Narrative:

I was assigned to be departure coordinator by a controller in charge. All management officials; including supervisors and operations mgrs; were in a meeting and controller staffing was short. There were numerous thunderstorms in and around the memphis approach control airspace that were forming; dissipating; and reforming ahead of a cold front. Coordination was necessary with all sectors of memphis en route center that bordered our airspace. Due to the ever changing WX; the coordination was constant and always changing. Shortly after taking the departure coordinator position; I requested to have the departure coordinator position split into a west departure coordinator and an east departure coordinator. The controller in charge approved this; and I was soon only handling east departure coordinator. I was coordinating with the east tower controller and the eastern ZMP sectors; another controller was coordinating with the west tower controller and the western ZMP sectors; and the controller in charge was coordinating with ZMP regarding arrs into memphis international airport. At about XA30; a supervisor entered the TRACON and relieved the controller in charge. Unfortunately; the supervisor must not have truly grasped the situation because he immediately opened a final position; leaving the TRACON with no supervision. Shortly thereafter; the wind shifted from approximately 190 degrees at 12 KTS to 340 degrees at 25 KTS with gusts to 43 KTS. The tower coordinator called the TRACON via land line and intercom to coordinate a runway change; but no one was available to make this coordination. Eventually; the supervisor had another controller relieve me; so I could get him off the final position. This is when the supervisor had the proximity event. The supervisor then decided that he would close the final position; and he had me coordinate a runway change with the tower. Approximately 20 mins after the wind shift; we were able to change runways accordingly. Due to this delay; numerous aircraft went missed approach; reentering airspace that was already too crowded. I believe that poor decision making on the part of the management team at memphis tower and TRACON put aircraft and controllers in an unsafe situation. By continuing a meeting when staffing was short and thunderstorms were in and around the airspace; the local agency officials chose to jeopardize safety. When a supervisor did finally arrive; the situation was so serious that more than 1 employee was necessary to fix it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEM CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING MGMNT'S TIMING OF A SUPVR MEETING DURING BUSY/COMPLEX TFC AND CHANGING WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: I WAS ASSIGNED TO BE DEP COORDINATOR BY A CIC. ALL MGMNT OFFICIALS; INCLUDING SUPVRS AND OPS MGRS; WERE IN A MEETING AND CTLR STAFFING WAS SHORT. THERE WERE NUMEROUS TSTMS IN AND AROUND THE MEMPHIS APCH CTL AIRSPACE THAT WERE FORMING; DISSIPATING; AND REFORMING AHEAD OF A COLD FRONT. COORD WAS NECESSARY WITH ALL SECTORS OF MEMPHIS ENRTE CTR THAT BORDERED OUR AIRSPACE. DUE TO THE EVER CHANGING WX; THE COORD WAS CONSTANT AND ALWAYS CHANGING. SHORTLY AFTER TAKING THE DEP COORDINATOR POS; I REQUESTED TO HAVE THE DEP COORDINATOR POS SPLIT INTO A W DEP COORDINATOR AND AN E DEP COORDINATOR. THE CIC APPROVED THIS; AND I WAS SOON ONLY HANDLING E DEP COORDINATOR. I WAS COORDINATING WITH THE E TWR CTLR AND THE EASTERN ZMP SECTORS; ANOTHER CTLR WAS COORDINATING WITH THE W TWR CTLR AND THE WESTERN ZMP SECTORS; AND THE CIC WAS COORDINATING WITH ZMP REGARDING ARRS INTO MEMPHIS INTL ARPT. AT ABOUT XA30; A SUPVR ENTERED THE TRACON AND RELIEVED THE CIC. UNFORTUNATELY; THE SUPVR MUST NOT HAVE TRULY GRASPED THE SITUATION BECAUSE HE IMMEDIATELY OPENED A FINAL POS; LEAVING THE TRACON WITH NO SUPERVISION. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE WIND SHIFTED FROM APPROX 190 DEGS AT 12 KTS TO 340 DEGS AT 25 KTS WITH GUSTS TO 43 KTS. THE TWR COORDINATOR CALLED THE TRACON VIA LAND LINE AND INTERCOM TO COORDINATE A RWY CHANGE; BUT NO ONE WAS AVAILABLE TO MAKE THIS COORD. EVENTUALLY; THE SUPVR HAD ANOTHER CTLR RELIEVE ME; SO I COULD GET HIM OFF THE FINAL POS. THIS IS WHEN THE SUPVR HAD THE PROXIMITY EVENT. THE SUPVR THEN DECIDED THAT HE WOULD CLOSE THE FINAL POS; AND HE HAD ME COORDINATE A RWY CHANGE WITH THE TWR. APPROX 20 MINS AFTER THE WIND SHIFT; WE WERE ABLE TO CHANGE RWYS ACCORDINGLY. DUE TO THIS DELAY; NUMEROUS ACFT WENT MISSED APCH; REENTERING AIRSPACE THAT WAS ALREADY TOO CROWDED. I BELIEVE THAT POOR DECISION MAKING ON THE PART OF THE MGMNT TEAM AT MEMPHIS TWR AND TRACON PUT ACFT AND CTLRS IN AN UNSAFE SITUATION. BY CONTINUING A MEETING WHEN STAFFING WAS SHORT AND TSTMS WERE IN AND AROUND THE AIRSPACE; THE LCL AGENCY OFFICIALS CHOSE TO JEOPARDIZE SAFETY. WHEN A SUPVR DID FINALLY ARRIVE; THE SITUATION WAS SO SERIOUS THAT MORE THAN 1 EMPLOYEE WAS NECESSARY TO FIX IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.