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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 764593 |
Time | |
Date | 200712 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : jfk.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | arrival : on vectors arrival : holding pattern arrival star : n/s |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : handoff position |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 4 controller time certified in position1 : 4 |
ASRS Report | 764593 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance Company |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Narrative:
I was working the camrn handoff position in the jfk sector at new york TRACON. We were doing a lot of holding for volume at jfk. Lendy sector at ZNY (who was in a hold) called me and said they had an rj who would be diverting shortly. I asked the supervisor and he said to take him; and I passed this on to lendy. The aircraft never showed up though; and the controller at ZNY said something about the aircraft possibly going to acy now. 10-15 mins passed and the supervisor tells me that the camrn sector at ZNY has an rj arrival who would be exempt from the 20 mi restr at the time. He didn't say anything else about a fuel situation to this aircraft or about it diverting. The supervisor takes a break while we are all working over 1+30 on position. He gives the watch to a controller in charge but does not mention anything about this rj aircraft. Eventually; the rj shows up at camrn intersection. It turns out to be the same rj who was holding at lendy who needed to divert. The pilot checks in with the radar controller; clearly concerned about something. He says something like; 'air carrier X with you at 11000 ft ready for runway 30 at atlantic city.' controller asks him if he is landing jfk or acy. The pilot says he was supposed to go to jfk; but was holding so long at lendy; that they decided to divert to acy. Somehow ZNY takes him from lendy to camrn to land jfk since camrn was not holding; even though the pilot wanted to go to acy. The radar controller and the pilot have a decision about where the pilot wants to go now; being that he is about 10 mi northeast of camrn on a 40 degree heading. Pilot never mentions fuel; but says that he cannot go around at jfk. The radar controller tells him he can get right into runway 31R and there would be no real delay. The pilot agrees. Just before the controller switches the aircraft to final vector; he asks him the total fuel remaining. 15 mins! He then goes straight in to runway 31L; and lands with about 5 mins of fuel. The controller in charge who was watching the floor for the supervisor on a break started asking questions about the aircraft landed to tmu and management as to what happened; and how it got this far. Apparently; tmu's response was 'we didn't know the aircraft had a fuel problem.' management had no answer; and was investigating what happened when I left. This was a total breakdown in communication between ATC facilities; and between management and tmu. The pilot also neglected to state how severe his fuel problem was; which was eerily reminiscent of the avianca crash in the 80's. N90 management neglected to give a full briefing to the controller in charge who was watching the shift; and failed to coordinate with the ZNY and mcguire approach to facilitate the rj's diversion. If the camrn radar controller had not said anything about fuel; I believe this aircraft would have ran out of fuel on his way to acy or jfk and crashed. These fuel crises occur on a daily basis at N90; and occur because of excessive volume into jfk; or management's lack of planning to deliver a workable number of aircraft per hour. If we get 60 arrs delivered an hour and we can only legally land 30; then obviously there is going to be a lot of holding and fuel issues.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: N90 DESCRIBED MINIMUM FUEL EVENT THAT DEVELOPED FOR JFK ARR BECAUSE OF INTRAFAC COORD/BRIEFING FAILURES.
Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE CAMRN HDOF POS IN THE JFK SECTOR AT NEW YORK TRACON. WE WERE DOING A LOT OF HOLDING FOR VOLUME AT JFK. LENDY SECTOR AT ZNY (WHO WAS IN A HOLD) CALLED ME AND SAID THEY HAD AN RJ WHO WOULD BE DIVERTING SHORTLY. I ASKED THE SUPVR AND HE SAID TO TAKE HIM; AND I PASSED THIS ON TO LENDY. THE ACFT NEVER SHOWED UP THOUGH; AND THE CTLR AT ZNY SAID SOMETHING ABOUT THE ACFT POSSIBLY GOING TO ACY NOW. 10-15 MINS PASSED AND THE SUPVR TELLS ME THAT THE CAMRN SECTOR AT ZNY HAS AN RJ ARR WHO WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THE 20 MI RESTR AT THE TIME. HE DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ELSE ABOUT A FUEL SITUATION TO THIS ACFT OR ABOUT IT DIVERTING. THE SUPVR TAKES A BREAK WHILE WE ARE ALL WORKING OVER 1+30 ON POS. HE GIVES THE WATCH TO A CIC BUT DOES NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT THIS RJ ACFT. EVENTUALLY; THE RJ SHOWS UP AT CAMRN INTXN. IT TURNS OUT TO BE THE SAME RJ WHO WAS HOLDING AT LENDY WHO NEEDED TO DIVERT. THE PLT CHKS IN WITH THE RADAR CTLR; CLRLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOMETHING. HE SAYS SOMETHING LIKE; 'ACR X WITH YOU AT 11000 FT READY FOR RWY 30 AT ATLANTIC CITY.' CTLR ASKS HIM IF HE IS LNDG JFK OR ACY. THE PLT SAYS HE WAS SUPPOSED TO GO TO JFK; BUT WAS HOLDING SO LONG AT LENDY; THAT THEY DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ACY. SOMEHOW ZNY TAKES HIM FROM LENDY TO CAMRN TO LAND JFK SINCE CAMRN WAS NOT HOLDING; EVEN THOUGH THE PLT WANTED TO GO TO ACY. THE RADAR CTLR AND THE PLT HAVE A DECISION ABOUT WHERE THE PLT WANTS TO GO NOW; BEING THAT HE IS ABOUT 10 MI NE OF CAMRN ON A 40 DEG HDG. PLT NEVER MENTIONS FUEL; BUT SAYS THAT HE CANNOT GO AROUND AT JFK. THE RADAR CTLR TELLS HIM HE CAN GET RIGHT INTO RWY 31R AND THERE WOULD BE NO REAL DELAY. THE PLT AGREES. JUST BEFORE THE CTLR SWITCHES THE ACFT TO FINAL VECTOR; HE ASKS HIM THE TOTAL FUEL REMAINING. 15 MINS! HE THEN GOES STRAIGHT IN TO RWY 31L; AND LANDS WITH ABOUT 5 MINS OF FUEL. THE CIC WHO WAS WATCHING THE FLOOR FOR THE SUPVR ON A BREAK STARTED ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACFT LANDED TO TMU AND MGMNT AS TO WHAT HAPPENED; AND HOW IT GOT THIS FAR. APPARENTLY; TMU'S RESPONSE WAS 'WE DIDN'T KNOW THE ACFT HAD A FUEL PROB.' MGMNT HAD NO ANSWER; AND WAS INVESTIGATING WHAT HAPPENED WHEN I LEFT. THIS WAS A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN COM BTWN ATC FACILITIES; AND BTWN MGMNT AND TMU. THE PLT ALSO NEGLECTED TO STATE HOW SEVERE HIS FUEL PROB WAS; WHICH WAS EERILY REMINISCENT OF THE AVIANCA CRASH IN THE 80'S. N90 MGMNT NEGLECTED TO GIVE A FULL BRIEFING TO THE CIC WHO WAS WATCHING THE SHIFT; AND FAILED TO COORDINATE WITH THE ZNY AND MCGUIRE APCH TO FACILITATE THE RJ'S DIVERSION. IF THE CAMRN RADAR CTLR HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT FUEL; I BELIEVE THIS ACFT WOULD HAVE RAN OUT OF FUEL ON HIS WAY TO ACY OR JFK AND CRASHED. THESE FUEL CRISES OCCUR ON A DAILY BASIS AT N90; AND OCCUR BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE VOLUME INTO JFK; OR MGMNT'S LACK OF PLANNING TO DELIVER A WORKABLE NUMBER OF ACFT PER HR. IF WE GET 60 ARRS DELIVERED AN HR AND WE CAN ONLY LEGALLY LAND 30; THEN OBVIOUSLY THERE IS GOING TO BE A LOT OF HOLDING AND FUEL ISSUES.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.