Narrative:

The day prior to the event day; we flew a nonstop transcontinental leg in aircraft X. The maintenance log history for aircraft X listed 20 items; dating back to sep/xa/07. Appearing 6 times was a gripe about the center fuel tank quantity indicating system going blank; sometimes intermittently. The first reference to this problem appeared about 2 weeks ago; as a rolled forward item. That totals 7 separate write-ups (we knew about) for the same gripe. The aircraft history shows it flew non-stops solely between 3 maintenance stations. The earliest maintenance action in response to this write-up; was a deferral. That deferral MEL placard limited center tank fuel to less than 5000 pounds; and designated that fuel as payload only; not to be used. It also prohibited flight planning using reduced fuel reserves. On this date; the fuel processor unit was replaced and the unit operation-tested normal. The very next flight; the center fuel tank indicated blank again. The maintenance actions up to the day of our flight; in sequence and in response to subsequent write-ups; were to: 1) reset circuit breakers to fueling quantity operations resumed to normal. 2) accomplish service tip XXXX operations check good. 3) fuel quantity processor bite has fault codes D3; 75. Reset flight quantity processor; fault codes cleared bite test normal. Flight deck display normal. 4) accomplished fuel quantity circuit breaker #1 and #2 rest; center fuel quantity indicator came back. 5) fuel quantity indication and FMC ok for service (with no action taken). Therefore; we were aware that the issue was chronic; and that after initially replacing the fuel processor; the maintenance work consisted of resetting circuit breakers and clearing fault codes; or observing normal operation on the ground. We were also aware that the maintenance action for the write-up imposed an operation limitation that mysteriously did not appear in any subsequent maintenance actions for the same problem. We departed and during climb out the center fuel quantity indicator went blank; accompanied by an EICAS status message; 'fuel quantity ind.' we lost our totalizer fuel and FMC totalizer indications. We sent a message via ACARS as soon as we leveled off at cruise; to give maintenance plenty of heads up on the incoming recurrent problem. We also had a lengthy discussion about wiring and fuel tanks; and the air carrier X incident. Our concern was prompted by the initial deferral; which prohibited center tank fuel pump usage. We also discussed how we would know when to turn off the center tank pumps in compliance with the operation restr imposed after air carrier X (to turn the pumps off at 1000 pounds). We were comfortable that we could determine the timing based on fuel flow and previously known quantities. The flight was uneventful. The next day; I received a phone call from the captain about an hour and a half before pickup at the hotel. He informed me that we had the same aircraft going home and that the problem had not been fixed. In fact; the issue was deferred and we were under the limits of the same MEL placard previously seen in the log history. The placard limited the center tank to less than 5000 pounds of fuel; designated as payload fuel. We were planned to make a fueling stop in ZZZ. The captain related how he had spoken to maintenance control at length