Narrative:

I was the captain of flight X to ZZZ. Flight was booked full; with MEL landing gear locked in the down position. This was an unscheduled aircraft change. Upon arriving at the gate there was confusion as to whether we would ferry the aircraft or revenue the aircraft to ZZZ for further maintenance. After contacting dispatch; who contacted the duty manager; the decision was made to carry passenger and fly with the gear down per the MEL. The first dispatch release did not have the MEL listed. Dispatch was notified and a new release was issued. Although fuel was added for the MEL; the flight was filed at 340 KTS TAS. Dispatch notified again. During this conversation with the dispatchers I asked if they had a 'gear down' flight profile. No profile was found; although we did discuss the 'gear down; long range cruise' profile charts in the performance section of the operations manual. The fuel flows listed in this section closely matched the fuel consumption that dispatch had planned. I voiced my concern that any ATC directed deviations from the flight profile due to the slow cruise airspeed of the flight would void the fuel plan. Dispatch stated they would contact ATC and notify them of the situation. I then compared the fuel flow figures from the filed cruise altitude and the lowest listed altitude (17000 ft) and noted that there was only a slight increase in fuel flow at the lower altitude; leaving me to believe that if the flight was forced to stay at a lower altitude (17000 ft) the entire way to ZZZ; there would only be a correspondingly slight increase in total fuel consumption. Prior to boarding I went to the gate area and used the PA system to explain the situation to the passenger and that the gear would be locked down the entire flight; resulting in a noisier and bumpier flight than normal. I then discussed the flight with the first officer regarding fuel consumption; passenger comfort and performance issues including loss of engine with gear down. The first officer notified clearance delivery of our airspeed and clearance delivery said they would pass the information along. The operations agent had to adjust the passenger load and use child weights to bring the aircraft below ATOG due to the increased fuel load. The ground time was hectic. Talking with maintenance and dispatch; dealing with a needy 'a' flight attendant and a skittish operations agent was time consuming. ATC handled the taxi; takeoff and climb portions of the flight very expeditiously. Center changed the arrival to shorten the route. The fuel burn at top of climb and over and en route matched the flight plan exactly. Prior to leaving the area behind; I wanted to be sure that the fuel consumption was as planned. Approximately 200 NM from ZZZ ATC gave the flight a descent clearance. The first officer requested that we stay at altitude; but ATC made all the remaining descent clrncs mandatory. The fuel over the next VOR was 100 pounds less than what the flight plan indicated should be remaining. Then a mandatory descent to 17000 ft was given. The fuel flow at 17000 ft was much higher than at altitude and far exceeded the fuel flows listed in the operations manual performance section. The 'a' flight attendant called the cockpit twice during descent to request gate information. The winds at ZZZ had shifted from easterly to westerly and were gusting to 17 KTS; necessitating a landing to the west. Contacted dispatch to let them know ATC was forcing the flight lower; which was consuming more fuel. Then we got a clearance to cross 15 NM west of XXX intersection at 10000 ft. The first