Narrative:

I flew a small airbus on a flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We were full to the gills; maximum passenger; cargo and 46000 pounds of fuel; gross weight over 203000 pounds. Everything was going smoothly as we approached pushback time. We had completed all cockpit checks and were getting the last few passenger on board. With less than 10 mins before scheduled departure a mechanic came to the cockpit and said he needed to do a required follow-up check on the 'ths;' and asked me if I knew what the 'ths' was. I said the logbook didn't have any MEL's and I was unaware that any follow-up inspections were required. I said that perhaps he was talking about the trimable horizontal stabilizer. He took the logbook onto the jetway and we got involved in the last min departure details. At the last min the agent tried to board a prisoner in handcuffs and flight attendants said their book required prisoners to be loaded first and deplaned last and he would not be riding on our plane. I reviewed the flight attendant's manual and concurred with this decision. We were ready for door closure and push when another mechanic showed up and asked if the required check had been done. I had almost forgotten the logbook and left without it. A third mechanic came to the aircraft and said the required follow-up was for a leaking actuator valve on the horizontal stabilizer. At this time I raised the 'bs' flag and got the dispatcher; operations manager; maintenance duty manager; chief pilot on a conference call. My first question was; how could such a follow-up inspection be required without a maintenance action in the logbook? This leak was discovered during a 'C' check. Maintenance said the leak required a check once per day and could be deferred for 600 (count 'em; 600) flight hours and did not require an MEL in the logbook. I found this incredible. The day before I had an MEL maintenance action with a seatback in the emergency exit row; but today I didn't need one with a leaking flight control valve? The required inspection was done and after I got a new release documenting the conference call I departed ZZZ about 1 hour late. On my way to ZZZ1 I reviewed the logbook to note if the required inspections had been done for the last 7 days. To my amazement; the inspection had been done only 2 of the last 7 days. On arrival in ZZZ1; I spoke with the maintenance duty manager and he verified 2 inspections had been done in the last 7 days. His comment was; if you think this is bad you should look at the international maintenance operation here. Can you believe we have a procedure in place where something as serious as a flight control valve maintenance deferred repair requiring daily inspection does not have an MEL sticker on the logbook to notify the captain; the person directly responsible for the safety of the flight; that this inspection is required? And this procedure resulted in only 2 of 7 required inspections being done? The maintenance tracking system is not working. Missing 5 of 7 required inspections on a primary flight control system is unsatisfactory. The current system takes the captain out of the loop. Get a better maintenance tracking system of required inspections. Maybe putting an MEL sticker on the logbook would be a good idea? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated his company recently reformatted their maintenance procedures. His concerns about the lack of any MEL deferral item in their logbook for a leaking trimable horizontal stabilizer valve and the required maintenance action that would need to be accomplished as part of that deferral seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Maintenance and his chief pilot basically told him maintenance knows what they have to do and no; an MEL is not required and a placard is not required to remind maintenance to perform a visual check of the leaking trimable horizontal stabilizer valve; that maintenance has their own tracking system. This issue came on the heels of reviewing the recent history of the aircraft he was flying that showed multiple engine overtemp flight write-ups that were signed-off; until the aircraft ended up with an in-flight engine shutdown. Reporter is quite concerned about the maintenance attitude; the increasing inadequate maintenance; the missed maintenance procedures and the lackof information he and other pilots are given regarding the aircraft's mechanical status.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS PILOT REPORTS OF INADEQUATE MAINT PROCEDURES; INCLUDING; BUT NOT LIMITED TO; MAINT FAILURES TO PERFORM REQUIRED ACTION ITEMS FOR ACTIVE MEL DEFERRALS AND THE LACK OF NOTIFYING CREW OF THE TRUE MECHANICAL STATUS OF ACFT.

