Narrative:

I had completed the 'cockpit inspection' items on our checklist and obtained ATIS and our clearance from sjc clearance delivery and entered in the clearance data in our flight management system. After briefing our passenger; my first officer joined me in the cockpit and occupied the right seat. I provided him with ATIS and the clearance information. We then went through our 'before starting' checklist items; started the engines and then completed our 'before taxiing' checklist items. At that point; my first officer called sjc ground control and informed them we had ATIS and that we were ready to taxi from the FBO. The ground controller cleared us to taxi to runway 30L and directed us to obtain new ATIS and advise him when we had it. The first officer stated that we should turn left off the ramp to taxi to runway 30L and I concurred. I then throttled up our engines to begin taxiing and the FBO marshaler vigorously directed us to turn to our right to exit their ramp. The first officer commented that he had hoped the marshaler would direct us to turn to our left; which would have been a more direct taxi to runway 30L. As we started to taxi the first officer switched to the ATIS frequency to obtain the new ATIS. Unfortunately; he did not have ground control frequency programmed into our other radio and neither of us was monitoring ground control. At the time; I was not aware that neither of us were monitoring ground control and this was not communicated between us; which was a flaw in our CRM procedure. While we were taxiing; my first officer was obtaining new ATIS and I was going through the 'taxiing' checklist items. When we came to the entrance to what I thought to be taxiway V (but in fact it was the entrance to runway 11/29); I asked the first officer (who had the airport diagram) if this was where we turned right (to taxi to runway 30L) and he responded 'yes.' as we taxied up to the entrance to what we thought was taxiway V (neither of us noticed any runway signs or distinct markings); I looked left and visually cleared the intersection and airspace above it and stated 'clear left' and the first officer looked to the right and visually cleared the intersection and airspace above it and stated 'clear right.' after confirming that there were no potential conflicts to the left and right; we entered the intersection and turned right onto what we though was taxiway V (heading southeast); but unfortunately; we had mistakenly entered onto runway 11/29. At that time the first officer switched from the ATIS frequency back to ground control frequency to advise him we had the new ATIS; and the controller immediately advised that we had turned onto runway 29 and had committed a 'pilot deviation.' as I recall the first officer immediately apologized to the ground controller and asked for instructions; to which the controller advised us to continue taxiing (southeast) down runway 11/29 and exit at the end and then continue our taxi to runway 30L. We taxied to runway 30L and upon arriving and switching to the tower frequency; we were advised to call the sjc tower manager upon our arrival. We were then cleared for takeoff from runway 30L and flew from sjc to ZZZ without further incident. Shortly after arriving at ZZZ we called the san jose tower manager (while in my presence; but I could only hear my first officer's side the conversation). The tower manager advised of the deviation report. The first officer told me that during his conversation with the tower manager; he was told that there had been 5 to 6 similar 'pilot deviations' on this runway in recent months and that there had been problems with the FBO marshalers and ramp personnel in other incidents; as well. I spoke with a san jose FSDO operations inspector who confirmed that there had been many similar incidents in the last year on runway 29 from aircraft departing the FBO. This was only the second time that either of us has flown into or out of sjc and we were not very familiar with the airport environment. Finally; the tower manager advised that 1) there was no conflicting traffic during the 'pilot deviation;' 2) we did not place any other aircraft in danger; 3) no inbound aircraft was required to execute a 'go around;' and 4) the incident did not cost anyone any money. It may be appropriate for the FAA to look at what may be possible shortcomings in the airport infrastructure on the ramp area near the FBO and the adjacent taxiway area. Better signage and markings could reduce the possibility of new 'pilot deviations.' furthermore; the commercial airport diagram is not very clear in depicting this area of the airport; the FBO ramp and how it integrates with taxiway V. Also; providing pilots who are departing from the FBO ramp a handout bringing attention to this problem and better training of marshalers with emphasis on which direction they direct aircraft to turn out of the ramp could reduce confusion and increase safety when taxiing away from the FBO.supplemental information from acn 744538: C560 requested taxi clearance from FBO for IFR departure and was instructed to taxi to runway 30L; which aircraft acknowledged. Controller noticed aircraft turn wrong direction on taxiway V; which is adjacent to FBO. Controller attempted but was unable to raise pilot on frequency after initial contact. Controller then noticed aircraft turn towards runway 29 at taxiway G; still unable to raise pilot on frequency. Controller observed aircraft turn onto runway 29; and alerted the tower controller. Eventually able to raise pilot who stated he was getting the current ATIS. The intersection of runway 29 taxiway G is clearly marked with signs and ground markings in red denoting a runway. There are no runway guard lights associated with this runway as it is primarily used for light GA aircraft. Sjc has had several pilot deviations of a similar nature in the same exact manner; whereas corporate type aircraft turn the wrong way out of the FBO and turn onto runway 29 at taxiway G. It seems inexplicable to try to understand how to prevent this type of error; except to say it probably has to do with situational awareness on behalf of the flight crews.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that in retrospect the vigorous marshaler taxi signals were intended to keep the aircraft turning right onto taxiway V. The ramp was not well marked in the area the aircraft was exiting and so the distinction between a taxiway (V) and runway was not clear. The area the aircraft was exiting appeared to be ramp and because a more narrow taxiway (F) was immediately in front of them leading onto what appeared to be a long wide taxiway (in fact runway 11/29) that path appeared the more obvious taxi direction. Compounding the problem was the fact that the first officer was getting ATIS leaving the captain solo during the initial critical taxi evolution. The reporter suggests more signage to identify the distinction between the FBO ramp and the taxiway and additionally upright signs for runway 11/29 at taxiway F. The reporter does not remember seeing any signs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT RPTS TAXIING ONTO SJC RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F AFTER LEAVING THE FBO RAMP IMMEDIATELY SE OF THE SJC TWR.