about the issue; and in particular; pointedly asked him about exceptions to the MEL (none); and whether the fuel sensor put any electrical current in the fuel tank (no). The captain mentioned to me during this phone call that he pointed out to maintenance control that the aircraft flew just fine; and that it had flown just fine many legs prior with the same issue. Apparently; this maintenance control controller could not be swayed; and was adamant the aircraft not fly any further without imposing the MEL restrs. The captain said he couldn't override maintenance control; and I agreed. We both left for the airport early; in the hopes of getting lunch. First we went to operations to flight plan. We drew up the paperwork; and as we were perusing it; got a call from dispatch. The dispatcher said he had planned us illegally; using a small amount of center tank fuel to get to ZZZ. He hadn't realized we were limited to wing tank fuelonly. Wing tanks alone could not carry sufficient fuel to get us to ZZZ. The dispatcher was going to look at ZZZ1. In fact; it turns out that; while we could easily get to ZZZ1; we would then not have enough fuel to fly from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 non-stop; using wing tank fuel. We were seriously looking at 2 fuel stops; not exactly the service our passenger were expecting. The dispatcher apparently then suggested to the captain that we dispatch to ZZZ and declare an emergency en route. His purported reasoning was that the MEL specifically said center tank fuel may be burned in an emergency situation. The captain relayed this statement to me while he was still on the phone with dispatch. I was not sure if this was a serious proposal; or not. The mere fact that there were quite a few witnesses to this exchange made it confusing -- we were; by now; the focal point of attention in the airport operations room. It seemed that the assemblage of personnel (maintenance; fueling; ramp; customer service and operations) was waiting for our decision concerning the operation of the flight. At least some of them heard this exchange. I pointed out it was illegal to dispatch knowing you were going to have to declare an emergency to get to your destination. The captain readily agreed; and that avenue was no longer pursued. The captain hung up; relaying that dispatch was feeling pressure to get this flight going. A different maintenance controller (than the one who deferred the gripe) initiated a call to the captain. He told the captain that he would get a mechanic to do a bite check and sign the log entry off. When the captain relayed this information; the line mechanic in operations shook his head; and said he wouldn't do it. He voiced his concern that there might be a short somewhere in the line. A maintenance supervisor arrived; and he said he would sign the write-up off; if it passed the bite check. The captain asked if the problem would recur again; and the supervisor said yes; but the aircraft was scheduled for 36 hours downwind in ZZZ2; and they would fix the problem there. Everyone seemed happy with this except me. I said; 'what if the pilots don't accept that?' then; I put my foot down and said 'I'm not taking this jet.' I admit my stance was emboldened by seeing the line mechanic take a stand -- saying he would not sign it off. I was vocal about my reasoning; saying that if