Narrative:

While on the STAR into dfw about 30 mi north of ukw VOR; we were level at 11000 ft and handed off to the dfw approach controller. A couple of mins before the handoff; the captain and I noticed 3 distinct buildups/thunderstorms on our WX radar display near ukw VOR. One of the buildups was directly over our LNAV map routing with 2 others slightly off to the right (west) of our route; each of them separated by approximately 5 or 6 mi. Each buildup painted a very sharp precipitation gradient (very thin green/yellow edge and solid red throughout the middle part of the return) on our radar and were about 2 mi wide in diameter. As we got within about 20-30 mi of the buildups; myself and the captain decided that we would need to go slightly left (5 degrees or less) to get around the one directly in front of us or a larger turn to the right to get around both of the buildups to the west. At about 20 mi from the buildups; I informed approach that we would need a left or right turn to get around 3 buildups that we were painting at 12 - 1 O'clock position and 20 mi. I believe that he informed us at that time that he would be unable to let us go left; but gave no further indication of what other options were available to us. A min or so later; now about 15 mi from the storms which were now 12 - 2 O'clock position; we again told him we would need a slight turn to the left or a larger turn about 40-50 degrees right to get around the storms; which we were now closer to. At that point; he told us that he was planning on having us go between the 2 storms to our right; just as an aircraft in front of us on the arrival had done. The captain and I quickly agreed that flying between the 2 storms wasn't an option (as they were very distinct buildups and separated by about 6 mi) and told ATC that we wouldn't accept that routing due to the small distance between the storms and the strength of the echoes and would accept any other vector he could give us around them. At that point he told us that he was 'unable' and asked us what our alternate was. We told him that our alternate was san antonio and then communicated that we could accept holding anywhere as a possible option. He informed us that holding was also not possible and then solicited a ride report from the aircraft in front of us who had just split the 2 storms. The preceding aircraft reported that the ride for them had been acceptable; just light turbulence; and the approach controller repeated that PIREP to us and told us the aircraft's position. Again the captain and I quickly agreed that going between the cells was not an option; and again told approach that we would accept any hold or vectoring; but that splitting the cells was not going to happen. At that point he said something to the effect of 'either you can accept that routing or you're going to san antonio; which is it?' we told him that if those were our only choices; that we would divert to san antonio. At that point he gave us about an 80 degree vector to the east and assigned us a climb to 17000 ft. We were then handed off (as best I remember) to another approach controller. When we checked in; I told him our assigned heading and altitude and informed him that if holding or a delay vector were available anywhere in their sector that we would accept it. The new controller informed us that neither was available and assigned us routing toward a fix for a STAR into san antonio. We repeated the clearance back and at this point our workload became extreme. I informed the captain that I would need to open the alternate charts brick to get the san antonio plates out so that the arrival and approach could be loaded into the FMC; at which time he opted to handle ATC communications and fly the airplane. During this time I also obtained the arrival ATIS at san antonio; made a call to the flight attendants informing them of our new destination and made a short PA to our passenger indicating that due to thunderstorms and ATC constraints we were diverting to san antonio. I then attempted to call operations for a patch to dispatch to inform them of the diversion. Operations didn't answer the radio; so I attempted to call dispatch without success. I then sent an ACARS to dispatch and asked them to come up on frequency; which they did just seconds later; and informed him that ATC was unable to work us around the WX in dfw and that we were proceeding to san antonio. He told me that we would be handled at XXX gate in san antonio