Narrative:

I was working D88 (darbs sector) during this incident. At the time of the incident; the sector was severely impacted with WX and associated deviations. The precipitation was covering a massive area of the state from at least 30 mi southwest of ocf continuing to the northeast for 50 mi or more. W470 and nova areas were hot and we tried but; were unable to obtain any release of these areas. Tpa departures were deviating west directly into the tpa arrival stream. As a result we had instituted the darbs 19; to have tpa arrs delivered to us at FL190 rather than the usual FL270; so that the departures could top the descending arrs. At the time of the incident we were trying to sequence 2 separate groups of tpa arrs that were stacked on top of one another; 3 aircraft in each stack. Again the darbs 19 was supposed to be in effect; however at this time we realized that we were also receiving tpa arrs at FL270 and FL250; thus the stacks (which should come to us in-trail). We made the supervisor aware that we were receiving the tpa's stacked and not on the darbs 19 meaning we were receiving arrs from 2 different sectors (high and low) thus the stacks and no in-trail at all and asked for some help. The sector complexity at this time was very high and we really could have used some tpa spacing and in-trail. At this time we noticed X conflict alert with Y. X was a tpa arrival level at FL270 that should have been descended prior to the R16 (mayo) boundary but apparently wasn't. Mayo (R16) apparently did not receive a pointout or data block on X. They proceeded to descend Y an mco arrival to FL270 in close proximity to X. Conflict alert activated and the radar person immediately descended X to avoid conflict. I believe much of this situation could have been avoided with some planning. We were very busy and had been for this entire session. Tmu should have increased the in-trail spacing for tpa. There seems to be an effort at our facility to never slow traffic down for any reason. The WX was severely impacting both arrs and departures yet we were receiving no help from tmu. The darbs 19 was supposed to be in effect yet it suddenly disappeared. Why; we don't know. But receiving tpa's stacked was completely unacceptable. It seems any time a controller asks for some in-trail it is met with tremendous resistance. Also of note; earlier in this session we were supposed to be receiving mco arrs 10 mi in-trail. We received several of these stacked. Again very busy. The radar instructed me to have mayo spin one of the stacked aircraft either a right or left 360 degrees their choice. The supervisor came over and said we must take that handoff and that mayo was much busier than us. Of course there was no way for us to get the in-trail without spinning this aircraft. In the end mayo spun the aircraft. But this is an example of the pressure they kept putting on us. The watch word seems to be 'keep pressure on the system.' then surprise when something breaks. We were constantly being distraction with new plans and several discussions with the supervisors during this entire session and we felt that we were getting very little help at all. I cannot help but feel that this attitude of 'we'll have no delays whatsoever' is almost certainly a compromise on safety. Incidentally due to the high complexity and volume very few WX calls were made to aircraft during this period.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL270; REPORTER CITING HEAVY TFC VOLUME AND FAILURE OF SUPVR/TMU INITIATIVES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING D88 (DARBS SECTOR) DURING THIS INCIDENT. