Narrative:

Concerning MEL for the 737; I was the third captain who unfortunately had to refuse the airplane with this MEL. This aircraft had both the forward panel leading edge device light inoperative and the overhead slat 5 annunciator panel inoperative. The MEL states; 'verify leading edge position for the inoperative indication prior to each takeoff and landing.' slat 5 is visible from the cockpit; I'll admit. My question is this; and I hope someone from the fleet and/or engineering can answer: if I'm taxiing out for takeoff and I put the flaps to 1; for example; how do I know that the slat is really 'locked' in position; even if it looks even with the rest of the slats during the visual check? It seems to me that it would be possible that with no aerodynamic load on the wing; during taxi; that the slat may be in the proper position; but perhaps with an aerodynamic load (like at rotation) the slat could retract and produce an unwanted rolling moment? How do I know if the slat is locked in position if my only two unlocked position indicators are inoperative? Pair an unexpected slat retraction with an engine failure and/or windshear and it seems as if this deferral could put the pilot in a very dangerous situation. Further; let's assume this deferral is used for a slat/flap that isn't visible from the cockpit. In this day and age; do we want the flight crew opening and closing the cockpit door to go into the cabin to verify the position of the slat or flap? And since we can't extend the flaps until we're below FL200 on approach; is it a good idea to be performing this cockpit maneuver in the terminal area just so we can delay maintenance to a more 'convenient' time? This little maneuver would have to be performed countless times as a more 'convenient' time for deferred items can be several days into the future. Beyond those questions listed above; when three captain's in a row refuse an airplane at a maintenance station; perhaps instead of 'shopping' the plane around; time should be spent in performing an actual repair; instead of trying to find a crew that is perhaps too intimidated to refuse an aircraft? Concerning altitude alerter MEL; as an lca; our lca coordination sends us the flight reports received by the fleet for the month; every month. I read report after report concerning altitude deviations on our fleet alone; and how the altitude alerter was often the device that made the pilots aware of the initial deviation. We see posters on the wall when we come in showing how many altitude deviations occur in a given amount of time. If we're truly are trying to aim for that '0' accident/incident rate; and we as an airline know that there are many; many altitude deviations every month at our airline even with a functioning altitude alerter; should we ever be flying with one deferred? Unfortunately; I had to refuse another airplane on the same trip which was coming into a maintenance station from a maintenance station with the alerter MEL'd inoperative. Maybe we should consider making that item an automatic repair upon arrival at a maintenance station; at the latest? Just a suggestion. I know I won't take an airplane without an altitude alerter properly functioning.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated within the past six months; his company has completely re-written their B737-300/500 MEL deferral procedures. No information yet on the overhead slat annunciator light being inoperative along with the center fwd leading edge indicator light also being inoperative and deferred as such.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 ACFT CAPT RPTS CONCERNS ABOUT CONTINUING MEL DEFERRAL OF MAINT ITEMS EVEN WHEN PASSING THROUGH COMPANY MAINT BASES. SOME MEL MAINT DEFERRALS REQUIRE A FLT CREW OFFICER TO LEAVE COCKPIT TO VERIFY FLT CONTROL SURFACE POSITION. SECURITY ISSUE.