and that he was going to call center to find out what the reason for our diversion was. (Note: in all of the approach/center communications; which are somewhat a blur; at one point we were informed that we were speaking to either an approach or center supervisor). At this point the captain told me that he would like to speak with dispatch and xferred control of the aircraft and ATC communications to me and told me what our assigned altitude and routing were. While the captain was talking to our dispatcher; I was told by center that if we would like to go back to dfw that was now available to us. I told the captain what ATC had offered and he said that that was fine; at which time I informed the controller that we would like to proceed to dfw. He then gave us a new heading and a descent clearance and handed us off to another controller. At this point our workload increased even more; which I wouldn't have thought possible at the time. We were given a vector to a fix that neither of us were familiar with on an arrival we had never been on. At this point the captain took control of the aircraft again and I got out the arrival chart and began to reload our new routing into the FMC. I also called the flight attendants; again; and informed them of the latest change of plans. As it turned out; the fix we were being vectored to was right behind another large thunderstorm and so we told ATC that we would need a vector around it. The sector was extremely busy and the controller seemed to have significant traffic considerations with regard to our return to ZZZ and asked us if we would be able to cross fever intersection at some lower altitude. Since we didn't know where we were relative to this new fix; yet since we were still plugging the arrival routing into the FMC; we asked her to stand by. She instead assigned us a heading; which as it turned out routed us through a cell of heavy precipitation and moderate turbulence. (We hadn't had time to re-adjust the WX radar tilt and didn't have a clear picture of the WX in front of us at that moment). She then handed us off to another approach controller who gave us another heading and indicated that it would be a vector for a visual approach to runway 36L. Shortly thereafter; we had the approach plugged into the FMC and were generally caught up. The final approach controller (who I believe was the same controller who had previously required that we divert) gave us vectors around WX near the airport when we requested them this time. The remainder of the arrival; approach and landing were normal. It is my opinion; based on the original approach controller's tone of voice and reliance on a preceding aircraft's PIREP to influence our decision about our routing around the WX; that this diversion was unnecessary. I believe that he became frustrated with our decision to not follow the preceding aircraft between the buildups and chose to not consider other routing; holding or delay vectors for our flight. I also believe that our extreme workload was in itself a hazardous situation even though we worked very well together throughout this ordeal. Our somewhat degraded situational awareness; as indicated by our flying through an area of heavy precipitation and turbulence on our return to dfw; is just one example of many possibilities of potential threats that exist when both crew members are saturated in dealing with rapidly changing situations over an extended period of time. Because I don't know exactly what the approach controllers' (meaning both of them since we were denied holding/vectors twice) considerations were at the time; I don't know if any course of action -- by them or us -- could have been taken to prevent this situation. I would personally like to know if this event occurred out of a legitimate absence of workable choices by the approach controllers' (both of them) standpoint or if we were needlessly diverted to san antonio because of a frustrated person's inability to accept our (safety based) refusal to transition to an area of thunderstorms.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR FLT CREW INBOUND TO DFW IN CONVECTIVE WX IS UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE PASSAGE AROUND CELLS. REPORTEDLY; APCH CTLR IS INSENSITIVE TO THEIR PREDICAMENT AND DIRECTS THEM TO DIVERT TO AN ALTERNATE.