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT; THE SECTOR WAS SEVERELY IMPACTED WITH WX AND ASSOCIATED DEVS. THE PRECIP WAS COVERING A MASSIVE AREA OF THE STATE FROM AT LEAST 30 MI SW OF OCF CONTINUING TO THE NE FOR 50 MI OR MORE. W470 AND NOVA AREAS WERE HOT AND WE TRIED BUT; WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY RELEASE OF THESE AREAS. TPA DEPS WERE DEVIATING W DIRECTLY INTO THE TPA ARR STREAM. AS A RESULT WE HAD INSTITUTED THE DARBS 19; TO HAVE TPA ARRS DELIVERED TO US AT FL190 RATHER THAN THE USUAL FL270; SO THAT THE DEPS COULD TOP THE DSNDING ARRS. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WE WERE TRYING TO SEQUENCE 2 SEPARATE GROUPS OF TPA ARRS THAT WERE STACKED ON TOP OF ONE ANOTHER; 3 ACFT IN EACH STACK. AGAIN THE DARBS 19 WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN EFFECT; HOWEVER AT THIS TIME WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE ALSO RECEIVING TPA ARRS AT FL270 AND FL250; THUS THE STACKS (WHICH SHOULD COME TO US IN-TRAIL). WE MADE THE SUPVR AWARE THAT WE WERE RECEIVING THE TPA'S STACKED AND NOT ON THE DARBS 19 MEANING WE WERE RECEIVING ARRS FROM 2 DIFFERENT SECTORS (HIGH AND LOW) THUS THE STACKS AND NO IN-TRAIL AT ALL AND ASKED FOR SOME HELP. THE SECTOR COMPLEXITY AT THIS TIME WAS VERY HIGH AND WE REALLY COULD HAVE USED SOME TPA SPACING AND IN-TRAIL. AT THIS TIME WE NOTICED X CONFLICT ALERT WITH Y. X WAS A TPA ARR LEVEL AT FL270 THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DSNDED PRIOR TO THE R16 (MAYO) BOUNDARY BUT APPARENTLY WASN'T. MAYO (R16) APPARENTLY DID NOT RECEIVE A POINTOUT OR DATA BLOCK ON X. THEY PROCEEDED TO DSND Y AN MCO ARR TO FL270 IN CLOSE PROX TO X. CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED AND THE RADAR PERSON IMMEDIATELY DSNDED X TO AVOID CONFLICT. I BELIEVE MUCH OF THIS SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH SOME PLANNING. WE WERE VERY BUSY AND HAD BEEN FOR THIS ENTIRE SESSION. TMU SHOULD HAVE INCREASED THE IN-TRAIL SPACING FOR TPA. THERE SEEMS TO BE AN EFFORT AT OUR FACILITY TO NEVER SLOW TFC DOWN FOR ANY REASON. THE WX WAS SEVERELY IMPACTING BOTH ARRS AND DEPS YET WE WERE RECEIVING NO HELP FROM TMU. THE DARBS 19 WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN EFFECT YET IT SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED. WHY; WE DON'T KNOW. BUT RECEIVING TPA'S STACKED WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IT SEEMS ANY TIME A CTLR ASKS FOR SOME IN-TRAIL IT IS MET WITH TREMENDOUS RESISTANCE. ALSO OF NOTE; EARLIER IN THIS SESSION WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE RECEIVING MCO ARRS 10 MI IN-TRAIL. WE RECEIVED SEVERAL OF THESE STACKED. AGAIN VERY BUSY. THE RADAR INSTRUCTED ME TO HAVE MAYO SPIN ONE OF THE STACKED ACFT EITHER A R OR L 360 DEGS THEIR CHOICE. THE SUPVR CAME OVER AND SAID WE MUST TAKE THAT HDOF AND THAT MAYO WAS MUCH BUSIER THAN US. OF COURSE THERE WAS NO WAY FOR US TO GET THE IN-TRAIL WITHOUT SPINNING THIS ACFT. IN THE END MAYO SPUN THE ACFT. BUT THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PRESSURE THEY KEPT PUTTING ON US. THE WATCH WORD SEEMS TO BE 'KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYS.' THEN SURPRISE WHEN SOMETHING BREAKS. WE WERE CONSTANTLY BEING DISTR WITH NEW PLANS AND SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SUPVRS DURING THIS ENTIRE SESSION AND WE FELT THAT WE WERE GETTING VERY LITTLE HELP AT ALL. I CANNOT HELP BUT FEEL THAT THIS ATTITUDE OF 'WE'LL HAVE NO DELAYS WHATSOEVER' IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A COMPROMISE ON SAFETY. INCIDENTALLY DUE TO THE HIGH COMPLEXITY AND VOLUME VERY FEW WX CALLS WERE MADE TO ACFT DURING THIS PERIOD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.