Narrative:

During taxi out; captain's brief was interrupted by the call from ground control; requiring that we contact the company to re-file our timed out flight plan. This was done near the end of the runway and the tower contacted us quickly thereafter with a new clearance (squawk code); and instructed us to taxi to the runway. This left us with little time to start the remaining engine. We were just completing the taxi checklist as tower issued our takeoff clearance. Things were progressing quickly and I never completed a full takeoff briefing. I had given a briefing that the main cabin door was deferred at the gate; but not how that pertained to ignoring EICAS warnings on takeoff. Thus; in my own mind; I never replaced the built-in 'between 80 KTS and V1 we'll abort for any major malfunctions or red EICAS messages;' with we'll ignore main cabin door open EICAS messages. Additionally; the switch; though deferred; had been functioning properly up to this point; so I trusted its indications over what the MEL said. We were running about 2 hours behind schedule due to our receiving a late inbound aircraft. Ramp cleared us to push and taxi; ground control cleared us to taxi to runway 10C via taxiway V and taxiway east. Just prior to reaching taxiway D; ground control cleared us to turn right on taxiway D; hold short of taxiway west and contact the company to re-file our flight plan; as they did not have a strip on us. We contacted operations for this request and I withheld starting the #1 engine until this was all sorted out. Ground came back rather quickly for this type of thing; with a new squawk code; everything else the same; taxi up to and hold short of runway 10C. We acknowledged the clearance; proceeded to start #1; taxied up to the hold short line; finished the taxi checklist; talked to the flight attendant; switched to tower; and acknowledged their takeoff clearance; all within a short period of time. The takeoff proceeded normally with the first officer as PF; until around 100 KIAS we got a triple chime and I aborted the takeoff as per our SOP. After the split second decision to abort was made and implemented; I saw that the EICAS message was for the main cabin door open; a message which could be ignored as per the deferral. We cleared the runway; declined further assistance; re-verified that the door was still properly secured; advised operations and the company; briefed the passenger; wrote up the abort in the log; waited approximately 30 mins for our brakes to cool; and departed normally. As a new captain; I felt that at a certain point in time; I allowed events occurring to dictate the pace of the flight rather than taking command; telling ground that we would need a min; and not shortening the standard brief with a perfunctory 'any questions?' had I taken a 'min for safety' on taxiway D short of taxiway west; I would have saved about 50 mins overall; as well as eliminating the substantial risks associated with a high speed abort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE AND TRYING TO CATCH UP LEADS TO A REJECTED TKOF FOR A WARNING ASSOCIATED WITH A KNOWN MEL ITEM.

Narrative: DURING TAXI OUT; CAPT'S BRIEF WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE CALL FROM GND CTL; REQUIRING THAT WE CONTACT THE COMPANY TO RE-FILE OUR TIMED OUT FLT PLAN. THIS WAS DONE NEAR THE END OF THE RWY AND THE TWR CONTACTED US QUICKLY THEREAFTER WITH A NEW CLRNC (SQUAWK CODE); AND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO THE RWY. THIS LEFT US WITH LITTLE TIME TO START THE REMAINING ENG. WE WERE JUST COMPLETING THE TAXI CHKLIST AS TWR ISSUED OUR TKOF CLRNC. THINGS WERE PROGRESSING QUICKLY AND I NEVER COMPLETED A FULL TKOF BRIEFING. I HAD GIVEN A BRIEFING THAT THE MAIN CABIN DOOR WAS DEFERRED AT THE GATE; BUT NOT HOW THAT PERTAINED TO IGNORING EICAS WARNINGS ON TKOF. THUS; IN MY OWN MIND; I NEVER REPLACED THE BUILT-IN 'BTWN 80 KTS AND V1 WE'LL ABORT FOR ANY MAJOR MALFUNCTIONS OR RED EICAS MESSAGES;' WITH WE'LL IGNORE MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN EICAS MESSAGES. ADDITIONALLY; THE SWITCH; THOUGH DEFERRED; HAD BEEN FUNCTIONING PROPERLY UP TO THIS POINT; SO I TRUSTED ITS INDICATIONS OVER WHAT THE MEL SAID. WE WERE RUNNING ABOUT 2 HRS BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO OUR RECEIVING A LATE INBOUND ACFT. RAMP CLRED US TO PUSH AND TAXI; GND CTL CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 10C VIA TXWY V AND TXWY E. JUST PRIOR TO REACHING TXWY D; GND CTL CLRED US TO TURN R ON TXWY D; HOLD SHORT OF TXWY W AND CONTACT THE COMPANY TO RE-FILE OUR FLT PLAN; AS THEY DID NOT HAVE A STRIP ON US. WE CONTACTED OPS FOR THIS REQUEST AND I WITHHELD STARTING THE #1 ENG UNTIL THIS WAS ALL SORTED OUT. GND CAME BACK RATHER QUICKLY FOR THIS TYPE OF THING; WITH A NEW SQUAWK CODE; EVERYTHING ELSE THE SAME; TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10C. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC; PROCEEDED TO START #1; TAXIED UP TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE; FINISHED THE TAXI CHKLIST; TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT; SWITCHED TO TWR; AND ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR TKOF CLRNC; ALL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE TKOF PROCEEDED NORMALLY WITH THE FO AS PF; UNTIL AROUND 100 KIAS WE GOT A TRIPLE CHIME AND I ABORTED THE TKOF AS PER OUR SOP. AFTER THE SPLIT SECOND DECISION TO ABORT WAS MADE AND IMPLEMENTED; I SAW THAT THE EICAS MESSAGE WAS FOR THE MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN; A MESSAGE WHICH COULD BE IGNORED AS PER THE DEFERRAL. WE CLRED THE RWY; DECLINED FURTHER ASSISTANCE; RE-VERIFIED THAT THE DOOR WAS STILL PROPERLY SECURED; ADVISED OPS AND THE COMPANY; BRIEFED THE PAX; WROTE UP THE ABORT IN THE LOG; WAITED APPROX 30 MINS FOR OUR BRAKES TO COOL; AND DEPARTED NORMALLY. AS A NEW CAPT; I FELT THAT AT A CERTAIN POINT IN TIME; I ALLOWED EVENTS OCCURRING TO DICTATE THE PACE OF THE FLT RATHER THAN TAKING COMMAND; TELLING GND THAT WE WOULD NEED A MIN; AND NOT SHORTENING THE STANDARD BRIEF WITH A PERFUNCTORY 'ANY QUESTIONS?' HAD I TAKEN A 'MIN FOR SAFETY' ON TXWY D SHORT OF TXWY W; I WOULD HAVE SAVED ABOUT 50 MINS OVERALL; AS WELL AS ELIMINATING THE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A HIGH SPD ABORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.