Narrative: WHILE ON THE STAR INTO DFW ABOUT 30 MI N OF UKW VOR; WE WERE LEVEL AT 11000 FT AND HANDED OFF TO THE DFW APCH CTLR. A COUPLE OF MINS BEFORE THE HDOF; THE CAPT AND I NOTICED 3 DISTINCT BUILDUPS/TSTMS ON OUR WX RADAR DISPLAY NEAR UKW VOR. ONE OF THE BUILDUPS WAS DIRECTLY OVER OUR LNAV MAP ROUTING WITH 2 OTHERS SLIGHTLY OFF TO THE R (W) OF OUR RTE; EACH OF THEM SEPARATED BY APPROX 5 OR 6 MI. EACH BUILDUP PAINTED A VERY SHARP PRECIP GRADIENT (VERY THIN GREEN/YELLOW EDGE AND SOLID RED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE PART OF THE RETURN) ON OUR RADAR AND WERE ABOUT 2 MI WIDE IN DIAMETER. AS WE GOT WITHIN ABOUT 20-30 MI OF THE BUILDUPS; MYSELF AND THE CAPT DECIDED THAT WE WOULD NEED TO GO SLIGHTLY L (5 DEGS OR LESS) TO GET AROUND THE ONE DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US OR A LARGER TURN TO THE R TO GET AROUND BOTH OF THE BUILDUPS TO THE W. AT ABOUT 20 MI FROM THE BUILDUPS; I INFORMED APCH THAT WE WOULD NEED A L OR R TURN TO GET AROUND 3 BUILDUPS THAT WE WERE PAINTING AT 12 - 1 O'CLOCK POS AND 20 MI. I BELIEVE THAT HE INFORMED US AT THAT TIME THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO LET US GO L; BUT GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION OF WHAT OTHER OPTIONS WERE AVAILABLE TO US. A MIN OR SO LATER; NOW ABOUT 15 MI FROM THE STORMS WHICH WERE NOW 12 - 2 O'CLOCK POS; WE AGAIN TOLD HIM WE WOULD NEED A SLIGHT TURN TO THE L OR A LARGER TURN ABOUT 40-50 DEGS R TO GET AROUND THE STORMS; WHICH WE WERE NOW CLOSER TO. AT THAT POINT; HE TOLD US THAT HE WAS PLANNING ON HAVING US GO BTWN THE 2 STORMS TO OUR R; JUST AS AN ACFT IN FRONT OF US ON THE ARR HAD DONE. THE CAPT AND I QUICKLY AGREED THAT FLYING BTWN THE 2 STORMS WASN'T AN OPTION (AS THEY WERE VERY DISTINCT BUILDUPS AND SEPARATED BY ABOUT 6 MI) AND TOLD ATC THAT WE WOULDN'T ACCEPT THAT ROUTING DUE TO THE SMALL DISTANCE BTWN THE STORMS AND THE STRENGTH OF THE ECHOES AND WOULD ACCEPT ANY OTHER VECTOR HE COULD GIVE US AROUND THEM. AT THAT POINT HE TOLD US THAT HE WAS 'UNABLE' AND ASKED US WHAT OUR ALTERNATE WAS. WE TOLD HIM THAT OUR ALTERNATE WAS SAN ANTONIO AND THEN COMMUNICATED THAT WE COULD ACCEPT HOLDING ANYWHERE AS A POSSIBLE OPTION. HE INFORMED US THAT HOLDING WAS ALSO NOT POSSIBLE AND THEN SOLICITED A RIDE RPT FROM THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US WHO HAD JUST SPLIT THE 2 STORMS. THE PRECEDING ACFT RPTED THAT THE RIDE FOR THEM HAD BEEN ACCEPTABLE; JUST LIGHT TURB; AND THE APCH CTLR REPEATED THAT PIREP TO US AND TOLD US THE ACFT'S POS. AGAIN THE CAPT AND I QUICKLY AGREED THAT GOING BTWN THE CELLS WAS NOT AN OPTION; AND AGAIN TOLD APCH THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT ANY HOLD OR VECTORING; BUT THAT SPLITTING THE CELLS WAS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. AT THAT POINT HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF 'EITHER YOU CAN ACCEPT THAT ROUTING OR YOU'RE GOING TO SAN ANTONIO; WHICH IS IT?' WE TOLD HIM THAT IF THOSE WERE OUR ONLY CHOICES; THAT WE WOULD DIVERT TO SAN ANTONIO. AT THAT POINT HE GAVE US ABOUT AN 80 DEG VECTOR TO THE E AND ASSIGNED US A CLB TO 17000 FT. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF (AS BEST I REMEMBER) TO ANOTHER APCH CTLR. WHEN WE CHKED IN; I TOLD HIM OUR ASSIGNED HDG AND ALT AND INFORMED HIM THAT IF HOLDING OR A DELAY VECTOR WERE AVAILABLE ANYWHERE IN THEIR SECTOR THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT IT. THE NEW CTLR INFORMED US THAT NEITHER WAS AVAILABLE AND ASSIGNED US ROUTING TOWARD A FIX FOR A STAR INTO SAN ANTONIO. WE REPEATED THE CLRNC BACK AND AT THIS POINT OUR WORKLOAD BECAME EXTREME. I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I WOULD NEED TO OPEN THE ALTERNATE CHARTS BRICK TO GET THE SAN ANTONIO PLATES OUT SO THAT THE ARR AND APCH COULD BE LOADED INTO THE FMC; AT WHICH TIME HE OPTED TO HANDLE ATC COMS AND FLY THE AIRPLANE. DURING THIS TIME I ALSO OBTAINED THE ARR ATIS AT SAN ANTONIO; MADE A CALL TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS INFORMING THEM OF OUR NEW DEST AND MADE A SHORT PA TO OUR PAX INDICATING THAT DUE TO TSTMS AND ATC CONSTRAINTS WE WERE DIVERTING TO SAN ANTONIO. