Narrative:

Approximately 45 mins prior to landing; the first officer inquired about specific issues related to lax as he had never operated at that airport. I briefed him on issues such as usual runway assignment; vigilance for hold short instructions; etc. I also briefed the civet 5 arrival; what to expect for altitude clearance; and how we should manage the fcp. The first officer then briefed the ILS runway 24R; as I had set it in the FMS per the latest information. I preset the secondary flight plan for runway 25L as backup. Prior to gramm intersection; socal approach cleared us 'to descend via the civet 5; expect the ILS 25L.' I set 7000 ft in the altitude window of the fcp due to the altitude restr at fuelr intersection; and activated the secondary flight plan for runway 25L. The first officer and I verified the crossing restrs associated with the civet 5 arrival. Between eddso and luvyn intxns; I hard tuned the ILS to runway 25L for reference. Prior to reaching fuelr intersection; socal approach cleared us for the ILS runway 25L. I set 1900 ft in the altitude window of the fcp; and verified the entry with the first officer as per the GS interception altitude at limma intersection. We were also assigned 200 KTS by socal approach. After passing gaate intersection; socal approach instructed us to maintain 3500 ft and 'set up for the ILS 25R.' I reset the altitude window in the fcp to 3500 ft and the first officer verified it. I selected the ILS runway 25R and inserted it into the flight plan. Due to a waypoint behind the aircraft position; the aircraft started a 30 degree bank left turn. The first officer realized the deviation immediately and disconnected the autoplt to maintain heading and altitude. The first officer briefed the approach and noted the change in baro setting; which was changed on both fcp controls. We also observed shell; fogla; and grimy intersection in the FMS. I set 1900 ft in the altitude window of the fcp again; as that is the GS interception ht at fogla intersection for runway 25R. It was verified by the first officer. I assisted the first officer in losing altitude by setting approximately -1000 FPM with the scroll wheel. The first officer asked for confign of the aircraft; and I agreed and complied. Controller stated 'cleared for the approach and contact tower.' the first officer asked for; and I selected the approach-land pushbutton on the fcp. The localizer and GS captured; and we completed the before landing checklist. The first officer had the aircraft stabilized in airspeed; GS; and localizer by 1900 ft. As I contacted the tower; I was still setting the missed approach setting in the fcp. I read back the landing clearance; but was concentrating on the first officer hand-flying an ILS in IMC conditions. At 1000 ft; I called and verified missed approach set. At 600 ft; I called 'approach lights in sight;' and the first officer called 'continuing;' as he later indicated he did not have the approach lighting system in sight. The 500 ft call was normal in airspeed and sink rate. There were no other calls from lax tower for entirety of the approach. Shortly after the 500 ft call; the first officer called the runway in sight and; 'taking over visually.' I silently reconfirmed being on GS and localizer; and the needles were centered. The airspeed was on bug. After landing rollout; we cleared the runway to the right and held behind an airbus 320. As we were given taxi instructions; the ground controller asked us to call tower for possible pilot deviation. After the aircraft was parked at the gate and appropriate checklists were complete; I called the number and talked to a tower controller who informed me that we had landed on runway 25L; with a landing clearance for runway 25R. I explained the poor handling by socal approach close to the airport environment; but he simply gave me the number to socal approach. He stated that no men; equipment; or other aircraft were in or near runway 25L and that it was open but that he was filing a 'preliminary pilot deviation report' with the los angeles FSDO. The event occurred due to the distrs of changing multiple approachs close to the airport; poor controller handling of our aircraft; and the failure to decline a sub-standard clearance. We were well ahead of the aircraft until the late change in runway assignment. The controller failed to analyze our position in relation to the runway environment; failed to give vectors or xref information; such as 'X mi from the XXX fix.' the lax tower controller failed to monitor our progress while we were in IMC conditions. I failed to maintain maximum situational awareness; to decline a substandard clearance; and failed to ask for vectors back to the approach. As far as the automation; my only presumptions are that the localizer for runway 25L was still captured; and we were distraction by the aircraft deviation due to the runway change. Also; the hard tuning of the runway 25L localizer in navigation-rad page may have had an impact. Being more defensive in the care of the aircraft in difficult ATC sits would relieve the crew from rushing into a situation. Socal is congested airspace; they use nonstandard phraseology; and repositioning aircraft for an approach causes huge problems. Lax tower controllers seemed as unaware of our situational awareness as we were. They only said something after it was all over. There was never a query of our position; or a go around instruction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B717 FLT CREW LANDS 25L IN IMC AT LAX AFTER TWO RWY CHANGES WITH CLEARANCE FOR ILS 25R.

