Narrative:

We were forced to deviate about 30 mi west around WX as we climbed out of ZZZ. WX in dfw was 900 ft overcast. As we approached dfw; ATC changed our arrival to one that favored the west side runways. We discussed the probability of a planned runway change; and elected to be ready for it. On our descent; however; ATC mentioned that they were trying to coordinate which runway to give us; and we took that as an attempt by them to give us our original east side runway if they could. We therefore delayed setting up and re-briefing the approach. ATC eventually decided just to keep us on the west side; and we briefed the approach as we descended from 11000 to 6000 ft on downwind. What we failed to do in our rush to complete everything; was re-enter the approach in our FMC. As we were given a turn to base we were slowed to 170 KTS and configured accordingly. Right after we were cleared to intercept the localizer; the first officer was distraction by a stuck microphone on the frequency; and was trying to get a word in or find another usable frequency. The aircraft captured the localizer just like it was set up to do; but because the FMC was still set up for a parallel approach on the east side; I perceived it as an early capture; and selected a heading until I could sort things out. I was hand flying in IMC conditions; with my first officer head-down distraction and looking for a working radio frequency. I managed to wander far enough east of the localizer to get everyone's attention; and the first ungarbled radio transmission we received was an ATC heading change to get back on course. We completed the approach and landing safely; but it was a very long and embarrassed taxi to our gate on the other side of the airport. Supplemental information from acn 763455: we were later assigned runway X and the captain reviewed the brief. We did not verify what was in the box. Vectored for a long approach due to traffic we finally were turned back to final and were instructed to intercept the runway X localizer and contact tower. We had already tuned and idented the runway X localizer correctly. As we turned to intercept I did not notice the discrepancy between the localizer and the map (which showed runway Y). We were IMC. I switched tower and encountered steady side tone and unusual intermittent tones. I double checked the frequency and continued to receive side tone; as if there was a stuck microphone on the frequency. I tried to call tower 2 to 3 times and got no response. I became too involved with the communication problem and then noted the discrepancy between the localizer and the map. I said 'something is not right.' at that same time the captain had begun a turn back to the left and we heard a call for XXX to turn immediately to intercept the runway X localizer. This call may have been on guard; which we were monitoring. We continued the turn and I responded on tower with our position. After my response communication we had good communication with tower. We had flown over near the extended centerline of runway Y while communication with tower was severely degraded/impossible. The rest of the approach and landing was routine and uneventful. The chain of events for me in this incident is: premature selection of landing runway in FMS; change of arrival procedure; incomplete approach brief; poor first officer xchk; IMC; communication failure on tower frequency.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR ACFT APCHING DFW FAILED TO SELECT A NEW FMS RWY FOLLOWING A RWY CHANGE AND DEVIATED INTO ANOTHER RWY'S FINAL WITHOUT CAPTURING THE PROPER LOC.

Narrative: WE WERE FORCED TO DEVIATE ABOUT 30 MI W AROUND WX AS WE CLBED OUT OF ZZZ. WX IN DFW WAS 900 FT OVCST. AS WE APCHED DFW; ATC CHANGED OUR ARR TO ONE THAT FAVORED THE W SIDE RWYS. WE DISCUSSED THE PROBABILITY OF A PLANNED RWY CHANGE; AND ELECTED TO BE READY FOR IT. ON OUR DSCNT; HOWEVER; ATC MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE TRYING TO COORDINATE WHICH RWY TO GIVE US; AND WE TOOK THAT AS AN ATTEMPT BY THEM TO GIVE US OUR ORIGINAL E SIDE RWY IF THEY COULD. WE THEREFORE DELAYED SETTING UP AND RE-BRIEFING THE APCH. ATC EVENTUALLY DECIDED JUST TO KEEP US ON THE W SIDE; AND WE BRIEFED THE APCH AS WE DSNDED FROM 11000 TO 6000 FT ON DOWNWIND. WHAT WE FAILED TO DO IN OUR RUSH TO COMPLETE EVERYTHING; WAS RE-ENTER THE APCH IN OUR FMC. AS WE WERE GIVEN A TURN TO BASE WE WERE SLOWED TO 170 KTS AND CONFIGURED ACCORDINGLY. RIGHT AFTER WE WERE CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC; THE FO WAS DISTR BY A STUCK MIKE ON THE FREQ; AND WAS TRYING TO GET A WORD IN OR FIND ANOTHER USABLE FREQ. THE ACFT CAPTURED THE LOC JUST LIKE IT WAS SET UP TO DO; BUT BECAUSE THE FMC WAS STILL SET UP FOR A PARALLEL APCH ON THE E SIDE; I PERCEIVED IT AS AN EARLY CAPTURE; AND SELECTED A HDG UNTIL I COULD SORT THINGS OUT. I WAS HAND FLYING IN IMC CONDITIONS; WITH MY FO HEAD-DOWN DISTR AND LOOKING FOR A WORKING RADIO FREQ. I MANAGED TO WANDER FAR ENOUGH E OF THE LOC TO GET EVERYONE'S ATTN; AND THE FIRST UNGARBLED RADIO XMISSION WE RECEIVED WAS AN ATC HDG CHANGE TO GET BACK ON COURSE. WE COMPLETED THE APCH AND LNDG SAFELY; BUT IT WAS A VERY LONG AND EMBARRASSED TAXI TO OUR GATE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 763455: WE WERE LATER ASSIGNED RWY X AND THE CAPT REVIEWED THE BRIEF. WE DID NOT VERIFY WHAT WAS IN THE BOX. VECTORED FOR A LONG APCH DUE TO TFC WE FINALLY WERE TURNED BACK TO FINAL AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO INTERCEPT THE RWY X LOC AND CONTACT TWR. WE HAD ALREADY TUNED AND IDENTED THE RWY X LOC CORRECTLY. AS WE TURNED TO INTERCEPT I DID NOT NOTICE THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE LOC AND THE MAP (WHICH SHOWED RWY Y). WE WERE IMC. I SWITCHED TWR AND ENCOUNTERED STEADY SIDE TONE AND UNUSUAL INTERMITTENT TONES. I DOUBLE CHKED THE FREQ AND CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SIDE TONE; AS IF THERE WAS A STUCK MIKE ON THE FREQ. I TRIED TO CALL TWR 2 TO 3 TIMES AND GOT NO RESPONSE. I BECAME TOO INVOLVED WITH THE COM PROB AND THEN NOTED THE DISCREPANCY BTWN THE LOC AND THE MAP. I SAID 'SOMETHING IS NOT RIGHT.' AT THAT SAME TIME THE CAPT HAD BEGUN A TURN BACK TO THE L AND WE HEARD A CALL FOR XXX TO TURN IMMEDIATELY TO INTERCEPT THE RWY X LOC. THIS CALL MAY HAVE BEEN ON GUARD; WHICH WE WERE MONITORING. WE CONTINUED THE TURN AND I RESPONDED ON TWR WITH OUR POS. AFTER MY RESPONSE COM WE HAD GOOD COM WITH TWR. WE HAD FLOWN OVER NEAR THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY Y WHILE COM WITH TWR WAS SEVERELY DEGRADED/IMPOSSIBLE. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS FOR ME IN THIS INCIDENT IS: PREMATURE SELECTION OF LNDG RWY IN FMS; CHANGE OF ARR PROC; INCOMPLETE APCH BRIEF; POOR FO XCHK; IMC; COM FAILURE ON TWR FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.