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO CALL OPS FOR A PATCH TO DISPATCH TO INFORM THEM OF THE DIVERSION. OPS DIDN'T ANSWER THE RADIO; SO I ATTEMPTED TO CALL DISPATCH WITHOUT SUCCESS. I THEN SENT AN ACARS TO DISPATCH AND ASKED THEM TO COME UP ON FREQ; WHICH THEY DID JUST SECONDS LATER; AND INFORMED HIM THAT ATC WAS UNABLE TO WORK US AROUND THE WX IN DFW AND THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING TO SAN ANTONIO. HE TOLD ME THAT WE WOULD BE HANDLED AT XXX GATE IN SAN ANTONIO AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO CALL CTR TO FIND OUT WHAT THE REASON FOR OUR DIVERSION WAS. (NOTE: IN ALL OF THE APCH/CTR COMS; WHICH ARE SOMEWHAT A BLUR; AT ONE POINT WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE WERE SPEAKING TO EITHER AN APCH OR CTR SUPVR). AT THIS POINT THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH DISPATCH AND XFERRED CTL OF THE ACFT AND ATC COMS TO ME AND TOLD ME WHAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND ROUTING WERE. WHILE THE CAPT WAS TALKING TO OUR DISPATCHER; I WAS TOLD BY CTR THAT IF WE WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK TO DFW THAT WAS NOW AVAILABLE TO US. I TOLD THE CAPT WHAT ATC HAD OFFERED AND HE SAID THAT THAT WAS FINE; AT WHICH TIME I INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED TO DFW. HE THEN GAVE US A NEW HDG AND A DSCNT CLRNC AND HANDED US OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR. AT THIS POINT OUR WORKLOAD INCREASED EVEN MORE; WHICH I WOULDN'T HAVE THOUGHT POSSIBLE AT THE TIME. WE WERE GIVEN A VECTOR TO A FIX THAT NEITHER OF US WERE FAMILIAR WITH ON AN ARR WE HAD NEVER BEEN ON. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AGAIN AND I GOT OUT THE ARR CHART AND BEGAN TO RELOAD OUR NEW ROUTING INTO THE FMC. I ALSO CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS; AGAIN; AND INFORMED THEM OF THE LATEST CHANGE OF PLANS. AS IT TURNED OUT; THE FIX WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO WAS RIGHT BEHIND ANOTHER LARGE TSTM AND SO WE TOLD ATC THAT WE WOULD NEED A VECTOR AROUND IT. THE SECTOR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND THE CTLR SEEMED TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT TFC CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO OUR RETURN TO ZZZ AND ASKED US IF WE WOULD BE ABLE TO CROSS FEVER INTXN AT SOME LOWER ALT. SINCE WE DIDN'T KNOW WHERE WE WERE RELATIVE TO THIS NEW FIX; YET SINCE WE WERE STILL PLUGGING THE ARR ROUTING INTO THE FMC; WE ASKED HER TO STAND BY. SHE INSTEAD ASSIGNED US A HDG; WHICH AS IT TURNED OUT ROUTED US THROUGH A CELL OF HVY PRECIP AND MODERATE TURB. (WE HADN'T HAD TIME TO RE-ADJUST THE WX RADAR TILT AND DIDN'T HAVE A CLR PICTURE OF THE WX IN FRONT OF US AT THAT MOMENT). SHE THEN HANDED US OFF TO ANOTHER APCH CTLR WHO GAVE US ANOTHER HDG AND INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE A VECTOR FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; WE HAD THE APCH PLUGGED INTO THE FMC AND WERE GENERALLY CAUGHT UP. THE FINAL APCH CTLR (WHO I BELIEVE WAS THE SAME CTLR WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED THAT WE DIVERT) GAVE US VECTORS AROUND WX NEAR THE ARPT WHEN WE REQUESTED THEM THIS TIME. THE REMAINDER OF THE ARR; APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL. IT IS MY OPINION; BASED ON THE ORIGINAL APCH CTLR'S TONE OF VOICE AND RELIANCE ON A PRECEDING ACFT'S PIREP TO INFLUENCE OUR DECISION ABOUT OUR ROUTING AROUND THE WX; THAT THIS DIVERSION WAS UNNECESSARY. I BELIEVE THAT HE BECAME FRUSTRATED WITH OUR DECISION TO NOT FOLLOW THE PRECEDING ACFT BTWN THE BUILDUPS AND CHOSE TO NOT CONSIDER OTHER ROUTING; HOLDING OR DELAY VECTORS FOR OUR FLT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT OUR EXTREME WORKLOAD WAS IN ITSELF A HAZARDOUS SITUATION EVEN THOUGH WE WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER THROUGHOUT THIS ORDEAL. OUR SOMEWHAT DEGRADED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; AS INDICATED BY OUR FLYING THROUGH AN AREA OF HVY PRECIP AND TURB ON OUR RETURN TO DFW; IS JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF MANY POSSIBILITIES OF POTENTIAL THREATS THAT EXIST WHEN BOTH CREW MEMBERS ARE SATURATED IN DEALING WITH RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATIONS OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE APCH CTLRS' (MEANING BOTH OF THEM SINCE WE WERE DENIED HOLDING/VECTORS TWICE) CONSIDERATIONS WERE AT THE TIME; I DON'T KNOW IF ANY COURSE OF ACTION -- BY THEM OR US -- COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT THIS SITUATION. I WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE TO KNOW IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED OUT OF A LEGITIMATE ABSENCE OF WORKABLE CHOICES BY THE APCH CTLRS' (BOTH OF THEM) STANDPOINT OR IF WE WERE NEEDLESSLY DIVERTED TO SAN ANTONIO BECAUSE OF A FRUSTRATED PERSON'S INABILITY TO ACCEPT OUR (SAFETY BASED) REFUSAL TO TRANSITION TO AN AREA OF TSTMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.