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Attributes | |
ACN | 755142 |
Time | |
Date | 200709 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Falcon 50 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | landing : roll |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 15500 flight time type : 500 |
ASRS Report | 755142 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ground encounters : animal |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Environmental Factor |
Primary Problem | Environmental Factor |
Narrative:
Crew made 4 attempts to contact remote site ground personnel via land-line prior to departure. The attempts were unsuccessful; hence; voice messages were left advising an ETA. Crew proceeded to conduct mission as planned. Approximately 3 mi from destination; crew attempted to contact remote site ground personnel via VHF. Repeated attempts were unsuccessful. Crew is very experienced in conducting operations to and from the remote site. SOP is for ground support personnel to clear the runway environment of any game; then proceed to a point adjacent to the runway to observe. Crew entered the area from the south; over-flying the runway to the west to view the environment; windsocks; and conduct aerial reconnaissance. PF initiated a descending 360 degree turn to starboard. Crew observed a ground support vehicle adjacent to the runway approximately midfield; per SOP. No visible signs of game or obstructions were present during aerial reconnaissance. PF conducted a normal approach and landing (aircraft weight: 28000 pounds; target speed: 122 KTS; vref: 112 KTS). Approximately 1.5-2.0 seconds after touchdown; PNF observed a deer running perpendicular to the aircraft course; entering the runway environment from the aircraft's starboard side. Several other deer were observed. However; these deer moved away from the runway environment. The nosewheel strut of the aircraft impacted the deer center mass. PF maintained aircraft control; bringing the aircraft to a normal stop. Aircraft integrity did not appear to be compromised. Aircraft continued under own power to parking stand; where normal shutdown procedures were completed. Postflt inspection revealed a damaged landing light on the nose gear strut. Results of impact were obvious; aircraft was immediately cleaned to facilitate a detailed postflt inspection. Further inspection revealed very small; minor dents (2) on the nose gear door (port and starboard sides) at locations approximately mid-length. No other damage was apparent. Crew (combined flying experience of approximately 20000 hours) conducted detailed; individual inspections; revealing no further evidence of impact other than previously noted. Structural integrity and airworthiness were never in question. Aircraft was deemed safe to operate. However; gear was left down and locked as a precautionary measure. Maintenance technicians' preliminary inspection supported crew's decision to operate the aircraft with the gear down and locked. No further damage discovered; though a detailed inspection is scheduled as a precautionary measure. Postflt runway inspection confirmed the deer (a young DOE; estimated at approximately 120 pounds) had indeed been struck center mass; between the shoulders and hind quarters; in the softest part of the animal. This would account for the very minor damage to the airframe. The upper torso of the animal was found approximately 300 ft from point of impact on the left edge of the runway. The hind quarters were found intact; although separately; approximately 50 ft further from the location of the torso (estimated 350 ft from point of impact). Corrective actions: SOP has been amended; requiring positive communication to be established between crew and remote site ground personnel. In the event positive communications cannot be established; mission will either be delayed or aborted until positive communications are established. Contributing factors: remote site is in a high-density game environment. Runway perimeter fencing is approximately 4.5 ft in ht. Game are capable of penetrating the perimeter; rending the perimeter fence ineffective. Corrective actions: perimeter fence will be increased to a minimum ht of 12 ft. Human factors considerations: there is no training syllabus currently available which addresses runway incursions by game. Recommend implementation of optional training scenarios; to be conducted during aircraft recurrent training; to address this issue. Had the animal had greater mass; the outcome could very well have been catastrophic.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A DA50 COLLIDED WITH A DEER; KILLING IT; BUT DOING MINIMAL ACFT DAMAGE.
