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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 764733 |
Time | |
Date | 200712 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : zzz.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : pushback |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 764733 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
The aircraft had a long history of high engine oil consumption and leak problems on the left engine; including exceeding limits several times. Maintenance had tried various repairs only to find the problem continuing. In ZZZ an oil leak had been discovered; a seal replaced; and the aircraft was sent out again. Fortunately the flight crew found the crescent wrench left in the engine on preflight. It flew 1 leg of 4:13 to ZZZ1. We got the airplane for the morning departure. Originally oil on the right engine indicated 19 quarts; left engine indicated 17 quarts (minimum). Unfortunately; as soon as we started to push back; prior to starting engines; the oil quantity on the left engine dropped to 16 quarts. We stopped the push and called maintenance who told us to start the engine; shut it down and check quantity. We told him of the history which he then checked. He told us to go ahead and try the start. We did so and the left engine oil quantity immediately dropped to 11 quarts; slowly came up to 13 quarts and remained there. Maintenance arranged for local contract maintenance to come and service the engine. They added 5 quarts of oil. We did the math and concluded that this must exceed the limit of .6 quarts per hour. Upon further conversation with maintenance they admitted it was over limits; especially since they calculated a burn of 1.3 quarts per hour. They sent us a maintenance release which said ok to continue; oil svced; no leaks found; further troubleshooting required. Aware that continuing would involve serious exceedance of a limit on the aircraft; I requested more information; specifically a copy of the maintenance bulletin which allowed us to continue. This technique usually works very well; allowing me to verify that the required items have been completed as well as providing a valuable heads up to evaluate future developments should the situation deteriorate in flight. Maintenance was very defensive and assured me that the aircraft was released on his signature; that made the release legal; and told me the maintenance manual was 50 pages long; it was too difficult to facsimile; and he didn't see why me reading it should change anything -- we were legal. I tried to explain that I have a responsibility to know and understand the complete maintenance status of the airplane; and I would be aided by reading the maintenance manual allowed us to exceed the limit; as well as providing a tool to evaluate further developments en route. I asked to please see only the pages of the maintenance manual required for our release. Maintenance faxed the information to ZZZ1 operations who brought it out to the airplane. I also spoke to the mechanic who had performed the maintenance; and between the 2 inputs felt confident that there was no oil leak likely to cause an engine fire; and that we were safe to depart to the ragged; icing; CAT 1 bordering CAT 2 WX in ZZZ3. Oil pressure on the left engine ran approximately 20 psi below the right engine through the flight. Other indications were normal. Maintenance sent a note on ACARS demanding my name and file number; telling me that my request was not normal; and he was turning the matter over to his supervisor to report. I consider this a blatant example of pilot pushing. We are all in a hurry; the airplane obviously should not have been released to ZZZ1. Many international customers were inconvenienced. Calls and ACARS to ZZZ3 even intervention by the dispatcher and for duty manager were unsuccessful in getting any customer service to the airplane to help the passenger. Our manual states safety; service and integrity as our primary goals. Legality is important; but a secondary requirement. I do not appreciate the bitterness and harassment of other departments as I try to determine whether or not it is safe to exceed a limit by over 100% and further define the circumstances in which I will do so. We need to communicate between departments; especially maintenance and flight operations that just because something can be deferred; that does not necessarily mean that it must be flown for that leg without further evaluate.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN ACR PILOT'S ACFT IS USING OIL BEYOND MAINT LIMITS. WHEN PILOT QUESTIONS MAINT HE FEELS THREATENED AND COERCED FOR THOROUGHLY REVIEWING A VIOLATION OF MAINT PROCEDURES BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE FLT.
