Narrative:

After departing ZZZ1 for ZZZ2; the flight crew on aircraft returned to the blocks due to speedbrake flap warning horn inoperative. Maintenance cleaned and tested the safety relay bypass switch and the aircraft departed for ZZZ2 again. While taxiing out the crew contacted the line maintenance supervisor to advise him they still had the takeoff warning problem and asked him whether they should continue on to ZZZ2. The maintenance supervisor told the captain he would contact maintenance control to see whether or not he should continue on with the faulty takeoff warning system. Approximately five minutes later the maintenance supervisor informed the captain maintenance control was advising he continue on to ZZZ2. The conversation between the line maintenance supervisor and flight crew can be verified by the line maintenance supervisor; flight crew; and two controllers. Approximately ten minutes after the aircraft departed maintenance control supervisor asked the two controllers on duty if they were aware of the takeoff warning problem on the aircraft. The line controller told the maintenance control supervisor he heard the conversation between the line maintenance supervisor and flight crew on maintenance frequency but was unaware of anyone in maintenance control giving the crew authorization to depart with a takeoff warning problem. Ten minutes later the maintenance control supervisor informed the line controller that another supervisor in maintenance control spoke with the line maintenance supervisor and told him it would be acceptable for the crew to continue on to ZZZ2. When the aircraft arrived in ZZZ2 it was removed from service for an intermittent discrepancy with the flap takeoff warning system and the second leg of the flight was cancelled. Contract maintenance troubleshot the discrepancy to a faulty flap up warning switch. The flap up warning switch was driven from ZZZ3 and changed in ZZZ2 and the aircraft was returned to service. I expressed my concern to the maintenance control supervisor about maintenance control providing authorization to allow an aircraft to depart with a known takeoff warning problem. I also want to ensure no blame has been placed with the line controllers as they had no direct involvement with the decision to allow the aircraft to depart with a known takeoff warning problem.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated his concerns that their maintenance controllers do not have the authority to stop the departure release of their aircraft. That requires management approval; and what he has seen and continues to see is disturbing. His company has been informed by the FAA pmi of the need for some kind of dispute resolution in their maintenance department. His company; unfortunately; does not seem interested in any such maintenance program.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ACFT DEPARTED WITH A KNOWN TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM IN THE SPEEDBRAKE FLAP WARNING HORN SYSTEM. SECOND FLIGHT CANCELED.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING ZZZ1 FOR ZZZ2; THE FLIGHT CREW ON AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO THE BLOCKS DUE TO SPEEDBRAKE FLAP WARNING HORN INOP. MAINTENANCE CLEANED AND TESTED THE SAFETY RELAY BYPASS SWITCH AND THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED FOR ZZZ2 AGAIN. WHILE TAXIING OUT THE CREW CONTACTED THE LINE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR TO ADVISE HIM THEY STILL HAD THE TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM AND ASKED HIM WHETHER THEY SHOULD CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ2. THE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR TOLD THE CAPTAIN HE WOULD CONTACT MAINT CTL TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD CONTINUE ON WITH THE FAULTY TAKEOFF WARNING SYSTEM. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES LATER THE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR INFORMED THE CAPTAIN MAINT CTL WAS ADVISING HE CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ2. THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LINE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR AND FLIGHT CREW CAN BE VERIFIED BY THE LINE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR; FLIGHT CREW; AND TWO CONTROLLERS. APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES AFTER THE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED MAINT CTL SUPERVISOR ASKED THE TWO CONTROLLERS ON DUTY IF THEY WERE AWARE OF THE TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM ON THE AIRCRAFT. THE LINE CTLR TOLD THE MAINT CTL SUPVR HE HEARD THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LINE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR AND FLIGHT CREW ON MAINTENANCE FREQUENCY BUT WAS UNAWARE OF ANYONE IN MAINT CTL GIVING THE CREW AUTHORIZATION TO DEPART WITH A TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM. TEN MINUTES LATER THE MAINT CTL SUPVR INFORMED THE LINE CTLR THAT ANOTHER SUPERVISOR IN MAINT CTL SPOKE WITH THE LINE MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR AND TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE CREW TO CONTINUE ON TO ZZZ2. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN ZZZ2 IT WAS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR AN INTERMITTENT DISCREPANCY WITH THE FLAP TAKEOFF WARNING SYSTEM AND THE SECOND LEG OF THE FLIGHT WAS CANCELLED. CONTRACT MAINTENANCE TROUBLESHOT THE DISCREPANCY TO A FAULTY FLAP UP WARNING SWITCH. THE FLAP UP WARNING SWITCH WAS DRIVEN FROM ZZZ3 AND CHANGED IN ZZZ2 AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE. I EXPRESSED MY CONCERN TO THE MAINT CTL SUPERVISOR ABOUT MAINT CTL PROVIDING AUTHORIZATION TO ALLOW AN AIRCRAFT TO DEPART WITH A KNOWN TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM. I ALSO WANT TO ENSURE NO BLAME HAS BEEN PLACED WITH THE LINE CONTROLLERS AS THEY HAD NO DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DECISION TO ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO DEPART WITH A KNOWN TAKEOFF WARNING PROBLEM.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HIS CONCERNS THAT THEIR MAINT CONTROLLERS DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO STOP THE DEPARTURE RELEASE OF THEIR ACFT. THAT REQUIRES MANAGEMENT APPROVAL; AND WHAT HE HAS SEEN AND CONTINUES TO SEE IS DISTURBING. HIS COMPANY HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE FAA PMI OF THE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THEIR MAINT DEPT. HIS COMPANY; UNFORTUNATELY; DOES NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN ANY SUCH MAINT PROGRAM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.