFERRED ITEM ALLOWS THE #4 SYS TO BURN ITSELF OFF THE ACCESSORY CASE OF THE #4 ENG AND YOUR BACKUP FOR MONITORING SYS TEMP IS WHEN THE FLUID DRAINS FROM THE SYS AT POINT OF FAILURE. THE DEFERRED ITEM NEEDS TO BE REWRITTEN AND FIXED AT FIRST MAINT OPPORTUNITY AVAILABLE. I WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS CONDITION FOR THIS LONG OF FLT NEXT TIME. MY FO STATED HE HAD THIS ACFT ON A FLT IN JUNE. THIS NEEDS TO BE REPAIRED ASAP. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO TEMP MONITORING REDUNDANCY UNTIL POINT OF FAILURE OF THE #4 SYS. MORE INFO MUST BE INCLUDED FOR THE FLT CREW'S NOTES FOR FUTURE DEFERRED ITEM AND SHORTER FLT TIME LIMIT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.