Narrative: APPROX 45 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG; THE FO INQUIRED ABOUT SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO LAX AS HE HAD NEVER OPERATED AT THAT ARPT. I BRIEFED HIM ON ISSUES SUCH AS USUAL RWY ASSIGNMENT; VIGILANCE FOR HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS; ETC. I ALSO BRIEFED THE CIVET 5 ARR; WHAT TO EXPECT FOR ALT CLRNC; AND HOW WE SHOULD MANAGE THE FCP. THE FO THEN BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 24R; AS I HAD SET IT IN THE FMS PER THE LATEST INFO. I PRESET THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN FOR RWY 25L AS BACKUP. PRIOR TO GRAMM INTXN; SOCAL APCH CLRED US 'TO DSND VIA THE CIVET 5; EXPECT THE ILS 25L.' I SET 7000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP DUE TO THE ALT RESTR AT FUELR INTXN; AND ACTIVATED THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN FOR RWY 25L. THE FO AND I VERIFIED THE XING RESTRS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CIVET 5 ARR. BTWN EDDSO AND LUVYN INTXNS; I HARD TUNED THE ILS TO RWY 25L FOR REF. PRIOR TO REACHING FUELR INTXN; SOCAL APCH CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 25L. I SET 1900 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP; AND VERIFIED THE ENTRY WITH THE FO AS PER THE GS INTERCEPTION ALT AT LIMMA INTXN. WE WERE ALSO ASSIGNED 200 KTS BY SOCAL APCH. AFTER PASSING GAATE INTXN; SOCAL APCH INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 3500 FT AND 'SET UP FOR THE ILS 25R.' I RESET THE ALT WINDOW IN THE FCP TO 3500 FT AND THE FO VERIFIED IT. I SELECTED THE ILS RWY 25R AND INSERTED IT INTO THE FLT PLAN. DUE TO A WAYPOINT BEHIND THE ACFT POS; THE ACFT STARTED A 30 DEG BANK L TURN. THE FO REALIZED THE DEV IMMEDIATELY AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO MAINTAIN HDG AND ALT. THE FO BRIEFED THE APCH AND NOTED THE CHANGE IN BARO SETTING; WHICH WAS CHANGED ON BOTH FCP CTLS. WE ALSO OBSERVED SHELL; FOGLA; AND GRIMY INTXN IN THE FMS. I SET 1900 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW OF THE FCP AGAIN; AS THAT IS THE GS INTERCEPTION HT AT FOGLA INTXN FOR RWY 25R. IT WAS VERIFIED BY THE FO. I ASSISTED THE FO IN LOSING ALT BY SETTING APPROX -1000 FPM WITH THE SCROLL WHEEL. THE FO ASKED FOR CONFIGN OF THE ACFT; AND I AGREED AND COMPLIED. CTLR STATED 'CLRED FOR THE APCH AND CONTACT TWR.' THE FO ASKED FOR; AND I SELECTED THE APCH-LAND PUSHBUTTON ON THE FCP. THE LOC AND GS CAPTURED; AND WE COMPLETED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. THE FO HAD THE ACFT STABILIZED IN AIRSPD; GS; AND LOC BY 1900 FT. AS I CONTACTED THE TWR; I WAS STILL SETTING THE MISSED APCH SETTING IN THE FCP. I READ BACK THE LNDG CLRNC; BUT WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE