Narrative:

There were wheel ruts in the asphalt on taxiway north north of runway 27R. They did not appear excessively deep from the cockpit. We were cleared to hold short of runway 27R on north. Main wheels settled into ruts and could not move aircraft using safe amount of thrust. Called company. Mechanic came out and towed us out of rut. This required 2 attempts; as the first tug was too small; and the tow bar shear pin broke. Mechanic determined that no damage to aircraft occurred and we departed uneventfully. We had been told that this happened to another company aircraft the previous day at the same location; but we could not see any holes that looked deep enough to be a threat. There was nothing noted on the release or in the NOTAMS or on ATIS about this. However; ground control seemed aware that the ruts required a lot of thrust to negotiate. I think the event occurred because the airport authority should have closed the taxiway and repaired the ruts; especially after the previous aircraft got stuck. 1) airport should keep surfaces in good repair. 2) in absence of (1); close taxiway. 3) in absence of (1) and/or (2); disseminate appropriate NOTAMS. 4) when a company aircraft had this occur the previous day; we should have had some reliable information about the hazard from the company.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 GOT STUCK IN A PAVEMENT RUT ON PHL TXWY N AT THE RWY 27R HOLD SHORT LINE. TUG ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

Narrative: THERE WERE WHEEL RUTS IN THE ASPHALT ON TXWY N NORTH OF RWY 27R. THEY DID NOT APPEAR EXCESSIVELY DEEP FROM THE COCKPIT. WE WERE CLRED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R ON N. MAIN WHEELS SETTLED INTO RUTS AND COULD NOT MOVE ACFT USING SAFE AMOUNT OF THRUST. CALLED COMPANY. MECHANIC CAME OUT AND TOWED US OUT OF RUT. THIS REQUIRED 2 ATTEMPTS; AS THE FIRST TUG WAS TOO SMALL; AND THE TOW BAR SHEAR PIN BROKE. MECH DETERMINED THAT NO DAMAGE TO ACFT OCCURRED AND WE DEPARTED UNEVENTFULLY. WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THIS HAPPENED TO ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT THE PREVIOUS DAY AT THE SAME LOCATION; BUT WE COULD NOT SEE ANY HOLES THAT LOOKED DEEP ENOUGH TO BE A THREAT. THERE WAS NOTHING NOTED ON THE RELEASE OR IN THE NOTAMS OR ON ATIS ABOUT THIS. HOWEVER; GND CTL SEEMED AWARE THAT THE RUTS REQUIRED A LOT OF THRUST TO NEGOTIATE. I THINK THE EVENT OCCURRED BECAUSE THE ARPT AUTHORITY SHOULD HAVE CLOSED THE TXWY AND REPAIRED THE RUTS; ESPECIALLY AFTER THE PREVIOUS ACFT GOT STUCK. 1) ARPT SHOULD KEEP SURFACES IN GOOD REPAIR. 2) IN ABSENCE OF (1); CLOSE TXWY. 3) IN ABSENCE OF (1) AND/OR (2); DISSEMINATE APPROPRIATE NOTAMS. 4) WHEN A COMPANY ACFT HAD THIS OCCUR THE PREVIOUS DAY; WE SHOULD HAVE HAD SOME RELIABLE INFO ABOUT THE HAZARD FROM THE COMPANY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.