officer requested to stay at altitude but the request was denied. The higher than planned fuel consumption at the lower altitudes and fuel consumption required at 10000 ft would have meant an unacceptable arrival fuel at ZZZ. A fuel emergency was declared and the aircraft was leveled at 16000 ft and proceeded direct to ZZZ. With ATIS winds now light and variable; made an uneventful landing at ZZZ. Fuel at the gate was 4200 pounds. I should have added more fuel even though it would have meant pulling more passenger. The fuel figures on the flight plan appeared to be sound but having never flown with the gear down; I did not know what to expect and should have planned for the worst case. Get more people involved in this abnormal situation. I wanted to talk with someone that had flown gear down or had knowledge of what to expect. Have a briefing for this special flight operation. Develop a gear down flight profile detailing climb and descent speeds and rates. Plan this flight for worst case scenario. At an airspeed below 220 KTS; I was concerned about vectors off course and the inevitable lower altitude. Should we have known the flight would be given lower altitudes so far from the field? List the opc; MEL gear down cruise page as a reference tool; perhaps as an MEL step. Check the fuel flow specifications. They matched the performance of the aircraft at FL230 exactly; but at the lower altitudes the required fuel flows were higher than published. In the QRH landing gear section list the opc; MEL gear down cruise page as a reference. Gear lever will not move up after takeoff is one possible location.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 FLT CREW OPERATING AS A PASSENGER FLIGHT WITH THE LANDING GEAR INOP IN THE EXTENDED POSITION FOUND THE FUEL FLOW TO EXCEED THE BOOK VALUES; AND DECLARED A FUEL EMERGENCY TO EXPEDITE THEIR ARRIVAL HANDLING AT DESTINATION.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT X TO ZZZ. FLT WAS BOOKED FULL; WITH MEL LNDG GEAR LOCKED IN THE DOWN POS. THIS WAS AN UNSCHEDULED ACFT CHANGE. UPON ARRIVING AT THE GATE THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD FERRY THE ACFT OR REVENUE THE ACFT TO ZZZ FOR FURTHER MAINT. AFTER CONTACTING DISPATCH; WHO CONTACTED THE DUTY MGR; THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CARRY PAX AND FLY WITH THE GEAR DOWN PER THE MEL. THE FIRST DISPATCH RELEASE DID NOT HAVE THE MEL LISTED. DISPATCH WAS NOTIFIED AND A NEW RELEASE WAS ISSUED. ALTHOUGH FUEL WAS ADDED FOR THE MEL; THE FLT WAS FILED AT 340 KTS TAS. DISPATCH NOTIFIED AGAIN. DURING THIS CONVERSATION WITH THE DISPATCHERS I ASKED IF THEY HAD A 'GEAR DOWN' FLT PROFILE. NO PROFILE WAS FOUND; ALTHOUGH WE DID DISCUSS THE 'GEAR DOWN; LONG RANGE CRUISE' PROFILE CHARTS IN THE PERFORMANCE SECTION OF THE OPS MANUAL. THE FUEL FLOWS LISTED IN THIS SECTION CLOSELY MATCHED THE FUEL CONSUMPTION THAT DISPATCH HAD PLANNED. I VOICED MY CONCERN THAT ANY ATC DIRECTED DEVS FROM THE FLT PROFILE DUE TO THE SLOW CRUISE AIRSPD OF THE FLT WOULD VOID THE FUEL PLAN. DISPATCH STATED THEY WOULD CONTACT ATC AND NOTIFY THEM OF THE SITUATION. I THEN COMPARED THE FUEL FLOW FIGURES FROM THE FILED CRUISE ALT AND THE LOWEST LISTED ALT (17000 FT) AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE IN FUEL FLOW AT THE LOWER ALT; LEAVING ME TO BELIEVE THAT IF THE FLT WAS FORCED TO STAY AT A LOWER ALT (17000 FT) THE ENTIRE WAY TO ZZZ; THERE WOULD ONLY BE A CORRESPONDINGLY SLIGHT INCREASE IN TOTAL FUEL CONSUMPTION. PRIOR TO BOARDING I WENT TO THE GATE AREA AND USED THE PA SYS TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO THE PAX AND