Narrative:

The aircraft's APU was inoperative. With the aircraft temperature inside in the mid 80's; I requested ground air; ground air was also inoperative. With no APU and parked at a critical blast gate; I tried to communicate with our tug driver our concern about how the aircraft would be pushed back in order to allow us the ability to perform a 'xbleed' start. The tug driver didn't seem to understand what my concern was. His english was broken and very difficult to understand. We called ramp control for help and were told that the aircraft would be pushed to a point that would allow for a xbleed start. Because of the inoperative APU; it was also necessary for us to start the 1 engine at the gate. It is normally our SOP to start the #1 engine first during normal operations; however; the tug driver cleared us to start the #2 engine first. Since this is not our normal sequence; I conferred with him that we were cleared on #2 engine first. He again replied; 'yes; you are cleared on #2 engine.' knowing that we had an air cart somewhere below the aircraft; I then asked the tug driver where the air cart was located. His reply was 'on the left; you are cleared to start #2 engine.' I was not sure where the air cart was located so I refused to start the engine. I then asked the first officer if he could see the cart and his reply was 'yes; it's right in front of the #2 engine.' I told the tug driver that I would not start the #2 engine with the air cart right in front of the engine. While he held the transmission button down to reply to me; I overheard someone yelling at him it was the #1 engine we were to start first. With that cleared up; we started the #1 engine; performed a xbleed start on #2 and left the gate area uneventfully. The lack of proper communication and understanding in this scenario could have resulted in an engine start very close proximity to the air start cart. The hose could have been ingested and the ramp personnel would have been in very close proximity to a turning motor. The tug driver could not distinguish between engine #1 and #2 and did not seem to think starting an engine with an air cart in front of it was a concern. I also had a very difficult time understanding the tug driver since his english was very poor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CAPTAIN REPORTS COMMUNICATION DIFFICULTIES WITH GROUND CREW WHO SPEAK POOR ENGLISH AND DO NOT KNOW WHICH ENGINE IS NUMBER ONE.

Narrative: THE ACFT'S APU WAS INOP. WITH THE ACFT TEMP INSIDE IN THE MID 80'S; I REQUESTED GND AIR; GND AIR WAS ALSO INOP. WITH NO APU AND PARKED AT A CRITICAL BLAST GATE; I TRIED TO COMMUNICATE WITH OUR TUG DRIVER OUR CONCERN ABOUT HOW THE ACFT WOULD BE PUSHED BACK IN ORDER TO ALLOW US THE ABILITY TO PERFORM A 'XBLEED' START. THE TUG DRIVER DIDN'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MY CONCERN WAS. HIS ENGLISH WAS BROKEN AND VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. WE CALLED RAMP CTL FOR HELP AND WERE TOLD THAT THE ACFT WOULD BE PUSHED TO A POINT THAT WOULD ALLOW FOR A XBLEED START. BECAUSE OF THE INOP APU; IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY FOR US TO START THE 1 ENG AT THE GATE. IT IS NORMALLY OUR SOP TO START THE #1 ENG FIRST DURING NORMAL OPS; HOWEVER; THE TUG DRIVER CLRED US TO START THE #2 ENG FIRST. SINCE THIS IS NOT OUR NORMAL SEQUENCE; I CONFERRED WITH HIM THAT WE WERE CLRED ON #2 ENG FIRST. HE AGAIN REPLIED; 'YES; YOU ARE CLRED ON #2 ENG.' KNOWING THAT WE HAD AN AIR CART SOMEWHERE BELOW THE ACFT; I THEN ASKED THE TUG DRIVER WHERE THE AIR CART WAS LOCATED. HIS REPLY WAS 'ON THE L; YOU ARE CLRED TO START #2 ENG.' I WAS NOT SURE WHERE THE AIR CART WAS LOCATED SO I REFUSED TO START THE ENG. I THEN ASKED THE FO IF HE COULD SEE THE CART AND HIS REPLY WAS 'YES; IT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE #2 ENG.' I TOLD THE TUG DRIVER THAT I WOULD NOT START THE #2 ENG WITH THE AIR CART RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE ENG. WHILE HE HELD THE XMISSION BUTTON DOWN TO REPLY TO ME; I OVERHEARD SOMEONE YELLING AT HIM IT WAS THE #1 ENG WE WERE TO START FIRST. WITH THAT CLRED UP; WE STARTED THE #1 ENG; PERFORMED A XBLEED START ON #2 AND LEFT THE GATE AREA UNEVENTFULLY. THE LACK OF PROPER COM AND UNDERSTANDING IN THIS SCENARIO COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN ENG START VERY CLOSE PROX TO THE AIR START CART. THE HOSE COULD HAVE BEEN INGESTED AND THE RAMP PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE BEEN IN VERY CLOSE PROX TO A TURNING MOTOR. THE TUG DRIVER COULD NOT DISTINGUISH BTWN ENG #1 AND #2 AND DID NOT SEEM TO THINK STARTING AN ENG WITH AN AIR CART IN FRONT OF IT WAS A CONCERN. I ALSO HAD A VERY DIFFICULT TIME UNDERSTANDING THE TUG DRIVER SINCE HIS ENGLISH WAS VERY POOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.