at least 2 maintenance controllers felt it unsafe; that I always go with the most conservative opinion. Regretfully; I opined that maintenance was pencil whipping the problem. I was wrong to question the professionalism of any mechanic; but I did not like the way the off-duty maintenance controller and line mechanic were overridden. I recalled the air carrier airlines incident; where 1 mechanic felt the stabilizer components were out of limits; and he was overridden by his superior. Just because an airplane has flown around successfully; thus far; with a known issue; there is no guarantee that circumstances won't conspire to bring it down on the next leg for the same problem. A wire could jostle -- who knows. I also felt; despite the captain's discussion with maintenance control; that a sensor in the fuel tank might carry some electrical current; and only the tiniest spark is needed to set the whole thing off. Our flight manuals are not detailed enough to assuage my fears on this point. When I told the captain he could find a replacement first officer; he responded; 'we are a team.' he added that he would not go without me. I was very gratified by his stance. At any rate; an aircraft swap was accomplished. The captain stayed behind to gather the new flight papers and I left to preflight the new aircraft. I left operations under the impression they were going to fix the aircraft. Once airborne; the captain pursued a hunch and checked on the aircraft departing behind us for ZZZ2. He was dismayed to find it was our old aircraft. We both believed the aircraft would be fixed prior to flight. Apparently; the deferral was removed and the aircraft was released with center tank fuel to ZZZ2. The oncoming captain had no way of knowing that an MEL placard had been imposed by 1 maintenance controller; and later deleted from the electronic record by a subsequent maintenance controller (after yet another bite check which accomplished no repair). If we had actually gone to the airplane; we could've made a log entry noting the refusal to fly in ACARS. But; we were assured by maintenance that the issue would be fixed before the aircraft flew; and so we did not. Now; I regret the lack of entry. Having said that; I have 2 more concerns. One; an aircraft that at least 2 maintenance controllers thought should not fly with center tank fuel; did. Is it; or is it not; safe to fly with a chronic center tank fuel indicating problem? Inconsistent responses from maintenance did not clarify this issue for me. I am confused as to how much latitude is allowed in deciding when to impose MEL restrs in response to a known maintenance issue? Particularly when an MEL exists that would seem to deny any discretion. If there is an MEL for the center tank fuel totalizer issue; after how many write-ups; and at what point; does the MEL actually get applied? If this maintenance issue is really 'nothing;' then why have an MEL at all? And finally; the mention of dispatching to ZZZ with the intent of declaring an emergency to bypass the MEL requirements. Is the MEL so irrelevant; so misguided; as to merit blatant disregard? Again; if this was just a joke on the dispatcher's part; then it was poorly relayed. I felt it was posed as a legitimate option; in operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FIRST OFFICER OF LGT REPORTS FAILURE OF MAINTENANCE TO FIX A CHRONIC FUEL GAUGE PROBLEM AND ATTEMPTS BY DISPATCHERS TO CIRCUMVENT MEL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. AFTER REFUSING ACFT; DISCOVERS IT WAS SIMPLY REASSIGNED TO A LATER COAST TO COAST FLT WITH NO MAINTENANCE ACTION AND NO MEL RESTRICTION.

