Narrative:

I was asked to inspect a slide replacement at door 1L on aircraft X. After replacement of door 1L slide; I proceeded with the inspection per the requirement of the rii list. The slide check was normal. I observed technician a making inputs for slide replacement into the maintenance data entry system. I asked technician a to flag the rii box for inspection. He flagged the rii box and part number record field and accomplished the required inputs for the maintenance data transaction. No error messages were observed. I completed the maintenance data transaction for the inspection item and signed off the computer; 'suggested resolution' to have stores issue recoverable tag directly to mechanic for verification of new part. The current process allowed the part issue without this being checked. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated there was a series of events that contributed to the installation and sign-off of a cabin slide at door 1-LEFT. Earlier that day; a different B767-300 required a slide replacement at door 2-RIGHT. The slide used for that aircraft at door 2-RIGHT was in the stores staging area; but was originally scheduled for their aircraft at door 1-LEFT. The 'old' slide removed from the earlier B767-300 aircraft at door 2-RIGHT; ended up in the same stores staging area for new parts. Reporter also stated mechanics assumed the slide in that stores staging area was in fact; the 'new' slide assembly. Problem was; both mechanics; when inputting the slide number into their maintenance data system; believed the other had checked the slide tag for a serviceable part. They had not. Reporter added that he; as the inspector; also missed verifying the parts tag for the slide installation at door 1-LEFT.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRCRAFT INSPECTOR DESCRIBES THE INSTALLATION OF A CABIN SLIDE AT DOOR 1-LEFT ON A B767-300. THE 'NEW' INSTALLED SLIDE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN REMOVED EARLIER FROM ANOTHER B767-300 FOR TIME.

Narrative: I WAS ASKED TO INSPECT A SLIDE REPLACEMENT AT DOOR 1L ON ACFT X. AFTER REPLACEMENT OF DOOR 1L SLIDE; I PROCEEDED WITH THE INSPECTION PER THE REQUIREMENT OF THE RII LIST. THE SLIDE CHK WAS NORMAL. I OBSERVED TECHNICIAN A MAKING INPUTS FOR SLIDE REPLACEMENT INTO THE MAINT DATA ENTRY SYS. I ASKED TECHNICIAN A TO FLAG THE RII BOX FOR INSPECTION. HE FLAGGED THE RII BOX AND PART NUMBER RECORD FIELD AND ACCOMPLISHED THE REQUIRED INPUTS FOR THE MAINT DATA TRANSACTION. NO ERROR MESSAGES WERE OBSERVED. I COMPLETED THE MAINT DATA TRANSACTION FOR THE INSPECTION ITEM AND SIGNED OFF THE COMPUTER; 'SUGGESTED RESOLUTION' TO HAVE STORES ISSUE RECOVERABLE TAG DIRECTLY TO MECH FOR VERIFICATION OF NEW PART. THE CURRENT PROCESS ALLOWED THE PART ISSUE WITHOUT THIS BEING CHKED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THERE WAS A SERIES OF EVENTS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INSTALLATION AND SIGN-OFF OF A CABIN SLIDE AT DOOR 1-LEFT. EARLIER THAT DAY; A DIFFERENT B767-300 REQUIRED A SLIDE REPLACEMENT AT DOOR 2-RIGHT. THE SLIDE USED FOR THAT ACFT AT DOOR 2-RIGHT WAS IN THE STORES STAGING AREA; BUT WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR THEIR ACFT AT DOOR 1-LEFT. THE 'OLD' SLIDE REMOVED FROM THE EARLIER B767-300 ACFT AT DOOR 2-RIGHT; ENDED UP IN THE SAME STORES STAGING AREA FOR NEW PARTS. REPORTER ALSO STATED MECHANICS ASSUMED THE SLIDE IN THAT STORES STAGING AREA WAS IN FACT; THE 'NEW' SLIDE ASSEMBLY. PROBLEM WAS; BOTH MECHANICS; WHEN INPUTTING THE SLIDE NUMBER INTO THEIR MAINT DATA SYSTEM; BELIEVED THE OTHER HAD CHECKED THE SLIDE TAG FOR A SERVICEABLE PART. THEY HAD NOT. REPORTER ADDED THAT HE; AS THE INSPECTOR; ALSO MISSED VERIFYING THE PARTS TAG FOR THE SLIDE INSTALLATION AT DOOR 1-LEFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.