Narrative:

I was directed to work a combined radar position and be controller in charge. This was due to #1) limited staffing; and #2) to accommodate training in ground control. While working radar; I was vectoring aircraft X for a visual approach. The aircraft was heading 030 degrees and descended to 13000 ft MSL; approximately 10 mi southwest of dbl VOR. As controller in charge; I overheard backgnd conversation concerning LLWS. About this time; I also had a VFR cessna call me relaying that he was changing his destination to lxv. I informed the cessna that I had no prior information concerning him. I turned to the local controller (tower) and asked about LLWS. The local controller said 'yeah; aircraft Y had LLWS.' I then turned to the ground controller/flight data position (where training was taking place); to ensure that an appropriate ATIS concerning LLWS was being completed. As I refocused my attention to radar; I saw aircraft Y whom 'now' appeared on base leg. I had previously observed him go into coast on short final and I thought he had landed. I couldn't believe my eyes and I said to the local controller 'what's aircraft Y doing on base leg? I thought he had landed.' it was at this time that the local controller (very little experience) told me that it was aircraft Y who had 'gone around' as the result of an onboard windshear alert. Until this point; and having to ask several questions of both local control and ground control; I thought the initial LLWS report was from a previous aircraft Z departure. As I asked further questions; I began to realize that aircraft Y's go around might have fallen into the category of what would be considered an 'unusual go around;' which would warrant a 'Q' (quality assurance) entry on the daily facility log and; subsequent reporting procedures. In my immediate attempt to comply with these reporting procedures (a special interest item here in the past); gain all the facts; and notify the air traffic manager (atm) via the cabin attendant phone (to validate the quality assurance necessity of the log entry); I neglected to notice that aircraft X had entered ZDV's airspace (the eagle shelf) approximately 7 mi north of dbl VOR. I immediately called sector 6 for an after-the-fact pointout. I noticed that aircraft X was going in and out of coast due to his position and altitude (still at the appropriate MVA). I told aircraft X to turn right heading 180 degrees; then later to proceed direct dbl VOR. I then told aircraft X to turn right heading 210 degrees and report ase in sight. Aircraft X reported ase in sight and I subsequently cleared him for a visual approach. I compiled my nerves and thoughts; and asked ground control to terminate training and relieve me so I could report the possible operational deviation to the atm. Contributing factors/corrective actions: the radar position should not have to be combined with controller in charge as this puts the radar controller in a safety compromising situation as they have to #1) work their radar position and; #2) try to oversee the overall operation of the tower at the same time. This happens as the direct result of trying to accomplish training (pressure by management) with a low staffing level. Corrective action: have a standalone controller in charge whose duties oversee the tower operation so the radar controller can stay focused on their position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ASE APCH CTLR/CIC DESCRIBED OPDEV WHEN ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR VIS APCH ENTERED ZDV'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT COORD.

Narrative: I WAS DIRECTED TO WORK A COMBINED RADAR POS AND BE CIC. THIS WAS DUE TO #1) LIMITED STAFFING; AND #2) TO ACCOMMODATE TRAINING IN GND CTL. WHILE WORKING RADAR; I WAS VECTORING ACFT X FOR A VISUAL APCH. THE ACFT WAS HDG 030 DEGS AND DSNDED TO 13000 FT MSL; APPROX 10 MI SW OF DBL VOR. AS CIC; I OVERHEARD BACKGND CONVERSATION CONCERNING LLWS. ABOUT THIS TIME; I ALSO HAD A VFR CESSNA CALL ME RELAYING THAT HE WAS CHANGING HIS DEST TO LXV. I INFORMED THE CESSNA THAT I HAD NO PRIOR INFO CONCERNING HIM. I TURNED TO THE LCL CTLR (TWR) AND ASKED ABOUT LLWS. THE LCL CTLR SAID 'YEAH; ACFT Y HAD LLWS.' I THEN TURNED TO THE GND CTLR/FLT DATA POS (WHERE TRAINING WAS TAKING PLACE); TO ENSURE THAT AN APPROPRIATE ATIS CONCERNING LLWS WAS BEING COMPLETED. AS I REFOCUSED MY ATTN TO RADAR; I SAW ACFT Y WHOM 'NOW' APPEARED ON BASE LEG. I HAD PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED HIM GO INTO COAST ON SHORT FINAL AND I THOUGHT HE HAD LANDED. I COULDN'T BELIEVE MY EYES AND I SAID TO THE LCL CTLR 'WHAT'S ACFT Y DOING ON BASE LEG? I THOUGHT HE HAD LANDED.' IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THE LCL CTLR (VERY LITTLE EXPERIENCE) TOLD ME THAT IT WAS ACFT Y WHO HAD 'GONE AROUND' AS THE RESULT OF AN ONBOARD WINDSHEAR ALERT. UNTIL THIS POINT; AND HAVING TO ASK SEVERAL QUESTIONS OF BOTH LCL CTL AND GND CTL; I THOUGHT THE INITIAL LLWS RPT WAS FROM A PREVIOUS ACFT Z DEP. AS I ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS; I BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT ACFT Y'S GAR MIGHT HAVE FALLEN INTO THE CATEGORY OF WHAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AN 'UNUSUAL GAR;' WHICH WOULD WARRANT A 'Q' (QUALITY ASSURANCE) ENTRY ON THE DAILY FACILITY LOG AND; SUBSEQUENT RPTING PROCS. IN MY IMMEDIATE ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH THESE RPTING PROCS (A SPECIAL INTEREST ITEM HERE IN THE PAST); GAIN ALL THE FACTS; AND NOTIFY THE AIR TFC MGR (ATM) VIA THE CAB PHONE (TO VALIDATE THE QUALITY ASSURANCE NECESSITY OF THE LOG ENTRY); I NEGLECTED TO NOTICE THAT ACFT X HAD ENTERED ZDV'S AIRSPACE (THE EAGLE SHELF) APPROX 7 MI N OF DBL VOR. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED SECTOR 6 FOR AN AFTER-THE-FACT POINTOUT. I NOTICED THAT ACFT X WAS GOING IN AND OUT OF COAST DUE TO HIS POS AND ALT (STILL AT THE APPROPRIATE MVA). I TOLD ACFT X TO TURN R HDG 180 DEGS; THEN LATER TO PROCEED DIRECT DBL VOR. I THEN TOLD ACFT X TO TURN R HDG 210 DEGS AND RPT ASE IN SIGHT. ACFT X RPTED ASE IN SIGHT AND I SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED HIM FOR A VISUAL APCH. I COMPILED MY NERVES AND THOUGHTS; AND ASKED GND CTL TO TERMINATE TRAINING AND RELIEVE ME SO I COULD RPT THE POSSIBLE OPDEV TO THE ATM. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS/CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: THE RADAR POS SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE COMBINED WITH CIC AS THIS PUTS THE RADAR CTLR IN A SAFETY COMPROMISING SITUATION AS THEY HAVE TO #1) WORK THEIR RADAR POS AND; #2) TRY TO OVERSEE THE OVERALL OP OF THE TWR AT THE SAME TIME. THIS HAPPENS AS THE DIRECT RESULT OF TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH TRAINING (PRESSURE BY MGMNT) WITH A LOW STAFFING LEVEL. CORRECTIVE ACTION: HAVE A STANDALONE CIC WHOSE DUTIES OVERSEE THE TWR OP SO THE RADAR CTLR CAN STAY FOCUSED ON THEIR POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.