Narrative: THE DAY PRIOR TO THE EVENT DAY; WE FLEW A NONSTOP TRANSCONTINENTAL LEG IN ACFT X. THE MAINT LOG HISTORY FOR ACFT X LISTED 20 ITEMS; DATING BACK TO SEP/XA/07. APPEARING 6 TIMES WAS A GRIPE ABOUT THE CTR FUEL TANK QUANTITY INDICATING SYS GOING BLANK; SOMETIMES INTERMITTENTLY. THE FIRST REF TO THIS PROB APPEARED ABOUT 2 WKS AGO; AS A ROLLED FORWARD ITEM. THAT TOTALS 7 SEPARATE WRITE-UPS (WE KNEW ABOUT) FOR THE SAME GRIPE. THE ACFT HISTORY SHOWS IT FLEW NON-STOPS SOLELY BTWN 3 MAINT STATIONS. THE EARLIEST MAINT ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THIS WRITE-UP; WAS A DEFERRAL. THAT DEFERRAL MEL PLACARD LIMITED CTR TANK FUEL TO LESS THAN 5000 LBS; AND DESIGNATED THAT FUEL AS PAYLOAD ONLY; NOT TO BE USED. IT ALSO PROHIBITED FLT PLANNING USING REDUCED FUEL RESERVES. ON THIS DATE; THE FUEL PROCESSOR UNIT WAS REPLACED AND THE UNIT OP-TESTED NORMAL. THE VERY NEXT FLT; THE CTR FUEL TANK INDICATED BLANK AGAIN. THE MAINT ACTIONS UP TO THE DAY OF OUR FLT; IN SEQUENCE AND IN RESPONSE TO SUBSEQUENT WRITE-UPS; WERE TO: 1) RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO FUELING QUANTITY OPS RESUMED TO NORMAL. 2) ACCOMPLISH SVC TIP XXXX OPS CHK GOOD. 3) FUEL QUANTITY PROCESSOR BITE HAS FAULT CODES D3; 75. RESET FLT QUANTITY PROCESSOR; FAULT CODES CLRED BITE TEST NORMAL. FLT DECK DISPLAY NORMAL. 4) ACCOMPLISHED FUEL QUANTITY CIRCUIT BREAKER #1 AND #2 REST; CTR FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR CAME BACK. 5) FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION AND FMC OK FOR SVC (WITH NO ACTION TAKEN). THEREFORE; WE WERE AWARE THAT THE ISSUE WAS CHRONIC; AND THAT AFTER INITIALLY REPLACING THE FUEL PROCESSOR; THE MAINT WORK CONSISTED OF RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND CLRING FAULT CODES; OR OBSERVING NORMAL OP ON THE GND. WE WERE ALSO AWARE THAT THE MAINT ACTION FOR THE WRITE-UP IMPOSED AN OP LIMITATION THAT MYSTERIOUSLY DID NOT APPEAR IN ANY SUBSEQUENT MAINT ACTIONS FOR THE SAME PROB. WE DEPARTED AND DURING CLBOUT THE CTR FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR WENT BLANK; ACCOMPANIED BY AN EICAS STATUS MESSAGE; 'FUEL QUANTITY IND.' WE LOST OUR TOTALIZER FUEL AND FMC TOTALIZER INDICATIONS. WE SENT A MESSAGE VIA ACARS AS SOON AS WE LEVELED OFF AT CRUISE; TO GIVE MAINT PLENTY OF HEADS UP ON THE INCOMING RECURRENT PROB. WE ALSO HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ABOUT WIRING AND FUEL TANKS; AND THE ACR X INCIDENT. OUR CONCERN WAS PROMPTED BY THE INITIAL DEFERRAL; WHICH PROHIBITED CTR TANK FUEL PUMP USAGE. WE ALSO DISCUSSED HOW WE WOULD KNOW WHEN TO TURN OFF THE CTR TANK PUMPS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OP RESTR IMPOSED AFTER ACR X (TO TURN THE PUMPS OFF AT 1000 LBS). WE WERE COMFORTABLE THAT WE COULD DETERMINE THE TIMING BASED ON FUEL FLOW AND PREVIOUSLY KNOWN QUANTITIES. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE NEXT DAY; I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM THE CAPT ABOUT AN HR AND A HALF BEFORE PICKUP AT THE HOTEL. HE INFORMED ME THAT WE HAD THE SAME ACFT GOING HOME AND THAT THE PROB HAD NOT BEEN FIXED. IN FACT; THE ISSUE WAS DEFERRED AND WE WERE UNDER THE LIMITS OF THE SAME MEL PLACARD PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN THE LOG HISTORY. THE PLACARD LIMITED THE CTR TANK TO LESS THAN 5000 LBS OF FUEL; DESIGNATED AS PAYLOAD FUEL. WE WERE PLANNED TO MAKE A FUELING STOP IN ZZZ. THE CAPT RELATED HOW HE HAD SPOKEN TO MAINT CTL AT LENGTH ABOUT THE ISSUE; AND IN PARTICULAR; POINTEDLY ASKED HIM ABOUT EXCEPTIONS TO THE MEL (NONE); AND WHETHER THE FUEL SENSOR PUT ANY ELECTRICAL CURRENT IN THE FUEL TANK (NO). THE CAPT MENTIONED TO ME DURING THIS PHONE CALL THAT HE POINTED OUT TO MAINT CTL THAT THE ACFT FLEW JUST FINE; AND THAT IT HAD FLOWN JUST FINE MANY LEGS PRIOR WITH THE SAME ISSUE. APPARENTLY; THIS MAINT CTL CTLR COULD NOT BE SWAYED; AND WAS ADAMANT THE ACFT NOT FLY ANY FURTHER WITHOUT IMPOSING THE MEL RESTRS. THE CAPT SAID HE COULDN'T OVERRIDE MAINT CTL; AND I AGREED. WE BOTH LEFT FOR THE ARPT EARLY; IN THE HOPES OF GETTING LUNCH. FIRST WE WENT TO OPS TO FLT PLAN. WE DREW UP THE PAPERWORK; AND AS WE WERE PERUSING IT; GOT A CALL FROM DISPATCH. THE DISPATCHER SAID HE HAD PLANNED US ILLEGALLY; USING A SMALL AMOUNT OF CTR TANK FUEL TO GET TO ZZZ. HE HADN'T REALIZED WE WERE LIMITED TO WING TANK FUELONLY. WING TANKS ALONE COULD NOT CARRY SUFFICIENT FUEL TO GET US TO ZZZ. THE DISPATCHER WAS GOING TO LOOK AT ZZZ1. IN FACT; IT TURNS OUT THAT; WHILE WE COULD EASILY GET TO ZZZ1; WE WOULD THEN NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 NON-STOP; USING WING TANK FUEL. WE WERE SERIOUSLY LOOKING AT 2 FUEL STOPS; NOT EXACTLY THE SVC OUR PAX WERE EXPECTING. THE DISPATCHER APPARENTLY THEN SUGGESTED TO THE CAPT THAT WE DISPATCH TO ZZZ AND DECLARE AN EMER ENRTE. HIS PURPORTED REASONING WAS THAT THE MEL SPECIFICALLY SAID CTR TANK FUEL MAY BE BURNED IN AN EMER SITUATION. THE CAPT RELAYED THIS STATEMENT TO ME WHILE HE WAS STILL ON THE PHONE WITH DISPATCH. I WAS NOT SURE IF THIS WAS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL; OR NOT. THE MERE FACT THAT THERE WERE QUITE A FEW WITNESSES TO THIS EXCHANGE MADE IT CONFUSING -- WE WERE; BY NOW; THE FOCAL POINT OF ATTN IN THE ARPT OPS ROOM. IT SEEMED THAT THE ASSEMBLAGE OF PERSONNEL (MAINT; FUELING; RAMP; CUSTOMER SVC AND OPS) WAS WAITING FOR OUR DECISION CONCERNING THE OP OF THE FLT. AT LEAST SOME OF THEM HEARD THIS EXCHANGE. I POINTED OUT IT WAS ILLEGAL TO DISPATCH KNOWING YOU WERE GOING TO HAVE TO DECLARE AN EMER TO GET TO YOUR DEST. THE CAPT READILY AGREED; AND THAT AVENUE WAS NO LONGER PURSUED. THE CAPT HUNG UP; RELAYING THAT DISPATCH WAS FEELING PRESSURE TO GET THIS FLT GOING. A DIFFERENT MAINT CTLR (THAN THE ONE WHO DEFERRED THE GRIPE) INITIATED A CALL TO THE CAPT. HE TOLD THE CAPT THAT HE WOULD GET A MECH TO DO A BITE CHK AND SIGN THE LOG ENTRY OFF. WHEN THE CAPT RELAYED THIS INFO; THE LINE MECH IN OPS SHOOK HIS HEAD; AND SAID HE WOULDN'T DO IT. HE VOICED HIS CONCERN THAT THERE MIGHT BE A SHORT SOMEWHERE IN THE LINE. A MAINT SUPVR ARRIVED; AND HE SAID HE WOULD SIGN THE WRITE-UP OFF; IF IT PASSED THE BITE CHK. THE CAPT ASKED IF THE PROB WOULD RECUR AGAIN; AND THE SUPVR SAID YES; BUT THE ACFT WAS SCHEDULED FOR 36 HRS DOWNWIND IN ZZZ2; AND THEY WOULD FIX THE PROB THERE. EVERYONE SEEMED HAPPY WITH THIS EXCEPT ME. I SAID; 'WHAT IF THE PLTS DON'T ACCEPT THAT?' THEN; I PUT MY FOOT DOWN AND SAID 'I'M NOT TAKING THIS JET.' I ADMIT MY STANCE WAS EMBOLDENED