Narrative: I FLEW A SMALL AIRBUS ON A FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. WE WERE FULL TO THE GILLS; MAX PAX; CARGO AND 46000 LBS OF FUEL; GROSS WT OVER 203000 LBS. EVERYTHING WAS GOING SMOOTHLY AS WE APCHED PUSHBACK TIME. WE HAD COMPLETED ALL COCKPIT CHKS AND WERE GETTING THE LAST FEW PAX ON BOARD. WITH LESS THAN 10 MINS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEP A MECH CAME TO THE COCKPIT AND SAID HE NEEDED TO DO A REQUIRED FOLLOW-UP CHK ON THE 'THS;' AND ASKED ME IF I KNEW WHAT THE 'THS' WAS. I SAID THE LOGBOOK DIDN'T HAVE ANY MEL'S AND I WAS UNAWARE THAT ANY FOLLOW-UP INSPECTIONS WERE REQUIRED. I SAID THAT PERHAPS HE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE TRIMABLE HORIZ STABILIZER. HE TOOK THE LOGBOOK ONTO THE JETWAY AND WE GOT INVOLVED IN THE LAST MIN DEP DETAILS. AT THE LAST MIN THE AGENT TRIED TO BOARD A PRISONER IN HANDCUFFS AND FLT ATTENDANTS SAID THEIR BOOK REQUIRED PRISONERS TO BE LOADED FIRST AND DEPLANED LAST AND HE WOULD NOT BE RIDING ON OUR PLANE. I REVIEWED THE FLT ATTENDANT'S MANUAL AND CONCURRED WITH THIS DECISION. WE WERE READY FOR DOOR CLOSURE AND PUSH WHEN ANOTHER MECH SHOWED UP AND ASKED IF THE REQUIRED CHK HAD BEEN DONE. I HAD ALMOST FORGOTTEN THE LOGBOOK AND LEFT WITHOUT IT. A THIRD MECH CAME TO THE ACFT AND SAID THE REQUIRED FOLLOW-UP WAS FOR A LEAKING ACTUATOR VALVE ON THE HORIZ STABILIZER. AT THIS TIME I RAISED THE 'BS' FLAG AND GOT THE DISPATCHER; OPS MGR; MAINT DUTY MGR; CHIEF PLT ON A CONFERENCE CALL. MY FIRST QUESTION WAS; HOW COULD SUCH A FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION BE REQUIRED WITHOUT A MAINT ACTION IN THE LOGBOOK? THIS LEAK WAS DISCOVERED DURING A 'C' CHK. MAINT SAID THE LEAK REQUIRED A CHK ONCE PER DAY AND COULD BE DEFERRED FOR 600 (COUNT 'EM; 600) FLT HRS AND DID NOT REQUIRE AN MEL IN THE LOGBOOK. I FOUND THIS INCREDIBLE. THE DAY BEFORE I HAD AN MEL MAINT ACTION WITH A SEATBACK IN THE EMER EXIT ROW; BUT TODAY I DIDN'T NEED ONE WITH A LEAKING FLT CTL VALVE? THE REQUIRED INSPECTION WAS DONE AND AFTER I GOT A NEW RELEASE DOCUMENTING THE CONFERENCE CALL I DEPARTED ZZZ ABOUT 1 HR LATE. ON MY WAY TO ZZZ1 I REVIEWED THE LOGBOOK TO NOTE IF THE REQUIRED INSPECTIONS HAD BEEN DONE FOR THE LAST 7 DAYS. TO MY AMAZEMENT; THE INSPECTION HAD BEEN DONE ONLY 2 OF THE LAST 7 DAYS. ON ARR IN ZZZ1; I SPOKE WITH THE MAINT DUTY MGR AND HE VERIFIED 2 INSPECTIONS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE LAST 7 DAYS. HIS COMMENT WAS; IF YOU THINK THIS IS BAD YOU SHOULD LOOK AT THE INTL MAINT OP HERE. CAN YOU BELIEVE WE HAVE A PROC IN PLACE WHERE SOMETHING AS SERIOUS AS A FLT CTL VALVE MAINT DEFERRED REPAIR REQUIRING DAILY INSPECTION DOES NOT HAVE AN MEL STICKER ON THE LOGBOOK TO NOTIFY THE CAPT; THE PERSON DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE FLT; THAT THIS INSPECTION IS REQUIRED? AND THIS PROC RESULTED IN ONLY 2 OF 7 REQUIRED INSPECTIONS BEING DONE? THE MAINT TRACKING SYS IS NOT WORKING. MISSING 5 OF 7 REQUIRED INSPECTIONS ON A PRIMARY FLT CTL SYS IS UNSATISFACTORY. THE CURRENT SYS TAKES THE CAPT OUT OF THE LOOP. GET A BETTER MAINT TRACKING SYS OF REQUIRED INSPECTIONS. MAYBE PUTTING AN MEL STICKER ON THE LOGBOOK WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED HIS COMPANY RECENTLY REFORMATTED THEIR MAINT PROCEDURES. HIS CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF ANY MEL DEFERRAL ITEM IN THEIR LOGBOOK FOR A LEAKING TRIMABLE HORIZ STAB VALVE AND THE REQUIRED MAINT ACTION THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AS PART OF THAT DEFERRAL SEEMS TO HAVE FALLEN ON DEAF EARS. MAINT AND HIS CHIEF PILOT BASICALLY TOLD HIM MAINT KNOWS WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO AND NO; AN MEL IS NOT REQUIRED AND A PLACARD IS NOT REQUIRED TO REMIND MAINT TO PERFORM A VISUAL CHECK OF THE LEAKING TRIMABLE HORIZ STAB VALVE; THAT MAINT HAS THEIR OWN TRACKING SYSTEM. THIS ISSUE CAME ON THE HEELS OF REVIEWING THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE ACFT HE WAS FLYING THAT SHOWED MULTIPLE ENGINE OVERTEMP FLIGHT WRITE-UPS THAT WERE SIGNED-OFF; UNTIL THE ACFT ENDED UP WITH AN IN-FLIGHT ENGINE SHUTDOWN. REPORTER IS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MAINT ATTITUDE; THE INCREASING INADEQUATE MAINT; THE MISSED MAINT PROCEDURES AND THE LACKOF INFORMATION HE AND OTHER PILOTS ARE GIVEN REGARDING THE ACFT'S MECHANICAL STATUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.