Narrative:

I was flying at 10000 ft and heading approximately 170 degrees. I had briefed the captain of our approach and landing in cmh runway 10L. The captain checked on with approach control and was given; I believe; 'turn 195 degrees; this will be vectors for the downwind to runway one-zero right; descend and maintain 4000 ft.' I believe that I heard the 'one-zero' part of the clearance and spun in 105 degrees in the heading knob instead of 195 degrees. I flew the erroneous heading and descended and wondered why we got a left turn instead of a right turn for the downwind vectors. I asked the captain; 'did he say turn one-zero-five?' the captain; busy with setting up the new runway approach procedure in the FMS and radios; said 'yes; one-zero-five.' I flew this heading for about 2 mins and we received a TCAS TA and noted a contact 3 mi to our left and 800 ft below. Just then approach called and stated 'what heading are you flying?' the captain told him 105 degrees; and approach replied; 'I told you 195 degrees and that's what you read back! Turn to heading 195 degrees!' I believe that this heading deviation was caused by several factors: I had a mindset of landing on runway 10L; which seemed like the most likely runway; given our approach direction. We had briefed and loaded the runway 10L approach into the FMS and navigation radios. When approach gave the instruction; there may have been additional unnecessary verbiage and as he was giving the instruction; I began thinking about how we would have to hurry and brief and load the new runway 10R approach and landing. I think; for this reason; I transformed the one-zero part of the clearance to the newly assigned heading and flew 105 degrees instead of 195 degrees. Also; since our workload increased now due to the unexpected runway; I believe that the captain trusted my left turn; even when I questioned him about it; since he was busy setting up the new approach. This trust may be further explained because the captain knows that I have over 4000 hours and have 2000 hours or so part 121 PIC time as well. These days; it's not unusual for this captain to have to fly with very low time pilots (under 500 hours total time; since that's what the regionals are hiring these days). Given this (and I have experienced this 'relaxation' when I was a captain as well); I believe that a little bit of blind trust interfered with our usual check-and-balance operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 TURNED TO WRONG HDG ON APCH; CONFUSING ASSIGNED HDG WITH THE RWY ASSIGNMENT IN THE CLRNC.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING AT 10000 FT AND HDG APPROX 170 DEGS. I HAD BRIEFED THE CAPT OF OUR APCH AND LNDG IN CMH RWY 10L. THE CAPT CHKED ON WITH APCH CTL AND WAS GIVEN; I BELIEVE; 'TURN 195 DEGS; THIS WILL BE VECTORS FOR THE DOWNWIND TO RWY ONE-ZERO RIGHT; DSND AND MAINTAIN 4000 FT.' I BELIEVE THAT I HEARD THE 'ONE-ZERO' PART OF THE CLRNC AND SPUN IN 105 DEGS IN THE HDG KNOB INSTEAD OF 195 DEGS. I FLEW THE ERRONEOUS HDG AND DSNDED AND WONDERED WHY WE GOT A L TURN INSTEAD OF A R TURN FOR THE DOWNWIND VECTORS. I ASKED THE CAPT; 'DID HE SAY TURN ONE-ZERO-FIVE?' THE CAPT; BUSY WITH SETTING UP THE NEW RWY APCH PROC IN THE FMS AND RADIOS; SAID 'YES; ONE-ZERO-FIVE.' I FLEW THIS HDG FOR ABOUT 2 MINS AND WE RECEIVED A TCAS TA AND NOTED A CONTACT 3 MI TO OUR L AND 800 FT BELOW. JUST THEN APCH CALLED AND STATED 'WHAT HDG ARE YOU FLYING?' THE CAPT TOLD HIM 105 DEGS; AND APCH REPLIED; 'I TOLD YOU 195 DEGS AND THAT'S WHAT YOU READ BACK! TURN TO HDG 195 DEGS!' I BELIEVE THAT THIS HDG DEV WAS CAUSED BY SEVERAL FACTORS: I HAD A MINDSET OF LNDG ON RWY 10L; WHICH SEEMED LIKE THE MOST LIKELY RWY; GIVEN OUR APCH DIRECTION. WE HAD BRIEFED AND LOADED THE RWY 10L APCH INTO THE FMS AND NAV RADIOS. WHEN APCH GAVE THE INSTRUCTION; THERE MAY HAVE BEEN ADDITIONAL UNNECESSARY VERBIAGE AND AS HE WAS GIVING THE INSTRUCTION; I BEGAN THINKING ABOUT HOW WE WOULD HAVE TO HURRY AND BRIEF AND LOAD THE NEW RWY 10R APCH AND LNDG. I THINK; FOR THIS REASON; I TRANSFORMED THE ONE-ZERO PART OF THE CLRNC TO THE NEWLY ASSIGNED HDG AND FLEW 105 DEGS INSTEAD OF 195 DEGS. ALSO; SINCE OUR WORKLOAD INCREASED NOW DUE TO THE UNEXPECTED RWY; I BELIEVE THAT THE CAPT TRUSTED MY L TURN; EVEN WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT IT; SINCE HE WAS BUSY SETTING UP THE NEW APCH. THIS TRUST MAY BE FURTHER EXPLAINED BECAUSE THE CAPT KNOWS THAT I HAVE OVER 4000 HRS AND HAVE 2000 HRS OR SO PART 121 PIC TIME AS WELL. THESE DAYS; IT'S NOT UNUSUAL FOR THIS CAPT TO HAVE TO FLY WITH VERY LOW TIME PLTS (UNDER 500 HRS TOTAL TIME; SINCE THAT'S WHAT THE REGIONALS ARE HIRING THESE DAYS). GIVEN THIS (AND I HAVE EXPERIENCED THIS 'RELAXATION' WHEN I WAS A CAPT AS WELL); I BELIEVE THAT A LITTLE BIT OF BLIND TRUST INTERFERED WITH OUR USUAL CHK-AND-BAL OP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.