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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 764889 |
Time | |
Date | 200712 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : phl.airport |
State Reference | PA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : phl.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff ground : maintenance |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : phl.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
ASRS Report | 764889 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA |
Primary Problem | FAA |
Narrative:
After we were cleared for takeoff and had started down runway 9L; tower cleared a dash 8 for takeoff on runway 8. We were never advised by tower to be cautious of the aircraft departing the adjoining runway. I do not recall whether he was advised that we would be coming up from behind and passing on the right. We fortunately heard the clearance and in just a moment were able to see the aircraft on his takeoff roll. He broke ground just before us. As we rotated he was at about 100 ft and 1/2 mi to our left. As we climbed through his altitude; approximately 200-300 ft; and passed off his right wing he made his assigned turn to the north. We continued to follow the SID while he followed the controller's directions with growing separation. We heard the other aircraft's clearance; and saw him taking off ahead of us and slightly to our left. We continued our takeoff straight out for 3 reasons. One; we had the other aircraft in sight and believed we would be able to maintain visual contact until safely separated. Two; we were at such a low altitude that I judged it safer to continue straight ahead than to attempt a turn at low altitude. Third; if I had tried to abort at the time that I saw how close we were going to be it would have been a high speed abort with the commensurate risk of that condition; and had I made a turn it would have had to be to the right which would have put us over the centerline of runway 9R and we didn't know who may have been over there. The controller cleared the larger and faster aircraft for takeoff first. I would like to make several suggestions. First is to determine if this is an authority/authorized procedure; or possibly a controller error. If it is an authority/authorized procedure my first recommendation would be to rescind the procedure. At the very least we should have been notified of the presence of the other aircraft. Barring either of those options; the other aircraft should have been cleared for takeoff first allowing him to create greater separation distance and giving him a chance to start his turn away from our departure path which would have also increased separation. If a controller error I would have asked that it be explained to him the risks if the dash 8 would have lost the right engine with the potential yawing to the right putting him directly into our path; and the risks involved if I had decided to execute a high speed abort.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR CAPT VOICED CONCERN REGARDING PARALLEL RWY DEP OPS FROM RWY 9L AND RWY 8 AT PHL; REPORTING NO ATC TFC ISSUED.
Narrative: AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND HAD STARTED DOWN RWY 9L; TWR CLRED A DASH 8 FOR TKOF ON RWY 8. WE WERE NEVER ADVISED BY TWR TO BE CAUTIOUS OF THE ACFT DEPARTING THE ADJOINING RWY. I DO NOT RECALL WHETHER HE WAS ADVISED THAT WE WOULD BE COMING UP FROM BEHIND AND PASSING ON THE R. WE FORTUNATELY HEARD THE CLRNC AND IN JUST A MOMENT WERE ABLE TO SEE THE ACFT ON HIS TKOF ROLL. HE BROKE GND JUST BEFORE US. AS WE ROTATED HE WAS AT ABOUT 100 FT AND 1/2 MI TO OUR L. AS WE CLBED THROUGH HIS ALT; APPROX 200-300 FT; AND PASSED OFF HIS R WING HE MADE HIS ASSIGNED TURN TO THE N. WE CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE SID WHILE HE FOLLOWED THE CTLR'S DIRECTIONS WITH GROWING SEPARATION. WE HEARD THE OTHER ACFT'S CLRNC; AND SAW HIM TAKING OFF AHEAD OF US AND SLIGHTLY TO OUR L. WE CONTINUED OUR TKOF STRAIGHT OUT FOR 3 REASONS. ONE; WE HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT AND BELIEVED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT UNTIL SAFELY SEPARATED. TWO; WE WERE AT SUCH A LOW ALT THAT I JUDGED IT SAFER TO CONTINUE STRAIGHT AHEAD THAN TO ATTEMPT A TURN AT LOW ALT. THIRD; IF I HAD TRIED TO ABORT AT THE TIME THAT I SAW HOW CLOSE WE WERE GOING TO BE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A HIGH SPD ABORT WITH THE COMMENSURATE RISK OF THAT CONDITION; AND HAD I MADE A TURN IT WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE TO THE R WHICH WOULD HAVE PUT US OVER THE CTRLINE OF RWY 9R AND WE DIDN'T KNOW WHO MAY HAVE BEEN OVER THERE. THE CTLR CLRED THE LARGER AND FASTER ACFT FOR TKOF FIRST. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS. FIRST IS TO DETERMINE IF THIS IS AN AUTH PROC; OR POSSIBLY A CTLR ERROR. IF IT IS AN AUTH PROC MY FIRST RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE TO RESCIND THE PROC. AT THE VERY LEAST WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHER ACFT. BARRING EITHER OF THOSE OPTIONS; THE OTHER ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF FIRST ALLOWING HIM TO CREATE GREATER SEPARATION DISTANCE AND GIVING HIM A CHANCE TO START HIS TURN AWAY FROM OUR DEP PATH WHICH WOULD HAVE ALSO INCREASED SEPARATION. IF A CTLR ERROR I WOULD HAVE ASKED THAT IT BE EXPLAINED TO HIM THE RISKS IF THE DASH 8 WOULD HAVE LOST THE R ENG WITH THE POTENTIAL YAWING TO THE R PUTTING HIM DIRECTLY INTO OUR PATH; AND THE RISKS INVOLVED IF I HAD DECIDED TO EXECUTE A HIGH SPD ABORT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.