Narrative: THE ACFT HAD A LONG HISTORY OF HIGH ENG OIL CONSUMPTION AND LEAK PROBS ON THE L ENG; INCLUDING EXCEEDING LIMITS SEVERAL TIMES. MAINT HAD TRIED VARIOUS REPAIRS ONLY TO FIND THE PROB CONTINUING. IN ZZZ AN OIL LEAK HAD BEEN DISCOVERED; A SEAL REPLACED; AND THE ACFT WAS SENT OUT AGAIN. FORTUNATELY THE FLT CREW FOUND THE CRESCENT WRENCH LEFT IN THE ENG ON PREFLT. IT FLEW 1 LEG OF 4:13 TO ZZZ1. WE GOT THE AIRPLANE FOR THE MORNING DEP. ORIGINALLY OIL ON THE R ENG INDICATED 19 QUARTS; L ENG INDICATED 17 QUARTS (MINIMUM). UNFORTUNATELY; AS SOON AS WE STARTED TO PUSH BACK; PRIOR TO STARTING ENGS; THE OIL QUANTITY ON THE L ENG DROPPED TO 16 QUARTS. WE STOPPED THE PUSH AND CALLED MAINT WHO TOLD US TO START THE ENG; SHUT IT DOWN AND CHK QUANTITY. WE TOLD HIM OF THE HISTORY WHICH HE THEN CHKED. HE TOLD US TO GO AHEAD AND TRY THE START. WE DID SO AND THE L ENG OIL QUANTITY IMMEDIATELY DROPPED TO 11 QUARTS; SLOWLY CAME UP TO 13 QUARTS AND REMAINED THERE. MAINT ARRANGED FOR LCL CONTRACT MAINT TO COME AND SVC THE ENG. THEY ADDED 5 QUARTS OF OIL. WE DID THE MATH AND CONCLUDED THAT THIS MUST EXCEED THE LIMIT OF .6 QUARTS PER HR. UPON FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH MAINT THEY ADMITTED IT WAS OVER LIMITS; ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY CALCULATED A BURN OF 1.3 QUARTS PER HR. THEY SENT US A MAINT RELEASE WHICH SAID OK TO CONTINUE; OIL SVCED; NO LEAKS FOUND; FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING REQUIRED. AWARE THAT CONTINUING WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS EXCEEDANCE OF A LIMIT ON THE ACFT; I REQUESTED MORE INFO; SPECIFICALLY A COPY OF THE MAINT BULLETIN WHICH ALLOWED US TO CONTINUE. THIS TECHNIQUE USUALLY WORKS VERY WELL; ALLOWING ME TO VERIFY THAT THE REQUIRED ITEMS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AS WELL AS PROVIDING A VALUABLE HEADS UP TO EVALUATE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD THE SITUATION DETERIORATE IN FLT. MAINT WAS VERY DEFENSIVE AND ASSURED ME THAT THE ACFT WAS RELEASED ON HIS SIGNATURE; THAT MADE THE RELEASE LEGAL; AND TOLD ME THE MAINT MANUAL WAS 50 PAGES LONG; IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT TO FAX; AND HE DIDN'T SEE WHY ME READING IT SHOULD CHANGE ANYTHING -- WE WERE LEGAL. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THAT I HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO KNOW AND UNDERSTAND THE COMPLETE MAINT STATUS OF THE AIRPLANE; AND I WOULD BE AIDED BY READING THE MAINT MANUAL ALLOWED US TO EXCEED THE LIMIT; AS WELL AS PROVIDING A TOOL TO EVALUATE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ENRTE. I ASKED TO PLEASE SEE ONLY THE PAGES OF THE MAINT MANUAL REQUIRED FOR OUR RELEASE. MAINT FAXED THE INFO TO ZZZ1 OPS WHO BROUGHT IT OUT TO THE AIRPLANE. I ALSO SPOKE TO THE MECH WHO HAD PERFORMED THE MAINT; AND BTWN THE 2 INPUTS FELT CONFIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO OIL LEAK LIKELY TO CAUSE AN ENG FIRE; AND THAT WE WERE SAFE TO DEPART TO THE RAGGED; ICING; CAT 1 BORDERING CAT 2 WX IN ZZZ3. OIL PRESSURE ON THE L ENG RAN APPROX 20 PSI BELOW THE R ENG THROUGH THE FLT. OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. MAINT SENT A NOTE ON ACARS DEMANDING MY NAME AND FILE NUMBER; TELLING ME THAT MY REQUEST WAS NOT NORMAL; AND HE WAS TURNING THE MATTER OVER TO HIS SUPVR TO RPT. I CONSIDER THIS A BLATANT EXAMPLE OF PLT PUSHING. WE ARE ALL IN A HURRY; THE AIRPLANE OBVIOUSLY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO ZZZ1. MANY INTL CUSTOMERS WERE INCONVENIENCED. CALLS AND ACARS TO ZZZ3 EVEN INTERVENTION BY THE DISPATCHER AND FOR DUTY MGR WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN GETTING ANY CUSTOMER SVC TO THE AIRPLANE TO HELP THE PAX. OUR MANUAL STATES SAFETY; SVC AND INTEGRITY AS OUR PRIMARY GOALS. LEGALITY IS IMPORTANT; BUT A SECONDARY REQUIREMENT. I DO NOT APPRECIATE THE BITTERNESS AND HARASSMENT OF OTHER DEPTS AS I TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT IS SAFE TO EXCEED A LIMIT BY OVER 100% AND FURTHER DEFINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH I WILL DO SO. WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE BTWN DEPTS; ESPECIALLY MAINT AND FLT OPS THAT JUST BECAUSE SOMETHING CAN BE DEFERRED; THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT IT MUST BE FLOWN FOR THAT LEG WITHOUT FURTHER EVAL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.