BY SEEING THE LINE MECH TAKE A STAND -- SAYING HE WOULD NOT SIGN IT OFF. I WAS VOCAL ABOUT MY REASONING; SAYING THAT IF AT LEAST 2 MAINT CTLRS FELT IT UNSAFE; THAT I ALWAYS GO WITH THE MOST CONSERVATIVE OPINION. REGRETFULLY; I OPINED THAT MAINT WAS PENCIL WHIPPING THE PROB. I WAS WRONG TO QUESTION THE PROFESSIONALISM OF ANY MECH; BUT I DID NOT LIKE THE WAY THE OFF-DUTY MAINT CTLR AND LINE MECH WERE OVERRIDDEN. I RECALLED THE ACR AIRLINES INCIDENT; WHERE 1 MECH FELT THE STABILIZER COMPONENTS WERE OUT OF LIMITS; AND HE WAS OVERRIDDEN BY HIS SUPERIOR. JUST BECAUSE AN AIRPLANE HAS FLOWN AROUND SUCCESSFULLY; THUS FAR; WITH A KNOWN ISSUE; THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WON'T CONSPIRE TO BRING IT DOWN ON THE NEXT LEG FOR THE SAME PROB. A WIRE COULD JOSTLE -- WHO KNOWS. I ALSO FELT; DESPITE THE CAPT'S DISCUSSION WITH MAINT CTL; THAT A SENSOR IN THE FUEL TANK MIGHT CARRY SOME ELECTRICAL CURRENT; AND ONLY THE TINIEST SPARK IS NEEDED TO SET THE WHOLE THING OFF. OUR FLT MANUALS ARE NOT DETAILED ENOUGH TO ASSUAGE MY FEARS ON THIS POINT. WHEN I TOLD THE CAPT HE COULD FIND A REPLACEMENT FO; HE RESPONDED; 'WE ARE A TEAM.' HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT GO WITHOUT ME. I WAS VERY GRATIFIED BY HIS STANCE. AT ANY RATE; AN ACFT SWAP WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE CAPT STAYED BEHIND TO GATHER THE NEW FLT PAPERS AND I LEFT TO PREFLT THE NEW ACFT. I LEFT OPS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE GOING TO FIX THE ACFT. ONCE AIRBORNE; THE CAPT PURSUED A HUNCH AND CHKED ON THE ACFT DEPARTING BEHIND US FOR ZZZ2. HE WAS DISMAYED TO FIND IT WAS OUR OLD ACFT. WE BOTH BELIEVED THE ACFT WOULD BE FIXED PRIOR TO FLT. APPARENTLY; THE DEFERRAL WAS REMOVED AND THE ACFT WAS RELEASED WITH CTR TANK FUEL TO ZZZ2. THE ONCOMING CAPT HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT AN MEL PLACARD HAD BEEN IMPOSED BY 1 MAINT CTLR; AND LATER DELETED FROM THE ELECTRONIC RECORD BY A SUBSEQUENT MAINT CTLR (AFTER YET ANOTHER BITE CHK WHICH ACCOMPLISHED NO REPAIR). IF WE HAD ACTUALLY GONE TO THE AIRPLANE; WE COULD'VE MADE A LOG ENTRY NOTING THE REFUSAL TO FLY IN ACARS. BUT; WE WERE ASSURED BY MAINT THAT THE ISSUE WOULD BE FIXED BEFORE THE ACFT FLEW; AND SO WE DID NOT. NOW; I REGRET THE LACK OF ENTRY. HAVING SAID THAT; I HAVE 2 MORE CONCERNS. ONE; AN ACFT THAT AT LEAST 2 MAINT CTLRS THOUGHT SHOULD NOT FLY WITH CTR TANK FUEL; DID. IS IT; OR IS IT NOT; SAFE TO FLY WITH A CHRONIC CTR TANK FUEL INDICATING PROB? INCONSISTENT RESPONSES FROM MAINT DID NOT CLARIFY THIS ISSUE FOR ME. I AM CONFUSED AS TO HOW MUCH LATITUDE IS ALLOWED IN DECIDING WHEN TO IMPOSE MEL RESTRS IN RESPONSE TO A KNOWN MAINT ISSUE? PARTICULARLY WHEN AN MEL EXISTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO DENY ANY DISCRETION. IF THERE IS AN MEL FOR THE CTR TANK FUEL TOTALIZER ISSUE; AFTER HOW MANY WRITE-UPS; AND AT WHAT POINT; DOES THE MEL ACTUALLY GET APPLIED? IF THIS MAINT ISSUE IS REALLY 'NOTHING;' THEN WHY HAVE AN MEL AT ALL? AND FINALLY; THE MENTION OF DISPATCHING TO ZZZ WITH THE INTENT OF DECLARING AN EMER TO BYPASS THE MEL REQUIREMENTS. IS THE MEL SO IRRELEVANT; SO MISGUIDED; AS TO MERIT BLATANT DISREGARD? AGAIN; IF THIS WAS JUST A JOKE ON THE DISPATCHER'S PART; THEN IT WAS POORLY RELAYED. I FELT IT WAS POSED AS A LEGITIMATE OPTION; IN OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.