Narrative:

Crew day began at XA00 after a minimum 10 hour rest. One flight out and back and then 8 hours at the hangar prior to a XL00 departure to north bend; or. This ended up being a 14 hour 30 min duty day. Crew had flown into north bend the previous day and flown a VOR DME arc approach to a circle to land on runway 22. On this night flight the airport beacon was in sight about 30-40 mi out but was then obscured by a mid level overcast layer of clouds. About 15-20 mi out the WX allowed a visual approach to runway 22. Wind favored runway 22 and it is the longest runway. The PF set up a visual approach for runway 22 on the FMS. The unicom operator advised there was no other traffic in the area. I attempted to turn up the runway lights on runway 22 without success. There appeared to be REIL at or near the approach end of runway 22 and I could see the MALSR activated for runway 4. At about 10 mi final we received a ground proximity warning which caused a distraction. The PF was following the 'GS' set in the FMS. Continued the visual without runway lights. Could clearly see the taxiway lights and a partial row of runway lights on the left side of the runway. PF continued the approach; was able to verify the runway by sighting the runway numbers and landed. Neither the center or the unicom operator were aware that the runway lights were inoperative and no NOTAM had been issued. Later review of the AFD showed that the HIRL for runway 4/22 are controled by the unicom operator; who was aware of our visual approach to runway 22. Have no idea why I did not advise the PF that the runway lights were inoperative and suggest left traffic for runway 31. This should have been done as we approached pattern altitude. Factors involved included the fact that we were tired; PF had much more experience in general and the aircraft in particular than I did; time constraint in that we had to get back to home base for fuel to avoid a callout fee for an early morning departure by another crew; and the common error of continuing an approach until it was easier to land then go around. Lesson learned is to review lighting at destination prior to departure; brief lighting during the approach briefing; and don't continue the approach without runway lights. Other danger was to rely on FMS descent angle which may not give adequate terrain clearance as the descent angle is set by the crew! On a long straight in to final visual approach there is really no data for the crew to use to set a safe descent angle in the FMS. The PF; over 18 months of operating single pilot in this aircraft; rationalized it was safer to continue the approach as he had an artificial GS rather than go around at an unfamiliar airport. Perhaps so; but the error was made long before that became an option. Verbalize any and all problems as soon as they are observed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LANDING IS PERFORMED WITH ONLY PARTIAL RWY LIGHTS AVAILABLE ON RWY22 AT OTH.

Narrative: CREW DAY BEGAN AT XA00 AFTER A MINIMUM 10 HR REST. ONE FLT OUT AND BACK AND THEN 8 HRS AT THE HANGAR PRIOR TO A XL00 DEP TO NORTH BEND; OR. THIS ENDED UP BEING A 14 HR 30 MIN DUTY DAY. CREW HAD FLOWN INTO NORTH BEND THE PREVIOUS DAY AND FLOWN A VOR DME ARC APCH TO A CIRCLE TO LAND ON RWY 22. ON THIS NIGHT FLT THE ARPT BEACON WAS IN SIGHT ABOUT 30-40 MI OUT BUT WAS THEN OBSCURED BY A MID LEVEL OVCST LAYER OF CLOUDS. ABOUT 15-20 MI OUT THE WX ALLOWED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 22. WIND FAVORED RWY 22 AND IT IS THE LONGEST RWY. THE PF SET UP A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 22 ON THE FMS. THE UNICOM OPERATOR ADVISED THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC IN THE AREA. I ATTEMPTED TO TURN UP THE RWY LIGHTS ON RWY 22 WITHOUT SUCCESS. THERE APPEARED TO BE REIL AT OR NEAR THE APCH END OF RWY 22 AND I COULD SEE THE MALSR ACTIVATED FOR RWY 4. AT ABOUT 10 MI FINAL WE RECEIVED A GND PROX WARNING WHICH CAUSED A DISTR. THE PF WAS FOLLOWING THE 'GS' SET IN THE FMS. CONTINUED THE VISUAL WITHOUT RWY LIGHTS. COULD CLRLY SEE THE TXWY LIGHTS AND A PARTIAL ROW OF RWY LIGHTS ON THE L SIDE OF THE RWY. PF CONTINUED THE APCH; WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THE RWY BY SIGHTING THE RWY NUMBERS AND LANDED. NEITHER THE CTR OR THE UNICOM OPERATOR WERE AWARE THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WERE INOP AND NO NOTAM HAD BEEN ISSUED. LATER REVIEW OF THE AFD SHOWED THAT THE HIRL FOR RWY 4/22 ARE CTLED BY THE UNICOM OPERATOR; WHO WAS AWARE OF OUR VISUAL APCH TO RWY 22. HAVE NO IDEA WHY I DID NOT ADVISE THE PF THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WERE INOP AND SUGGEST L TFC FOR RWY 31. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE AS WE APCHED PATTERN ALT. FACTORS INVOLVED INCLUDED THE FACT THAT WE WERE TIRED; PF HAD MUCH MORE EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL AND THE ACFT IN PARTICULAR THAN I DID; TIME CONSTRAINT IN THAT WE HAD TO GET BACK TO HOME BASE FOR FUEL TO AVOID A CALLOUT FEE FOR AN EARLY MORNING DEP BY ANOTHER CREW; AND THE COMMON ERROR OF CONTINUING AN APCH UNTIL IT WAS EASIER TO LAND THEN GAR. LESSON LEARNED IS TO REVIEW LIGHTING AT DEST PRIOR TO DEP; BRIEF LIGHTING DURING THE APCH BRIEFING; AND DON'T CONTINUE THE APCH WITHOUT RWY LIGHTS. OTHER DANGER WAS TO RELY ON FMS DSCNT ANGLE WHICH MAY NOT GIVE ADEQUATE TERRAIN CLRNC AS THE DSCNT ANGLE IS SET BY THE CREW! ON A LONG STRAIGHT IN TO FINAL VISUAL APCH THERE IS REALLY NO DATA FOR THE CREW TO USE TO SET A SAFE DSCNT ANGLE IN THE FMS. THE PF; OVER 18 MONTHS OF OPERATING SINGLE PLT IN THIS ACFT; RATIONALIZED IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE THE APCH AS HE HAD AN ARTIFICIAL GS RATHER THAN GO AROUND AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT. PERHAPS SO; BUT THE ERROR WAS MADE LONG BEFORE THAT BECAME AN OPTION. VERBALIZE ANY AND ALL PROBS AS SOON AS THEY ARE OBSERVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.