Narrative:

As we began our descent; it took me 3 attempts to get abc to the top of page 1 on the legs page of the FMC. The visual approach was rebriefed for our new runway assignment. Since the approach changed from a base leg approach to a straight-in approach; altitude was a concern and the spoilers were deployed until we got back on profile. With those 2 items under control; we started looking for the runway. The first officer was new and I did not have a high level of confidence in 'my' ability to pick out the runway from among the lights in front of us (morning guy; dark; not intimately familiar with ZZZ). The first officer picked out the SFL's for the runway and talked my eyes to them. I said I was not positive the lights he saw were ZZZ because the VASI showed red over white but the GS was pegged at the bottom of the case (and I do not believe I had a GS flag). We decided the ILS to runway X was not up (runway Y active) and xchking the moving map display showed the airport location to match the SFL's and the runway alignment to be correct. We began configuring for landing and when the landing gear was extended; I heard the flight attendant begin the arrival PA. When we got to the gate; I told the 'a' flight attendant I was very sorry that they were not notified; and that in the dark I must have pushed the 'ground' call button instead of the 'attendant' call button and showed her they were right next to each other. She said 'no;' I had made the notification because the captain call light was on in the cabin; but none of the flight attendants had heard the notification. The 'a' flight attendant then showed me she had been injured when in their haste to secure the forward galley; the 'C' flight attendant had slammed the ice drawer on her finger and the finger was cut and bleeding. The problem was that none of the flight attendants heard the notification and due to my preoccupation with flying safely to the new runway; I failed to confirm the flight attendants heard the notification. I have adopted the technique when confronted with turbulence and I have the flight attendants remain in their seats; I drape the hand microphone across my right leg to remind me of their status. I have decided to use the hand microphone technique to prevent the incident I have described from recurring; I will drape the hand microphone on my leg when we complete the descent checklist and remove it when I hear the flight attendants make their arrival PA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR PILOT REPORTS THAT AFTER A RWY CHANGE AND DUE TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS' FAILURE TO HEAR THE PRE LNDG BELLS; A FLT ATTENDANT'S HAND WAS INJURED DURING A HASTY; DELAYED CABIN PREPARATION.

Narrative: AS WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT; IT TOOK ME 3 ATTEMPTS TO GET ABC TO THE TOP OF PAGE 1 ON THE LEGS PAGE OF THE FMC. THE VISUAL APCH WAS REBRIEFED FOR OUR NEW RWY ASSIGNMENT. SINCE THE APCH CHANGED FROM A BASE LEG APCH TO A STRAIGHT-IN APCH; ALT WAS A CONCERN AND THE SPOILERS WERE DEPLOYED UNTIL WE GOT BACK ON PROFILE. WITH THOSE 2 ITEMS UNDER CTL; WE STARTED LOOKING FOR THE RWY. THE FO WAS NEW AND I DID NOT HAVE A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN 'MY' ABILITY TO PICK OUT THE RWY FROM AMONG THE LIGHTS IN FRONT OF US (MORNING GUY; DARK; NOT INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH ZZZ). THE FO PICKED OUT THE SFL'S FOR THE RWY AND TALKED MY EYES TO THEM. I SAID I WAS NOT POSITIVE THE LIGHTS HE SAW WERE ZZZ BECAUSE THE VASI SHOWED RED OVER WHITE BUT THE GS WAS PEGGED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE CASE (AND I DO NOT BELIEVE I HAD A GS FLAG). WE DECIDED THE ILS TO RWY X WAS NOT UP (RWY Y ACTIVE) AND XCHKING THE MOVING MAP DISPLAY SHOWED THE ARPT LOCATION TO MATCH THE SFL'S AND THE RWY ALIGNMENT TO BE CORRECT. WE BEGAN CONFIGURING FOR LNDG AND WHEN THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED; I HEARD THE FLT ATTENDANT BEGIN THE ARR PA. WHEN WE GOT TO THE GATE; I TOLD THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT I WAS VERY SORRY THAT THEY WERE NOT NOTIFIED; AND THAT IN THE DARK I MUST HAVE PUSHED THE 'GND' CALL BUTTON INSTEAD OF THE 'ATTENDANT' CALL BUTTON AND SHOWED HER THEY WERE RIGHT NEXT TO EACH OTHER. SHE SAID 'NO;' I HAD MADE THE NOTIFICATION BECAUSE THE CAPT CALL LIGHT WAS ON IN THE CABIN; BUT NONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD HEARD THE NOTIFICATION. THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT THEN SHOWED ME SHE HAD BEEN INJURED WHEN IN THEIR HASTE TO SECURE THE FORWARD GALLEY; THE 'C' FLT ATTENDANT HAD SLAMMED THE ICE DRAWER ON HER FINGER AND THE FINGER WAS CUT AND BLEEDING. THE PROB WAS THAT NONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS HEARD THE NOTIFICATION AND DUE TO MY PREOCCUPATION WITH FLYING SAFELY TO THE NEW RWY; I FAILED TO CONFIRM THE FLT ATTENDANTS HEARD THE NOTIFICATION. I HAVE ADOPTED THE TECHNIQUE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH TURB AND I HAVE THE FLT ATTENDANTS REMAIN IN THEIR SEATS; I DRAPE THE HAND MIKE ACROSS MY R LEG TO REMIND ME OF THEIR STATUS. I HAVE DECIDED TO USE THE HAND MIKE TECHNIQUE TO PREVENT THE INCIDENT I HAVE DESCRIBED FROM RECURRING; I WILL DRAPE THE HAND MIKE ON MY LEG WHEN WE COMPLETE THE DSCNT CHKLIST AND REMOVE IT WHEN I HEAR THE FLT ATTENDANTS MAKE THEIR ARR PA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.