Narrative: I HAD COMPLETED THE 'COCKPIT INSPECTION' ITEMS ON OUR CHKLIST AND OBTAINED ATIS AND OUR CLRNC FROM SJC CLRNC DELIVERY AND ENTERED IN THE CLRNC DATA IN OUR FLT MGMNT SYSTEM. AFTER BRIEFING OUR PAX; MY FO JOINED ME IN THE COCKPIT AND OCCUPIED THE R SEAT. I PROVIDED HIM WITH ATIS AND THE CLRNC INFO. WE THEN WENT THROUGH OUR 'BEFORE STARTING' CHKLIST ITEMS; STARTED THE ENGINES AND THEN COMPLETED OUR 'BEFORE TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. AT THAT POINT; MY FO CALLED SJC GND CTL AND INFORMED THEM WE HAD ATIS AND THAT WE WERE READY TO TAXI FROM THE FBO. THE GND CTLR CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND DIRECTED US TO OBTAIN NEW ATIS AND ADVISE HIM WHEN WE HAD IT. THE FO STATED THAT WE SHOULD TURN L OFF THE RAMP TO TAXI TO RWY 30L AND I CONCURRED. I THEN THROTTLED UP OUR ENGINES TO BEGIN TAXIING AND THE FBO MARSHALER VIGOROUSLY DIRECTED US TO TURN TO OUR R TO EXIT THEIR RAMP. THE FO COMMENTED THAT HE HAD HOPED THE MARSHALER WOULD DIRECT US TO TURN TO OUR L; WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE DIRECT TAXI TO RWY 30L. AS WE STARTED TO TAXI THE FO SWITCHED TO THE ATIS FREQ TO OBTAIN THE NEW ATIS. UNFORTUNATELY; HE DID NOT HAVE GND CTL FREQ PROGRAMMED INTO OUR OTHER RADIO AND NEITHER OF US WAS MONITORING GND CTL. AT THE TIME; I WAS NOT AWARE THAT NEITHER OF US WERE MONITORING GND CTL AND THIS WAS NOT COMMUNICATED BETWEEN US; WHICH WAS A FLAW IN OUR CRM PROC. WHILE WE WERE TAXIING; MY FO WAS OBTAINING NEW ATIS AND I WAS GOING THROUGH THE 'TAXIING' CHKLIST ITEMS. WHEN WE CAME TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT I THOUGHT TO BE TXWY V (BUT IN FACT IT WAS THE ENTRANCE TO RWY 11/29); I ASKED THE FO (WHO HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM) IF THIS WAS WHERE WE TURNED R (TO TAXI TO RWY 30L) AND HE RESPONDED 'YES.' AS WE TAXIED UP TO THE ENTRANCE TO WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS TXWY V (NEITHER OF US NOTICED ANY RUNWAY SIGNS OR DISTINCT MARKINGS); I LOOKED L AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR L' AND THE FO LOOKED TO THE R AND VISUALLY CLRED THE INTXN AND AIRSPACE ABOVE IT AND STATED 'CLR R.' AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THERE WERE NO POTENTIAL CONFLICTS TO THE L AND R; WE ENTERED THE INTXN AND TURNED R ONTO WHAT WE THOUGH WAS TXWY V (HEADING SE); BUT UNFORTUNATELY; WE HAD MISTAKENLY ENTERED ONTO RWY 11/29. AT THAT TIME THE FO SWITCHED FROM THE ATIS FREQ BACK TO GND CTL FREQ TO ADVISE HIM WE HAD THE NEW ATIS; AND THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT WE HAD TURNED ONTO RWY 29 AND HAD COMMITTED A 'PLT DEV.' AS I RECALL THE FO IMMEDIATELY APOLOGIZED TO THE GND CTLR AND ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS; TO WHICH THE CTLR ADVISED US TO CONTINUE TAXIING (SE) DOWN RWY 11/29 AND EXIT AT THE END AND THEN CONTINUE OUR TAXI TO RWY 30L. WE TAXIED TO RWY 30L AND UPON ARRIVING AND SWITCHING TO THE TWR FREQ; WE WERE ADVISED TO CALL THE SJC TWR MGR UPON OUR ARRIVAL. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF FROM RWY 30L AND FLEW FROM SJC TO ZZZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING AT ZZZ WE CALLED THE SAN JOSE TWR MGR (WHILE IN MY PRESENCE; BUT I COULD ONLY HEAR MY FO'S SIDE THE CONVERSATION). THE TWR MGR ADVISED OF THE DEV RPT. THE FO TOLD ME THAT DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE TWR MGR; HE WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN 5 TO 6 SIMILAR 'PLT DEVS' ON THIS RWY IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROBS WITH THE FBO MARSHALERS AND RAMP PERSONNEL IN OTHER INCIDENTS; AS WELL. I SPOKE WITH A SAN JOSE FSDO OPS INSPECTOR WHO CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MANY SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE LAST YEAR ON RWY 29 FROM ACFT DEPARTING THE FBO. THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TIME THAT EITHER OF US HAS FLOWN INTO OR OUT OF SJC AND WE WERE NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT. FINALLY; THE TWR MGR ADVISED THAT 1) THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC DURING THE 'PLT DEV;' 2) WE DID NOT PLACE ANY OTHER ACFT IN DANGER; 3) NO INBOUND ACFT WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE A 'GAR;' AND 4) THE INCIDENT DID NOT COST ANYONE ANY MONEY. IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE FAA TO LOOK AT WHAT MAY BE POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE ARPT INFRASTRUCTURE ON THE RAMP AREA NEAR THE FBO AND THE ADJACENT TXWY AREA. BETTER SIGNAGE AND MARKINGS COULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW 'PLT DEVS.' FURTHERMORE; THE COMMERCIAL ARPT DIAGRAM IS NOT VERY CLR IN DEPICTING THIS AREA OF THE ARPT; THE FBO RAMP AND HOW IT INTEGRATES WITH TXWY V. ALSO; PROVIDING PLTS WHO ARE DEPARTING FROM THE FBO RAMP A HANDOUT BRINGING ATTENTION TO THIS PROB AND BETTER TRAINING OF MARSHALERS WITH EMPHASIS ON WHICH DIRECTION THEY DIRECT ACFT TO TURN OUT OF THE RAMP COULD REDUCE CONFUSION AND INCREASE SAFETY WHEN TAXIING AWAY FROM THE FBO.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 744538: C560 REQUESTED TAXI CLRNC FROM FBO FOR IFR DEP AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 30L; WHICH ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED. CTLR NOTICED ACFT TURN WRONG DIRECTION ON TXWY V; WHICH IS ADJACENT TO FBO. CTLR ATTEMPTED BUT WAS UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY AFTER INITIAL CONTACT. CTLR THEN NOTICED ACFT TURN TOWARDS RWY 29 AT TXWY G; STILL UNABLE TO RAISE PLT ON FREQUENCY. CTLR OBSERVED ACFT TURN ONTO RWY 29; AND ALERTED THE TOWER CTLR. EVENTUALLY ABLE TO RAISE PLT WHO STATED HE WAS GETTING THE CURRENT ATIS. THE INTXN OF RWY 29 TXWY G IS CLRLY MARKED WITH SIGNS AND GROUND MARKINGS IN RED DENOTING A RWY. THERE ARE NO RWY GUARD LIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RWY AS IT IS PRIMARILY USED FOR LIGHT GA ACFT. SJC HAS HAD SEVERAL PLT DEVS OF A SIMILAR NATURE IN THE SAME EXACT MANNER; WHEREAS CORPORATE TYPE ACFT TURN THE WRONG WAY OUT OF THE FBO AND TURN ONTO RWY 29 AT TXWY G. IT SEEMS INEXPLICABLE TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND HOW TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF ERROR; EXCEPT TO SAY IT PROBABLY HAS TO DO WITH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON BEHALF OF THE FLT CREWS.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT IN RETROSPECT THE VIGOROUS MARSHALER TAXI SIGNALS WERE INTENDED TO KEEP THE ACFT TURNING R ONTO TXWY V. THE RAMP WAS NOT WELL MARKED IN THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING AND SO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A TXWY (V) AND RWY WAS NOT CLEAR. THE AREA THE ACFT WAS EXITING APPEARED TO BE RAMP AND BECAUSE A MORE NARROW TXWY (F) WAS IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THEM LEADING ONTO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LONG WIDE TXWY (IN FACT RWY 11/29) THAT PATH APPEARED THE MORE OBVIOUS TAXI DIRECTION. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM WAS THE FACT THAT THE FO WAS GETTING ATIS LEAVING THE CAPT SOLO DURING THE INITIAL CRITICAL TAXI EVOLUTION. THE RPTR SUGGESTS MORE SIGNAGE TO IDENTIFY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FBO RAMP AND THE TXWY AND ADDITIONALLY UPRIGHT SIGNS FOR RWY 11/29 AT TXWY F. THE RPTR DOES NOT REMEMBER SEEING ANY SIGNS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.