Narrative: CREW MADE 4 ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT REMOTE SITE GND PERSONNEL VIA LAND-LINE PRIOR TO DEP. THE ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; HENCE; VOICE MESSAGES WERE LEFT ADVISING AN ETA. CREW PROCEEDED TO CONDUCT MISSION AS PLANNED. APPROX 3 MI FROM DEST; CREW ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT REMOTE SITE GND PERSONNEL VIA VHF. REPEATED ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. CREW IS VERY EXPERIENCED IN CONDUCTING OPS TO AND FROM THE REMOTE SITE. SOP IS FOR GND SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO CLR THE RWY ENVIRONMENT OF ANY GAME; THEN PROCEED TO A POINT ADJACENT TO THE RWY TO OBSERVE. CREW ENTERED THE AREA FROM THE S; OVER-FLYING THE RWY TO THE W TO VIEW THE ENVIRONMENT; WINDSOCKS; AND CONDUCT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. PF INITIATED A DSNDING 360 DEG TURN TO STARBOARD. CREW OBSERVED A GND SUPPORT VEHICLE ADJACENT TO THE RWY APPROX MIDFIELD; PER SOP. NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF GAME OR OBSTRUCTIONS WERE PRESENT DURING AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. PF CONDUCTED A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG (ACFT WT: 28000 LBS; TARGET SPD: 122 KTS; VREF: 112 KTS). APPROX 1.5-2.0 SECONDS AFTER TOUCHDOWN; PNF OBSERVED A DEER RUNNING PERPENDICULAR TO THE ACFT COURSE; ENTERING THE RWY ENVIRONMENT FROM THE ACFT'S STARBOARD SIDE. SEVERAL OTHER DEER WERE OBSERVED. HOWEVER; THESE DEER MOVED AWAY FROM THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. THE NOSEWHEEL STRUT OF THE ACFT IMPACTED THE DEER CTR MASS. PF MAINTAINED ACFT CTL; BRINGING THE ACFT TO A NORMAL STOP. ACFT INTEGRITY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE COMPROMISED. ACFT CONTINUED UNDER OWN PWR TO PARKING STAND; WHERE NORMAL SHUTDOWN PROCS WERE COMPLETED. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED A DAMAGED LNDG LIGHT ON THE NOSE GEAR STRUT. RESULTS OF IMPACT WERE OBVIOUS; ACFT WAS IMMEDIATELY CLEANED TO FACILITATE A DETAILED POSTFLT INSPECTION. FURTHER INSPECTION REVEALED VERY SMALL; MINOR DENTS (2) ON THE NOSE GEAR DOOR (PORT AND STARBOARD SIDES) AT LOCATIONS APPROX MID-LENGTH. NO OTHER DAMAGE WAS APPARENT. CREW (COMBINED FLYING EXPERIENCE OF APPROX 20000 HRS) CONDUCTED DETAILED; INDIVIDUAL INSPECTIONS; REVEALING NO FURTHER EVIDENCE OF IMPACT OTHER THAN PREVIOUSLY NOTED. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND AIRWORTHINESS WERE NEVER IN QUESTION. ACFT WAS DEEMED SAFE TO OPERATE. HOWEVER; GEAR WAS LEFT DOWN AND LOCKED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. MAINT TECHNICIANS' PRELIMINARY INSPECTION SUPPORTED CREW'S DECISION TO OPERATE THE ACFT WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED. NO FURTHER DAMAGE DISCOVERED; THOUGH A DETAILED INSPECTION IS SCHEDULED AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. POSTFLT RWY INSPECTION CONFIRMED THE DEER (A YOUNG DOE; ESTIMATED AT APPROX 120 LBS) HAD INDEED BEEN STRUCK CTR MASS; BTWN THE SHOULDERS AND HIND QUARTERS; IN THE SOFTEST PART OF THE ANIMAL. THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE VERY MINOR DAMAGE TO THE AIRFRAME. THE UPPER TORSO OF THE ANIMAL WAS FOUND APPROX 300 FT FROM POINT OF IMPACT ON THE L EDGE OF THE RWY. THE HIND QUARTERS WERE FOUND INTACT; ALTHOUGH SEPARATELY; APPROX 50 FT FURTHER FROM THE LOCATION OF THE TORSO (ESTIMATED 350 FT FROM POINT OF IMPACT). CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: SOP HAS BEEN AMENDED; REQUIRING POSITIVE COM TO BE ESTABLISHED BTWN CREW AND REMOTE SITE GND PERSONNEL. IN THE EVENT POSITIVE COMS CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED; MISSION WILL EITHER BE DELAYED OR ABORTED UNTIL POSITIVE COMS ARE ESTABLISHED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: REMOTE SITE IS IN A HIGH-DENSITY GAME ENVIRONMENT. RWY PERIMETER FENCING IS APPROX 4.5 FT IN HT. GAME ARE CAPABLE OF PENETRATING THE PERIMETER; RENDING THE PERIMETER FENCE INEFFECTIVE. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: PERIMETER FENCE WILL BE INCREASED TO A MINIMUM HT OF 12 FT. HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS: THERE IS NO TRAINING SYLLABUS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE WHICH ADDRESSES RWY INCURSIONS BY GAME. RECOMMEND IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIONAL TRAINING SCENARIOS; TO BE CONDUCTED DURING ACFT RECURRENT TRAINING; TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. HAD THE ANIMAL HAD GREATER MASS; THE OUTCOME COULD VERY WELL HAVE BEEN CATASTROPHIC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.