Narrative: CONCERNING MEL FOR THE 737; I WAS THE THIRD CAPT WHO UNFORTUNATELY HAD TO REFUSE THE AIRPLANE WITH THIS MEL. THIS ACFT HAD BOTH THE FORWARD PANEL LEADING EDGE DEVICE LIGHT INOPERATIVE AND THE OVERHEAD SLAT 5 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL INOPERATIVE. THE MEL STATES; 'VERIFY LEADING EDGE POSITION FOR THE INOPERATIVE INDICATION PRIOR TO EACH TAKEOFF AND LNDG.' SLAT 5 IS VISIBLE FROM THE COCKPIT; I'LL ADMIT. MY QUESTION IS THIS; AND I HOPE SOMEONE FROM THE FLEET AND/OR ENGINEERING CAN ANSWER: IF I'M TAXIING OUT FOR TAKEOFF AND I PUT THE FLAPS TO 1; FOR EXAMPLE; HOW DO I KNOW THAT THE SLAT IS REALLY 'LOCKED' IN POSITION; EVEN IF IT LOOKS EVEN WITH THE REST OF THE SLATS DURING THE VISUAL CHECK? IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT WITH NO AERODYNAMIC LOAD ON THE WING; DURING TAXI; THAT THE SLAT MAY BE IN THE PROPER POSITION; BUT PERHAPS WITH AN AERODYNAMIC LOAD (LIKE AT ROTATION) THE SLAT COULD RETRACT AND PRODUCE AN UNWANTED ROLLING MOMENT? HOW DO I KNOW IF THE SLAT IS LOCKED IN POSITION IF MY ONLY TWO UNLOCKED POSITION INDICATORS ARE INOPERATIVE? PAIR AN UNEXPECTED SLAT RETRACTION WITH AN ENGINE FAILURE AND/OR WINDSHEAR AND IT SEEMS AS IF THIS DEFERRAL COULD PUT THE PLT IN A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION. FURTHER; LET'S ASSUME THIS DEFERRAL IS USED FOR A SLAT/FLAP THAT ISN'T VISIBLE FROM THE COCKPIT. IN THIS DAY AND AGE; DO WE WANT THE FLIGHT CREW OPENING AND CLOSING THE COCKPIT DOOR TO GO INTO THE CABIN TO VERIFY THE POSITION OF THE SLAT OR FLAP? AND SINCE WE CAN'T EXTEND THE FLAPS UNTIL WE'RE BELOW FL200 ON APCH; IS IT A GOOD IDEA TO BE PERFORMING THIS COCKPIT MANEUVER IN THE TERMINAL AREA JUST SO WE CAN DELAY MAINT TO A MORE 'CONVENIENT' TIME? THIS LITTLE MANEUVER WOULD HAVE TO BE PERFORMED COUNTLESS TIMES AS A MORE 'CONVENIENT' TIME FOR DEFERRED ITEMS CAN BE SEVERAL DAYS INTO THE FUTURE. BEYOND THOSE QUESTIONS LISTED ABOVE; WHEN THREE CAPT'S IN A ROW REFUSE AN AIRPLANE AT A MAINT STATION; PERHAPS INSTEAD OF 'SHOPPING' THE PLANE AROUND; TIME SHOULD BE SPENT IN PERFORMING AN ACTUAL REPAIR; INSTEAD OF TRYING TO FIND A CREW THAT IS PERHAPS TOO INTIMIDATED TO REFUSE AN ACFT? CONCERNING ALTITUDE ALERTER MEL; AS AN LCA; OUR LCA COORD SENDS US THE FLT RPTS RECEIVED BY THE FLEET FOR THE MONTH; EVERY MONTH. I READ RPT AFTER RPT CONCERNING ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS ON OUR FLEET ALONE; AND HOW THE ALTITUDE ALERTER WAS OFTEN THE DEVICE THAT MADE THE PLTS AWARE OF THE INITIAL DEVIATION. WE SEE POSTERS ON THE WALL WHEN WE COME IN SHOWING HOW MANY ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS OCCUR IN A GIVEN AMOUNT OF TIME. IF WE'RE TRULY ARE TRYING TO AIM FOR THAT '0' ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RATE; AND WE AS AN AIRLINE KNOW THAT THERE ARE MANY; MANY ALTITUDE DEVIATIONS EVERY MONTH AT OUR AIRLINE EVEN WITH A FUNCTIONING ALTITUDE ALERTER; SHOULD WE EVER BE FLYING WITH ONE DEFERRED? UNFORTUNATELY; I HAD TO REFUSE ANOTHER AIRPLANE ON THE SAME TRIP WHICH WAS COMING INTO A MAINT STATION FROM A MAINT STATION WITH THE ALERTER MEL'D INOPERATIVE. MAYBE WE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING THAT ITEM AN AUTOMATIC REPAIR UPON ARRIVAL AT A MAINT STATION; AT THE LATEST? JUST A SUGGESTION. I KNOW I WON'T TAKE AN AIRPLANE WITHOUT AN ALTITUDE ALERTER PROPERLY FUNCTIONING.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED WITHIN THE PAST SIX MONTHS; HIS COMPANY HAS COMPLETELY RE-WRITTEN THEIR B737-300/500 MEL DEFERRAL PROCS. NO INFO YET ON THE OVERHEAD SLAT ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT BEING INOP ALONG WITH THE CENTER FWD LEADING EDGE INDICATOR LIGHT ALSO BEING INOP AND DEFERRED AS SUCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.