Narrative:

Reason I feel this situation occurred: 1) staffing -- only 12 controllers scheduled for this evening shift which used to be the normal number for a standard night shift; which on a normal night shift is not considered busy. Previously this evening shift was assigned 15 controllers. 2) no coordinator -- at the time of the occurrence the traffic was very complex due to WX in the area and when help was needed there was no extra person to come over to the position to help with coordination or to assist in working or watching the traffic. 3) equipment not working -- the flight printers for the position I was working; which was departure east radar was not working properly. What was happening was my flight strip information was being sent to another position; which was departure west radar. What this meant is that I was talking to aircraft before I knew their route of flight which makes the position much more complex. 4) WX -- when I took the position there were thunderstorms that were encompassing the east departure gate which meant that the east departures off ind would not go that way without deviating. When this occurs this makes the position very complex. 5) no tmu -- even though there was known WX in the area no traffic management was instituted by the supervisor. Nothing was coordinated with the tower to control the traffic going east. 6) no supervisor in the TRACON -- there was no management official or supervisor in the TRACON during this occurrence. A controller in charge or controller in charge was overseeing the TRACON; which reduced even more available controllers. Air carrier X came off of the airport. I did not have flight plan information on the aircraft and issued radar contact. Complexity was increasing because of the efsts failure (flight strip) and WX deviations. I then called lcle to stop all east departures. I turned aircraft Z to a 050 degree heading to try to get away from departure traffic. I issued a heading to eastbound jet traffic and then climbed aircraft west; an eastbound propeller. Subsequently; aircraft Y came off of the airport. I did not have flight plan information and issued radar contact. I then received the flight progress strip for aircraft X and I turned the aircraft to a 090 degree heading. I then gave aircraft Z a heading of 050 degrees. I then got the strip for aircraft Y and climbed the aircraft to 050. I noticed aircraft Y and aircraft X on converging courses and aircraft X at 050 and aircraft Y at 040. I told aircraft Y to maintain 040 and he replied 'maintain 040; we were cleared to 050 and we will go back down to 040.' I noticed aircraft Y still climbing so I climbed aircraft X to 060 immediately.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IND CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 5000 WITH TWO ACFT ON CONVERGING COURSES; CITING WX AND TFC VOLUME/COMPLEXITY AS CAUSAL FACTORS.

Narrative: REASON I FEEL THIS SITUATION OCCURRED: 1) STAFFING -- ONLY 12 CTLRS SCHEDULED FOR THIS EVENING SHIFT WHICH USED TO BE THE NORMAL NUMBER FOR A STANDARD NIGHT SHIFT; WHICH ON A NORMAL NIGHT SHIFT IS NOT CONSIDERED BUSY. PREVIOUSLY THIS EVENING SHIFT WAS ASSIGNED 15 CTLRS. 2) NO COORDINATOR -- AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE THE TFC WAS VERY COMPLEX DUE TO WX IN THE AREA AND WHEN HELP WAS NEEDED THERE WAS NO EXTRA PERSON TO COME OVER TO THE POS TO HELP WITH COORD OR TO ASSIST IN WORKING OR WATCHING THE TFC. 3) EQUIP NOT WORKING -- THE FLT PRINTERS FOR THE POS I WAS WORKING; WHICH WAS DEP E RADAR WAS NOT WORKING PROPERLY. WHAT WAS HAPPENING WAS MY FLT STRIP INFO WAS BEING SENT TO ANOTHER POS; WHICH WAS DEP W RADAR. WHAT THIS MEANT IS THAT I WAS TALKING TO ACFT BEFORE I KNEW THEIR RTE OF FLT WHICH MAKES THE POS MUCH MORE COMPLEX. 4) WX -- WHEN I TOOK THE POS THERE WERE TSTMS THAT WERE ENCOMPASSING THE E DEP GATE WHICH MEANT THAT THE E DEPS OFF IND WOULD NOT GO THAT WAY WITHOUT DEVIATING. WHEN THIS OCCURS THIS MAKES THE POS VERY COMPLEX. 5) NO TMU -- EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS KNOWN WX IN THE AREA NO TFC MGMNT WAS INSTITUTED BY THE SUPVR. NOTHING WAS COORDINATED WITH THE TWR TO CTL THE TFC GOING E. 6) NO SUPVR IN THE TRACON -- THERE WAS NO MGMNT OFFICIAL OR SUPVR IN THE TRACON DURING THIS OCCURRENCE. A CIC OR CTLR IN CHARGE WAS OVERSEEING THE TRACON; WHICH REDUCED EVEN MORE AVAILABLE CTLRS. ACR X CAME OFF OF THE ARPT. I DID NOT HAVE FLT PLAN INFO ON THE ACFT AND ISSUED RADAR CONTACT. COMPLEXITY WAS INCREASING BECAUSE OF THE EFSTS FAILURE (FLT STRIP) AND WX DEVS. I THEN CALLED LCLE TO STOP ALL E DEPS. I TURNED ACFT Z TO A 050 DEG HDG TO TRY TO GET AWAY FROM DEP TFC. I ISSUED A HDG TO EBOUND JET TFC AND THEN CLBED ACFT W; AN EBOUND PROP. SUBSEQUENTLY; ACFT Y CAME OFF OF THE ARPT. I DID NOT HAVE FLT PLAN INFO AND ISSUED RADAR CONTACT. I THEN RECEIVED THE FLT PROGRESS STRIP FOR ACFT X AND I TURNED THE ACFT TO A 090 DEG HDG. I THEN GAVE ACFT Z A HDG OF 050 DEGS. I THEN GOT THE STRIP FOR ACFT Y AND CLBED THE ACFT TO 050. I NOTICED ACFT Y AND ACFT X ON CONVERGING COURSES AND ACFT X AT 050 AND ACFT Y AT 040. I TOLD ACFT Y TO MAINTAIN 040 AND HE REPLIED 'MAINTAIN 040; WE WERE CLRED TO 050 AND WE WILL GO BACK DOWN TO 040.' I NOTICED ACFT Y STILL CLBING SO I CLBED ACFT X TO 060 IMMEDIATELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.