37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 743189 |
Time | |
Date | 200706 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 194 flight time type : 194 |
ASRS Report | 743189 |
Events | |
Anomaly | maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Our inbound aircraft arrived with a pack-trip write-up and maintenance control directed the contract maintenance in ZZZ to replace a pack valve. After the valve was installed and tested using the APU and engine motoring; I was advised by the contract maintenance personnel that maintenance control required that the engine be run at a high power setting (80% N1) for 5 mins per a boeing maintenance procedure to ensure that the pack would not trip off; and that I was to contact maintenance control. I wasn't comfortable with the thought that I and my crew would have to do this test and I asked the contract mechanics if they were qualified on B737-300/400 models and they said just check with our maintenance control to make sure it was ok for them to taxi our aircraft. I then contacted maintenance control and I relayed my concern for doing this test and asked if the ZZZ contract mechanics could do it. The reply was 'absolutely not!;' and maintenance control implied that I had to do the engine run. They said they were faxing all of the procedures to the contract maintenance people in ZZZ. After I hung up the phone; I still had misgivings about doing this; and I called maintenance control back and asked them who was authorized to be on the aircraft for this engine run and; were the flight attendants allowed to be on the airplane? And they said yes; the flight attendants could remain on board and for them just to arm the doors in the normal manner for taxi. I didn't like the sound of this whole thing; but I have never been placed in the situation before and I assumed that maintenance control has been doing this for a long time and if they were telling me that I had to perform this engine run; then I had to perform the engine run and they would provide me with all the necessary procedures. Now I find out after the fact that we as pilots are not trained to do these runs and that there are all kinds of safety procedures in place regarding safety zones; chocking of wheels; center of gravity requirements; etc. I was not informed of any of these requirements by maintenance control; not to mention the risks of taxiing the airplane clear across one of the busiest airports in the united states crossing 3 active runways -- once to get out to the engine run location and then again to return to the gate. In hindsight; I should never have done this test; and I feel that I should never have been pressured into doing it by maintenance control. I think that a statement needs to be added to the section in the fom regarding engine runs at idle; that states: 'flight crews will not perform any other types of engine runs.' I checked this portion of the fom prior to doing this engine run and it really only said that engine runs at the gate will be at idle; it said nothing that would prohibit engine runs above idle away from the gate. Directed by maintenance control to perform a high-power engine run; and led to believe that this was required and that I and my first officer were qualified to perform the engine run; and not given any information as to the risks; safety precautions; and procedures for said engine run.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737 PILOT TAXIES AN ACFT FOR A HIGH POWER RUN FOLLOWING A PACK VALVE CHANGE BUT IS NOT TOLD THAT THE THIS IS A MAINTENANCE ACTION NOT FOR PLTS.
Narrative: OUR INBOUND ACFT ARRIVED WITH A PACK-TRIP WRITE-UP AND MAINT CTL DIRECTED THE CONTRACT MAINT IN ZZZ TO REPLACE A PACK VALVE. AFTER THE VALVE WAS INSTALLED AND TESTED USING THE APU AND ENG MOTORING; I WAS ADVISED BY THE CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL THAT MAINT CTL REQUIRED THAT THE ENG BE RUN AT A HIGH PWR SETTING (80% N1) FOR 5 MINS PER A BOEING MAINT PROC TO ENSURE THAT THE PACK WOULD NOT TRIP OFF; AND THAT I WAS TO CONTACT MAINT CTL. I WASN'T COMFORTABLE WITH THE THOUGHT THAT I AND MY CREW WOULD HAVE TO DO THIS TEST AND I ASKED THE CONTRACT MECHS IF THEY WERE QUALIFIED ON B737-300/400 MODELS AND THEY SAID JUST CHK WITH OUR MAINT CTL TO MAKE SURE IT WAS OK FOR THEM TO TAXI OUR ACFT. I THEN CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND I RELAYED MY CONCERN FOR DOING THIS TEST AND ASKED IF THE ZZZ CONTRACT MECHS COULD DO IT. THE REPLY WAS 'ABSOLUTELY NOT!;' AND MAINT CTL IMPLIED THAT I HAD TO DO THE ENG RUN. THEY SAID THEY WERE FAXING ALL OF THE PROCS TO THE CONTRACT MAINT PEOPLE IN ZZZ. AFTER I HUNG UP THE PHONE; I STILL HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT DOING THIS; AND I CALLED MAINT CTL BACK AND ASKED THEM WHO WAS AUTHORIZED TO BE ON THE ACFT FOR THIS ENG RUN AND; WERE THE FLT ATTENDANTS ALLOWED TO BE ON THE AIRPLANE? AND THEY SAID YES; THE FLT ATTENDANTS COULD REMAIN ON BOARD AND FOR THEM JUST TO ARM THE DOORS IN THE NORMAL MANNER FOR TAXI. I DIDN'T LIKE THE SOUND OF THIS WHOLE THING; BUT I HAVE NEVER BEEN PLACED IN THE SITUATION BEFORE AND I ASSUMED THAT MAINT CTL HAS BEEN DOING THIS FOR A LONG TIME AND IF THEY WERE TELLING ME THAT I HAD TO PERFORM THIS ENG RUN; THEN I HAD TO PERFORM THE ENG RUN AND THEY WOULD PROVIDE ME WITH ALL THE NECESSARY PROCS. NOW I FIND OUT AFTER THE FACT THAT WE AS PLTS ARE NOT TRAINED TO DO THESE RUNS AND THAT THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF SAFETY PROCS IN PLACE REGARDING SAFETY ZONES; CHOCKING OF WHEELS; CTR OF GRAVITY REQUIREMENTS; ETC. I WAS NOT INFORMED OF ANY OF THESE REQUIREMENTS BY MAINT CTL; NOT TO MENTION THE RISKS OF TAXIING THE AIRPLANE CLEAR ACROSS ONE OF THE BUSIEST ARPTS IN THE UNITED STATES XING 3 ACTIVE RWYS -- ONCE TO GET OUT TO THE ENG RUN LOCATION AND THEN AGAIN TO RETURN TO THE GATE. IN HINDSIGHT; I SHOULD NEVER HAVE DONE THIS TEST; AND I FEEL THAT I SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN PRESSURED INTO DOING IT BY MAINT CTL. I THINK THAT A STATEMENT NEEDS TO BE ADDED TO THE SECTION IN THE FOM REGARDING ENG RUNS AT IDLE; THAT STATES: 'FLT CREWS WILL NOT PERFORM ANY OTHER TYPES OF ENG RUNS.' I CHKED THIS PORTION OF THE FOM PRIOR TO DOING THIS ENG RUN AND IT REALLY ONLY SAID THAT ENG RUNS AT THE GATE WILL BE AT IDLE; IT SAID NOTHING THAT WOULD PROHIBIT ENG RUNS ABOVE IDLE AWAY FROM THE GATE. DIRECTED BY MAINT CTL TO PERFORM A HIGH-PWR ENG RUN; AND LED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS REQUIRED AND THAT I AND MY FO WERE QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THE ENG RUN; AND NOT GIVEN ANY INFO AS TO THE RISKS; SAFETY PRECAUTIONS; AND PROCS FOR SAID ENG RUN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.