Narrative:

This report is being submitted by the captain who was the monitoring pilot. We computed our quick turn around weight (qtaw) prior to top of descent and determined our projected landing weight at flaps 40 degrees to be below the limit; but not at flaps 30 degrees. Flew the sunst arrival and noticed significant buildups to the east of the field; approximately 15 mi. We were planning a short base visual to runway 25L when we were notified by approach of the winds shifting from the south to more out of the east. Approach asked if we'd prefer runway 19L and we said yes as we didn't want to be dealing with a gusting tailwind. We re-bugged our landing speeds for a flaps 30 degrees for controllability in the gusty conditions and added a gust factor correction. Flare and touchdown were uneventful and braking was initiated immediately along with thrust reversers. We comfortably made the taxiway B turnoff and taxied to the gate. On taxi in we radioed las operations to let them know the qtaw had been exceeded and to send out a mechanic per flight handbook bulletin. Passenger deplaned uneventfully. The contract mechanic reported to me in operations that the #3 and #4 brakes had exceeded the temperature limits. Shortly thereafter he came back in and said the #4 tire fuse plug had blown due to excessive temperature; releasing all the air out of that tire. At this point I had the operations agent call the fire truck to come to the aircraft to standby as a precautionary measure. I then called the duty manager; via dispatch; to inform the company of the situation. After the call I went out to the aircraft and spoke with the firemen; the airport operations representative and the mechanic. I asked if they needed any report or paperwork from me and they all said 'no.' the brakes had reached their maximum temperature without further incident. The mechanic then waited for the brakes to cool to a reasonable temperature to change the #3 and #4 tires (although the #3 fuse plug had not blown; I was told they are always changed as a pair). Our return flight was canceled due to the delay. With the more efficient brakes of the B737NG's qtaw is not a factor. It is often a factor on the B737-400's. In our case initiating the braking on the shorter runway with the bumped up approach speeds was a priority.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-400 FLT CREW ELECTED TO LAND WITH FLAPS 30 AND INCREASED APCH SPEED FOR GUSTS. LNDG WAS NORMAL; BUT AFTER ACFT WAS PARKED; FUSE PLUG RELEASED ON ONE OF THE MAINS DUE TO EXCESSIVE TEMP.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS BEING SUBMITTED BY THE CAPT WHO WAS THE MONITORING PLT. WE COMPUTED OUR QUICK TURN AROUND WT (QTAW) PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT AND DETERMINED OUR PROJECTED LNDG WT AT FLAPS 40 DEGS TO BE BELOW THE LIMIT; BUT NOT AT FLAPS 30 DEGS. FLEW THE SUNST ARR AND NOTICED SIGNIFICANT BUILDUPS TO THE E OF THE FIELD; APPROX 15 MI. WE WERE PLANNING A SHORT BASE VISUAL TO RWY 25L WHEN WE WERE NOTIFIED BY APCH OF THE WINDS SHIFTING FROM THE S TO MORE OUT OF THE E. APCH ASKED IF WE'D PREFER RWY 19L AND WE SAID YES AS WE DIDN'T WANT TO BE DEALING WITH A GUSTING TAILWIND. WE RE-BUGGED OUR LNDG SPDS FOR A FLAPS 30 DEGS FOR CONTROLLABILITY IN THE GUSTY CONDITIONS AND ADDED A GUST FACTOR CORRECTION. FLARE AND TOUCHDOWN WERE UNEVENTFUL AND BRAKING WAS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY ALONG WITH THRUST REVERSERS. WE COMFORTABLY MADE THE TXWY B TURNOFF AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. ON TAXI IN WE RADIOED LAS OPS TO LET THEM KNOW THE QTAW HAD BEEN EXCEEDED AND TO SEND OUT A MECH PER FLT HANDBOOK BULLETIN. PAX DEPLANED UNEVENTFULLY. THE CONTRACT MECH RPTED TO ME IN OPS THAT THE #3 AND #4 BRAKES HAD EXCEEDED THE TEMP LIMITS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER HE CAME BACK IN AND SAID THE #4 TIRE FUSE PLUG HAD BLOWN DUE TO EXCESSIVE TEMP; RELEASING ALL THE AIR OUT OF THAT TIRE. AT THIS POINT I HAD THE OPS AGENT CALL THE FIRE TRUCK TO COME TO THE ACFT TO STANDBY AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. I THEN CALLED THE DUTY MGR; VIA DISPATCH; TO INFORM THE COMPANY OF THE SITUATION. AFTER THE CALL I WENT OUT TO THE ACFT AND SPOKE WITH THE FIREMEN; THE ARPT OPS REPRESENTATIVE AND THE MECH. I ASKED IF THEY NEEDED ANY RPT OR PAPERWORK FROM ME AND THEY ALL SAID 'NO.' THE BRAKES HAD REACHED THEIR MAX TEMP WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE MECH THEN WAITED FOR THE BRAKES TO COOL TO A REASONABLE TEMP TO CHANGE THE #3 AND #4 TIRES (ALTHOUGH THE #3 FUSE PLUG HAD NOT BLOWN; I WAS TOLD THEY ARE ALWAYS CHANGED AS A PAIR). OUR RETURN FLT WAS CANCELED DUE TO THE DELAY. WITH THE MORE EFFICIENT BRAKES OF THE B737NG'S QTAW IS NOT A FACTOR. IT IS OFTEN A FACTOR ON THE B737-400'S. IN OUR CASE INITIATING THE BRAKING ON THE SHORTER RWY WITH THE BUMPED UP APCH SPDS WAS A PRIORITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.