FO HAND-FLYING AN ILS IN IMC CONDITIONS. AT 1000 FT; I CALLED AND VERIFIED MISSED APCH SET. AT 600 FT; I CALLED 'APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT;' AND THE FO CALLED 'CONTINUING;' AS HE LATER INDICATED HE DID NOT HAVE THE APCH LIGHTING SYS IN SIGHT. THE 500 FT CALL WAS NORMAL IN AIRSPD AND SINK RATE. THERE WERE NO OTHER CALLS FROM LAX TWR FOR ENTIRETY OF THE APCH. SHORTLY AFTER THE 500 FT CALL; THE FO CALLED THE RWY IN SIGHT AND; 'TAKING OVER VISUALLY.' I SILENTLY RECONFIRMED BEING ON GS AND LOC; AND THE NEEDLES WERE CTRED. THE AIRSPD WAS ON BUG. AFTER LNDG ROLLOUT; WE CLRED THE RWY TO THE R AND HELD BEHIND AN AIRBUS 320. AS WE WERE GIVEN TAXI INSTRUCTIONS; THE GND CTLR ASKED US TO CALL TWR FOR POSSIBLE PLTDEV. AFTER THE ACFT WAS PARKED AT THE GATE AND APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE; I CALLED THE NUMBER AND TALKED TO A TWR CTLR WHO INFORMED ME THAT WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 25L; WITH A LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 25R. I EXPLAINED THE POOR HANDLING BY SOCAL APCH CLOSE TO THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT; BUT HE SIMPLY GAVE ME THE NUMBER TO SOCAL APCH. HE STATED THAT NO MEN; EQUIP; OR OTHER ACFT WERE IN OR NEAR RWY 25L AND THAT IT WAS OPEN BUT THAT HE WAS FILING A 'PRELIMINARY PLTDEV RPT' WITH THE LOS ANGELES FSDO. THE EVENT OCCURRED DUE TO THE DISTRS OF CHANGING MULTIPLE APCHS CLOSE TO THE ARPT; POOR CTLR HANDLING OF OUR ACFT; AND THE FAILURE TO DECLINE A SUB-STANDARD CLRNC. WE WERE WELL AHEAD OF THE ACFT UNTIL THE LATE CHANGE IN RWY ASSIGNMENT. THE CTLR FAILED TO ANALYZE OUR POS IN RELATION TO THE RWY ENVIRONMENT; FAILED TO GIVE VECTORS OR XREF INFO; SUCH AS 'X MI FROM THE XXX FIX.' THE LAX TWR CTLR FAILED TO MONITOR OUR PROGRESS WHILE WE WERE IN IMC CONDITIONS. I FAILED TO MAINTAIN MAX SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; TO DECLINE A SUBSTANDARD CLRNC; AND FAILED TO ASK FOR VECTORS BACK TO THE APCH. AS FAR AS THE AUTOMATION; MY ONLY PRESUMPTIONS ARE THAT THE LOC FOR RWY 25L WAS STILL CAPTURED; AND WE WERE DISTR BY THE ACFT DEV DUE TO THE RWY CHANGE. ALSO; THE HARD TUNING OF THE RWY 25L LOC IN NAV-RAD PAGE MAY HAVE HAD AN IMPACT. BEING MORE DEFENSIVE IN THE CARE OF THE ACFT IN DIFFICULT ATC SITS WOULD RELIEVE THE CREW FROM RUSHING INTO A SIT. SOCAL IS CONGESTED AIRSPACE; THEY USE NONSTANDARD PHRASEOLOGY; AND REPOSITIONING ACFT FOR AN APCH CAUSES HUGE PROBS. LAX TWR CTLRS SEEMED AS UNAWARE OF OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS WE WERE. THEY ONLY SAID SOMETHING AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER. THERE WAS NEVER A QUERY OF OUR POS; OR A GAR INSTRUCTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.