Narrative:

In-flight; we discovered a discrepancy between weight and balance weight; and flight augmentation computer (facility) calculated weight of around 8500 pounds. We attempted to resolve the discrepancy; and formulate a plan of action with dispatch and maintenance; but were unsuccessful. We landed in ZZZ2; possibly overweight; which would mean that we were also overweight on takeoff from ZZZ1. While in cruise at FL370; the first officer was suspicious of the aircraft performance during the last step climb; and then remembered that after takeoff; the trim seemed to be way out. He entered aids in the mcdu; and entered the alpha parameter call-up gwfl. Both facility's indicated calculated weights approximately 8500 pounds heavier than our weight and balance mcdu weight. The fact that both facility's were in agreement; and the airplane felt very sluggish; we concurred that the aircraft was possibly overweight on takeoff; and would also be overweight on landing. Our weight and balance mcdu weight on landing was 133.0 pounds; and facility calculated weight was approximately 141.5 pounds. Again; we did not know for sure that the aircraft was overweight; but suspected that was the case. We sent several ACARS messages to dispatch and maintenance in hopes that they would investigate and coordination with load planning and maintenance to determine the actual weight. Maintenance never did respond; and I don't think dispatch ever understood the situation; despite several lengthy and detailed messages. Dispatch asked at least twice how much overweight we would be on landing. This lack of support and coordination constitutes a communications failure. With the lack of response after requesting operational (dispatch; maintenance; load planning; etc) input to formulate a plan of action; we weighed the options; considered the WX; and the fact that we still did not know for sure if we were overweight or not; and decided the safest course of action would be to land as planned in ZZZ2. To help mitigate any increased risk (just in case we were overweight); we followed the QRH overweight landing procedures. There were several other considerations in play; primarily WX; available alternates; and fuel. Had we not held for bout 40 mins; we would have been another 4000 pounds heavier on landing. While we were holding; after sending several messages to dispatch (asking for a closer alternate than ZZZ3); without response; we finally sent a notice of 10 mins hold fuel remaining (snow plow stuck on the runway); then 5 mins hold fuel remaining until diversion; and only then did we get an ACARS from dispatch saying that there had been a shift change and that he was now working on a closer alternate. With about 2 mins remaining; our alternate was changed; which allowed the needed mins to land in ZZZ2. We generated a load report for maintenance to document the possible overweight landing; made a logbook entry; and when talking to maintenance at the gate; he indicated that he had only 1 previous message concerning the problem. There was zero support during this in-flight incident; and it appears no action had been taken by anyone on the ground.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 WAS SLUGGISH ON TKOF; CLB AND AT CRUISE. FLT CREW CALCULATED THE ACFT TO BE OVERWT BY 8500 LBS. ACFT EXCEEDED BOTH MGTOW AND MAX LANDING WT.

Narrative: INFLT; WE DISCOVERED A DISCREPANCY BTWN WT AND BAL WT; AND FLT AUGMENTATION COMPUTER (FAC) CALCULATED WT OF AROUND 8500 LBS. WE ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE DISCREPANCY; AND FORMULATE A PLAN OF ACTION WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT; BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE LANDED IN ZZZ2; POSSIBLY OVERWT; WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT WE WERE ALSO OVERWT ON TKOF FROM ZZZ1. WHILE IN CRUISE AT FL370; THE FO WAS SUSPICIOUS OF THE ACFT PERFORMANCE DURING THE LAST STEP CLB; AND THEN REMEMBERED THAT AFTER TKOF; THE TRIM SEEMED TO BE WAY OUT. HE ENTERED AIDS IN THE MCDU; AND ENTERED THE ALPHA PARAMETER CALL-UP GWFL. BOTH FAC'S INDICATED CALCULATED WTS APPROX 8500 LBS HEAVIER THAN OUR WT AND BAL MCDU WT. THE FACT THAT BOTH FAC'S WERE IN AGREEMENT; AND THE AIRPLANE FELT VERY SLUGGISH; WE CONCURRED THAT THE ACFT WAS POSSIBLY OVERWT ON TKOF; AND WOULD ALSO BE OVERWT ON LNDG. OUR WT AND BAL MCDU WT ON LNDG WAS 133.0 LBS; AND FAC CALCULATED WT WAS APPROX 141.5 LBS. AGAIN; WE DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE THAT THE ACFT WAS OVERWT; BUT SUSPECTED THAT WAS THE CASE. WE SENT SEVERAL ACARS MESSAGES TO DISPATCH AND MAINT IN HOPES THAT THEY WOULD INVESTIGATE AND COORD WITH LOAD PLANNING AND MAINT TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL WT. MAINT NEVER DID RESPOND; AND I DON'T THINK DISPATCH EVER UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION; DESPITE SEVERAL LENGTHY AND DETAILED MESSAGES. DISPATCH ASKED AT LEAST TWICE HOW MUCH OVERWT WE WOULD BE ON LNDG. THIS LACK OF SUPPORT AND COORD CONSTITUTES A COMS FAILURE. WITH THE LACK OF RESPONSE AFTER REQUESTING OPERATIONAL (DISPATCH; MAINT; LOAD PLANNING; ETC) INPUT TO FORMULATE A PLAN OF ACTION; WE WEIGHED THE OPTIONS; CONSIDERED THE WX; AND THE FACT THAT WE STILL DID NOT KNOW FOR SURE IF WE WERE OVERWT OR NOT; AND DECIDED THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO LAND AS PLANNED IN ZZZ2. TO HELP MITIGATE ANY INCREASED RISK (JUST IN CASE WE WERE OVERWT); WE FOLLOWED THE QRH OVERWT LNDG PROCS. THERE WERE SEVERAL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN PLAY; PRIMARILY WX; AVAILABLE ALTERNATES; AND FUEL. HAD WE NOT HELD FOR BOUT 40 MINS; WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ANOTHER 4000 LBS HEAVIER ON LNDG. WHILE WE WERE HOLDING; AFTER SENDING SEVERAL MESSAGES TO DISPATCH (ASKING FOR A CLOSER ALTERNATE THAN ZZZ3); WITHOUT RESPONSE; WE FINALLY SENT A NOTICE OF 10 MINS HOLD FUEL REMAINING (SNOW PLOW STUCK ON THE RWY); THEN 5 MINS HOLD FUEL REMAINING UNTIL DIVERSION; AND ONLY THEN DID WE GET AN ACARS FROM DISPATCH SAYING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT CHANGE AND THAT HE WAS NOW WORKING ON A CLOSER ALTERNATE. WITH ABOUT 2 MINS REMAINING; OUR ALTERNATE WAS CHANGED; WHICH ALLOWED THE NEEDED MINS TO LAND IN ZZZ2. WE GENERATED A LOAD RPT FOR MAINT TO DOCUMENT THE POSSIBLE OVERWT LNDG; MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY; AND WHEN TALKING TO MAINT AT THE GATE; HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD ONLY 1 PREVIOUS MESSAGE CONCERNING THE PROB. THERE WAS ZERO SUPPORT DURING THIS INFLT INCIDENT; AND IT APPEARS NO ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY ANYONE ON THE GND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.