THAT THE GEAR WOULD BE LOCKED DOWN THE ENTIRE FLT; RESULTING IN A NOISIER AND BUMPIER FLT THAN NORMAL. I THEN DISCUSSED THE FLT WITH THE FO REGARDING FUEL CONSUMPTION; PAX COMFORT AND PERFORMANCE ISSUES INCLUDING LOSS OF ENG WITH GEAR DOWN. THE FO NOTIFIED CLRNC DELIVERY OF OUR AIRSPD AND CLRNC DELIVERY SAID THEY WOULD PASS THE INFO ALONG. THE OPS AGENT HAD TO ADJUST THE PAX LOAD AND USE CHILD WTS TO BRING THE ACFT BELOW ATOG DUE TO THE INCREASED FUEL LOAD. THE GND TIME WAS HECTIC. TALKING WITH MAINT AND DISPATCH; DEALING WITH A NEEDY 'A' FLT ATTENDANT AND A SKITTISH OPS AGENT WAS TIME CONSUMING. ATC HANDLED THE TAXI; TKOF AND CLB PORTIONS OF THE FLT VERY EXPEDITIOUSLY. CTR CHANGED THE ARR TO SHORTEN THE RTE. THE FUEL BURN AT TOP OF CLB AND OVER AND ENRTE MATCHED THE FLT PLAN EXACTLY. PRIOR TO LEAVING THE AREA BEHIND; I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT THE FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS AS PLANNED. APPROX 200 NM FROM ZZZ ATC GAVE THE FLT A DSCNT CLRNC. THE FO REQUESTED THAT WE STAY AT ALT; BUT ATC MADE ALL THE REMAINING DSCNT CLRNCS MANDATORY. THE FUEL OVER THE NEXT VOR WAS 100 LBS LESS THAN WHAT THE FLT PLAN INDICATED SHOULD BE REMAINING. THEN A MANDATORY DSCNT TO 17000 FT WAS GIVEN. THE FUEL FLOW AT 17000 FT WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN AT ALT AND FAR EXCEEDED THE FUEL FLOWS LISTED IN THE OPS MANUAL PERFORMANCE SECTION. THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT CALLED THE COCKPIT TWICE DURING DSCNT TO REQUEST GATE INFO. THE WINDS AT ZZZ HAD SHIFTED FROM EASTERLY TO WESTERLY AND WERE GUSTING TO 17 KTS; NECESSITATING A LNDG TO THE W. CONTACTED DISPATCH TO LET THEM KNOW ATC WAS FORCING THE FLT LOWER; WHICH WAS CONSUMING MORE FUEL. THEN WE GOT A CLRNC TO CROSS 15 NM W OF XXX INTXN AT 10000 FT. THE FO REQUESTED TO STAY AT ALT BUT THE REQUEST WAS DENIED. THE HIGHER THAN PLANNED FUEL CONSUMPTION AT THE LOWER ALTS AND FUEL CONSUMPTION REQUIRED AT 10000 FT WOULD HAVE MEANT AN UNACCEPTABLE ARR FUEL AT ZZZ. A FUEL EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE ACFT WAS LEVELED AT 16000 FT AND PROCEEDED DIRECT TO ZZZ. WITH ATIS WINDS NOW LIGHT AND VARIABLE; MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG AT ZZZ. FUEL AT THE GATE WAS 4200 LBS. I SHOULD HAVE ADDED MORE FUEL EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE MEANT PULLING MORE PAX. THE FUEL FIGURES ON THE FLT PLAN APPEARED TO BE SOUND BUT HAVING NEVER FLOWN WITH THE GEAR DOWN; I DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT AND SHOULD HAVE PLANNED FOR THE WORST CASE. GET MORE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS ABNORMAL SITUATION. I WANTED TO TALK WITH SOMEONE THAT HAD FLOWN GEAR DOWN OR HAD KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT TO EXPECT. HAVE A BRIEFING FOR THIS SPECIAL FLT OP. DEVELOP A GEAR DOWN FLT PROFILE DETAILING CLB AND DSCNT SPDS AND RATES. PLAN THIS FLT FOR WORST CASE SCENARIO. AT AN AIRSPD BELOW 220 KTS; I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT VECTORS OFF COURSE AND THE INEVITABLE LOWER ALT. SHOULD WE HAVE KNOWN THE FLT WOULD BE GIVEN LOWER ALTS SO FAR FROM THE FIELD? LIST THE OPC; MEL GEAR DOWN CRUISE PAGE AS A REF TOOL; PERHAPS AS AN MEL STEP. CHK THE FUEL FLOW SPECS. THEY MATCHED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACFT AT FL230 EXACTLY; BUT AT THE LOWER ALTS THE REQUIRED FUEL FLOWS WERE HIGHER THAN PUBLISHED. IN THE QRH LNDG GEAR SECTION LIST THE OPC; MEL GEAR DOWN CRUISE PAGE AS A REF. GEAR LEVER WILL NOT MOVE UP AFTER TKOF IS ONE POSSIBLE LOCATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.