37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 744494 |
Time | |
Date | 200706 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ord.airport |
State Reference | IL |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : lga.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 215 flight time total : 3200 flight time type : 2800 |
ASRS Report | 744494 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure non adherence other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Chart Or Publication |
Primary Problem | Chart Or Publication |
Narrative:
Captain requests and directs first officer to conduct an external visual check of flap settings during taxi-out phase of flight operations on active taxiway at ord airport. I; the first officer; challenge the decision and make multiple attempts to persuade PIC to use different runway or contact ground control to let them know of our intentions with no positive result. Initially; I; the first officer; challenge the decision to exit aircraft on an active taxiway with engines running at idle; but captain cites for his judgement call the company flight manual which states; 'takeoff flaps must be set prior to departure and an external visual check must be accomplished to detect to any twisting; skewing; or abnormal deformation of the flaps. Use the information provided in the normal/abnormal outboard flap confign and outboard flaps go/no-go criteria figures located in this section. If any additional change is necessary; prior to takeoff; accomplish the visual check specified by the preceding figures...' this interpretation of a company flight manual puts a first officer in a precarious position. First officer's want to follow directions of PIC and provide an ideal CRM environment as they work as a 'team;' however; at the same time common sense is absent in this kind of decision making. This kind of company flight manual interpretation is a safety hazard and security risk. Thankfully; no incidents or accidents resulted. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the captain cited the company flight manual which states that a visual check of takeoff flaps is required if a change in flap position is made. The check is normally accomplished during preflight with takeoff flaps preset; but if a runway change necessitates another flap setting; this apparently mandates an 'external visual check.' apparently some capts for this carrier interpret this to mean that the first officer must exit the aircraft for this check.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ200 FO WAS ORDERED TO EXIT ACFT ON TAXIWAY TO VISUALLY CHECK FLAPS AFTER AN ALTERNATE FLAP SETTING WAS MADE.
Narrative: CAPT REQUESTS AND DIRECTS FO TO CONDUCT AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK OF FLAP SETTINGS DURING TAXI-OUT PHASE OF FLT OPS ON ACTIVE TXWY AT ORD ARPT. I; THE FO; CHALLENGE THE DECISION AND MAKE MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE PIC TO USE DIFFERENT RWY OR CONTACT GND CTL TO LET THEM KNOW OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH NO POSITIVE RESULT. INITIALLY; I; THE FO; CHALLENGE THE DECISION TO EXIT ACFT ON AN ACTIVE TXWY WITH ENGS RUNNING AT IDLE; BUT CAPT CITES FOR HIS JUDGEMENT CALL THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL WHICH STATES; 'TKOF FLAPS MUST BE SET PRIOR TO DEP AND AN EXTERNAL VISUAL CHK MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO DETECT TO ANY TWISTING; SKEWING; OR ABNORMAL DEFORMATION OF THE FLAPS. USE THE INFO PROVIDED IN THE NORMAL/ABNORMAL OUTBOARD FLAP CONFIGN AND OUTBOARD FLAPS GO/NO-GO CRITERIA FIGURES LOCATED IN THIS SECTION. IF ANY ADDITIONAL CHANGE IS NECESSARY; PRIOR TO TKOF; ACCOMPLISH THE VISUAL CHK SPECIFIED BY THE PRECEDING FIGURES...' THIS INTERP OF A COMPANY FLT MANUAL PUTS A FO IN A PRECARIOUS POS. FO'S WANT TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF PIC AND PROVIDE AN IDEAL CRM ENVIRONMENT AS THEY WORK AS A 'TEAM;' HOWEVER; AT THE SAME TIME COMMON SENSE IS ABSENT IN THIS KIND OF DECISION MAKING. THIS KIND OF COMPANY FLT MANUAL INTERP IS A SAFETY HAZARD AND SECURITY RISK. THANKFULLY; NO INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS RESULTED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THE CAPT CITED THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL WHICH STATES THAT A VISUAL CHECK OF TKOF FLAPS IS REQUIRED IF A CHANGE IN FLAP POSITION IS MADE. THE CHECK IS NORMALLY ACCOMPLISHED DURING PREFLIGHT WITH TKOF FLAPS PRESET; BUT IF A RWY CHANGE NECESSITATES ANOTHER FLAP SETTING; THIS APPARENTLY MANDATES AN 'EXTERNAL VISUAL CHECK.' APPARENTLY SOME CAPTS FOR THIS CARRIER INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT THE FO MUST EXIT THE ACFT FOR THIS CHECK.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.