Narrative:

During a heavy arrival push at phl; using runway 9R with construction on taxiway S2. At least 7 arrs could not comprehend the lengthy; detailed taxi instructions required to get around construction on the taxiway. These arrs needed to be issued these detailed instructions at least twice. Not one single arrival could be given taxi instructions in 1 transmission. Most arrs required 3 or 4 instructions before moving over to the ramp area and out of the jurisdiction of the local west controller. 3 arrs missed taxiway U and got stuck holding short of S2 construction with nowhere to go. These aircraft had to wait for a gap between arrs and quickly taxi onto the arrival runway and get off at the end prior to the next arrival. The disregard for the safety of all parties involved (controllers; pilots; flying public) by having such complex instructions and additional workload during a time when the workload is already being taxed defies understanding. This situation is difficult during the day and one can only imagine how much more so at night with visibility reduced. I have suggested that the arrs exit at the end of the runway and avoid the construction altogether. This had and has not even been considered to the point that the amount of arrs per hour lost has not even been determined. Luckily; I caught all incorrect readbacks as well as incorrect turns by the aircraft prior to any incident occurring. If this situation is not rectified; I believe that a runway incursion could easily happen through no fault of the parties; but; the unwillingness of the system to accept less arrs in lieu of creating as safe an environment as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING ARPT CONSTRUCTION THAT REQUIRED COMPLEX TAXI RTES; CONFUSED BY SEVERAL ACFT.

Narrative: DURING A HVY ARR PUSH AT PHL; USING RWY 9R WITH CONSTRUCTION ON TXWY S2. AT LEAST 7 ARRS COULD NOT COMPREHEND THE LENGTHY; DETAILED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED TO GET AROUND CONSTRUCTION ON THE TXWY. THESE ARRS NEEDED TO BE ISSUED THESE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS AT LEAST TWICE. NOT ONE SINGLE ARR COULD BE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS IN 1 XMISSION. MOST ARRS REQUIRED 3 OR 4 INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE MOVING OVER TO THE RAMP AREA AND OUT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE LCL W CTLR. 3 ARRS MISSED TXWY U AND GOT STUCK HOLDING SHORT OF S2 CONSTRUCTION WITH NOWHERE TO GO. THESE ACFT HAD TO WAIT FOR A GAP BTWN ARRS AND QUICKLY TAXI ONTO THE ARR RWY AND GET OFF AT THE END PRIOR TO THE NEXT ARR. THE DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED (CTLRS; PLTS; FLYING PUBLIC) BY HAVING SUCH COMPLEX INSTRUCTIONS AND ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD DURING A TIME WHEN THE WORKLOAD IS ALREADY BEING TAXED DEFIES UNDERSTANDING. THIS SITUATION IS DIFFICULT DURING THE DAY AND ONE CAN ONLY IMAGINE HOW MUCH MORE SO AT NIGHT WITH VISIBILITY REDUCED. I HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE ARRS EXIT AT THE END OF THE RWY AND AVOID THE CONSTRUCTION ALTOGETHER. THIS HAD AND HAS NOT EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED TO THE POINT THAT THE AMOUNT OF ARRS PER HR LOST HAS NOT EVEN BEEN DETERMINED. LUCKILY; I CAUGHT ALL INCORRECT READBACKS AS WELL AS INCORRECT TURNS BY THE ACFT PRIOR TO ANY INCIDENT OCCURRING. IF THIS SITUATION IS NOT RECTIFIED; I BELIEVE THAT A RWY INCURSION COULD EASILY HAPPEN THROUGH NO FAULT OF THE PARTIES; BUT; THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE SYS TO ACCEPT LESS ARRS IN LIEU OF CREATING AS SAFE AN ENVIRONMENT AS POSSIBLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.